GORUSINGH Vs. DEOKISHAN
LAWS(RAJ)-1962-4-1
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on April 19,1962

GORUSINGH Appellant
VERSUS
DEOKISHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

JAGAT NARAYAN, J. - (1.) THIS is an auction-purchaser's revision application against an order of the executing court refusing to accept a bid made by him at a court sale held on 6th August, 1959, which was accepted by the Sale Amin. The order was confirmed on appeal by the learned District Judge.
(2.) THE judgment-debtors owned 1/6 share in a house which was sold on 24. 4. 1959 for Rs. 231/- in favour of one Udairaj. This sale was set aside on 25. 5. 1959 and the property was ordered to be resold on 4th, 5th and 6th August, 1959. On 4th and 5th August, 1959, no one offered any bid. On 6th August, 1959 Gorusingh applicant offered a bid of Rs. 53/-which was accepted by the Sale Amin. Gorusingh deposited 1/4 of the purchase money forthwith and presented a tender on 8. 8. 1959 before the executing court for the balance. On the same day, the decree-holder filed an application praying that the bid should not be accepted as it was grossly inadequate and on account of collusion between the judgment-debtor and Gorusingh, no one had offered any higher bid. THE executing court heard the decree-holder, the auction purchaser and the judgment-debtor on 8. 8. 1959 and reserved orders on the application of the decree-holder. On 11. 8. 1959 he asked the parties to file affidavits in support of their respective allegations. After these affidavits had been filed, he passed an order on 22. 8. 1959 refusing to accept Gorusingh's bid of Rs. 53/ -. On behalf of the applicant it is contended that in its order dated 25. 5. 1959, the court had authorised the Sale Amin to knock the sale in favour of the highest bidder and no discretion was left with it to refuse to accept the same. Reference was made to Order 21 Rule 84 (1) which runs: - "on every sale of immovable property the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay immediately after such declaration a deposit of twenty-five per cent of the amount of his pur chase-money to the officer or other person conducting the sale, and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be re-sold. " It is argued that the contract of sale between the auction-purchaser and the courts agent, namely the Sale Amin, became final on 6. 8. 1959. I am unable to accept this contention. The effect of rule 84 (1) is that the purchaser is bound to deposit one-fourth purchase money immediately after the declaration of sale by the Sale Amin. If he fails to make a deposit in accordance with this sub-rule, the property is to be resold and any deficiency of price which may happen on such resale and all expenses attending the resale are recoverable from the defaulting purchaser under rule 71. This is by virtue of the statutory provisions contained in these two rules and not under the law relating to contracts. The court sale is further subject to condition No. 3 contained in the sale proclamation (Form No. 29 Appendix E) which runs as follows.- "the highest bidder shall be declared to be the purchaser of any lot, provided always that he is legally qualified to bid and provided that it shall be in the discretion of the Court or officer holding the sale to decline acceptance of the highest bid when the price offered appears so clearly inadequate as to make it advisable to do so. " The proper interpretation of this condition is that both the Sale Amin and the court have discretion to refuse to accept the highest bid on the ground that it is clearly inadequate. See Uda Vs. Balu Lal and others (1 ). To hold otherwise will lead to malpractices on the part of Sale amins and will defeat the scheme underlying the provisions relating to a court sale which do not provide for setting it aside on the simple ground of inadequacy of consideration. This discretion is naturally to be exercised by the Sale Amin first. If he thinks that the bid is not clearly inadequate he declares the sale and upon such declaration rules 84 (1) and 71 become applicable. The person making the highest bid remains bound by the provisions contained in these rules till the court exercises its discretion. If the court chooses to refuse to accept the highest bid on the ground that it is clearly inadequate, the person making it is relieved of the liability to which he became subject under rule 71 when the Sale amin declared the sale in his favour. If on the other hand, the court also accepts the bid expressly or impliedly, the sale is to be confirmed after 30 days unless it is set aside under rules 89, 90 or 91. In other words, the sale binds the purchaser if the Sale amin declares it in his favour, but the court is not bound by it till it has exercised its discretion under condition No. 3 expressly or impliedly. I would like to make it clear that the court can decline to accept the highest bid only on the ground that the price offered is clearly inadequate. It cannot refuse to accept the highest bid on the ground that since the sale was declared by the Sale Amin, a higher bid has been made before him. In the present case the highest bid of Rs. 53/- was clearly inadequate. At the previous auction a bid of Rs. 231/- had been made. The sale amin should not have declared the sale in favour of the applicant in view of condition No. 3 of the sale proclamation. His failure to exercise his discretion did not debar the executing court from exercising its discretion and as the bid was clearly inadequate, the executing court very properly declined to accept it. Another contention, which was advanced on behalf of the applicant, is that the court, having signed the voucher on 11. 8. 1958, exercised its discretion impliedly in favour of accepting the sale. This contention is also unacceptable. The court had before it for consideration application of the decree-holder dated 8. 8. 1959 on which it had specifically reserved orders. The decision might have been delayed and the time for depositing the 3/4th of the purchase price under rule 85 might have expired. It was, therefore, necessary to get the balance deposited by the auction-purchaser within the time provided under that rule. The signing of the voucher by the executing court in these circumstances did not imply that it was accepting the bid of Gorusingh applicant. I accordingly find that there is no force in this revision application and dismiss it. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs. . ;


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