JAGAT NARAYAN, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's revision application against an appellate decree of Civil Judge, Sirohi, decreeing a suit for the recovery of money against him. The suit was dismissed by the trial court as being time barred.
(2.) ACCORDING to the facts as found by both the courts below, the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 300/- from the plaintiff on 23rd February, 1954 and executed a Khata Ex. 1 agreeing to pay interest at -/8/-annas pet cent per month. The interest due up to 22nd February, 1955 was paid by the defendant and an entry about this payment was written in the Khata and was signed by the defendant. Again on 1st March, 1956 the interest which had fallen due by that date was paid by the defendant and another entry was endorsed on the Khata about this payment as well which was signed by the defendant. On 19th February, 1957 a sum of Rs. 18/- had fallen due. An entry about it was made in Khata Ex. 1 and it was signed by the defendant on 19th February, 1957. The sole question which arises for determination in the present case is whether from this entry acknowledging expressly that a sum of Rs. 18/- had fallen due by way of interest on the loan, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the Khata dated 23rd February, 1954 can be inferred so as to extend limitation under sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. If it does not, then the present suit, which was instituted on 11th August, 1959 would be barred by limitation. The trial court was of the opinion that an acknowledgment which does not expressly acknowledge an existing liability cannot extend limitation within the meaning of sec. 19 Limitation Act, and dismissed the suit as being time barred. The appellate court was, however, of the view that extrinsic circumstances could be looked at in order to interpret the words of the acknowledgment and when so interpreted it was quite clear that by signing the entry relating to the interest which had fallen due on the loan advanced under Khata Ex. 1 on 23rd February, 1954, the defendant consciously acknowledged the liability under that khata as an existing liability on 19th February, 1957 and that such an acknowledgment extended limitation under sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. On behalf of the applicant it is contended that the view taken by the trial court was correct and that taken by the appellate court was erroneous. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ishri Prasad Kishun Tiwari Vs. Chandrabhan Prasad Kishun Tiwari (1) in which it was held as follows: - "the question whether any particular endorsement amounts to an acknowledgment or not within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Act must depend on the actual words used. The endorsement itself must contain the acknowledgment; and pleadings or any extrinsic circumstances cannot be looked at in order to explain the en dorsement and to ascertain whether the debtor can be held to have acknowledged anything more than the endorsement itself purported to acknowledge. " In that case on the back of a promissory note the following endorsement was written and signed by the defendant: - "dastkhatt Chandrabhan Prasad Kishun Tiwari babat pronote haza ke mahajan ko mublig 25 rupiya diya. Tarikh 2nd May 1931, baqalam khas. " The learned Judges observed that the endorsement on the promissory note in suit could not mean that Rs. 25/- were being paid in respect to or relating to the promissory note in suit. With all respect, it was expressly mentioned in the endorsement that the sum of Rs. 25/- was being paid towards the pronote. Further, even if the promissory note had not been referred to specifically in the endorsement about the payment, the very fact that the endorsement was made on the back of the promissory note would go to show that the payment was being made towards it. For, if the payment had been made towards some other loan, a reference to it would have been made in the endorsement. Apart from the inference of facts drawn in the above decision, the view of the law taken in the above case was overruled by a subsequent Full Bench decision of the same Court in Munshi Lal Vs. Hira Lal (2) wherein it was held: - "a document said to constitute an acknowledgment has to be construed in the context in which it is given and where its language is not clear in itself, the "context may be examined to see what it is to which the words refer. " In Maniram Seth Vs. Seth Rupchand (3) there was a statement of what was held to amount to an admission of a debt at a time antecedent to the date of the statement, that is to say, the statement relied upon referred to the debt as having existed at a previous date. It was held under the circumstances of the case that, as the statement did not, as it would, naturally if it had been a fact, do, go on to say that the position had altered since, it must be taken that the natural presumption was that the debt still continued down to the date of the statement, and that was held under those circumstances to be enough. One has to look at all the facts at the time of the statement which is claimed to be an admission and they say whether the proper inference to draw is that it was the intention to make an admission of the then existence of the debt. In Shapoor Freedom Mazda Vs. Durga Prosad Chamaria (4) it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court : - "the statement on which a plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgment must, however indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission, and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is fairly clear, then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it. "in construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgment rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. "stated generally, courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred, or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or farfetched process. " Applying the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, it is quite clear from the fact that the entry about the interest being due was made on Khata Ex. 1 itself, which contains all entries connected with the transaction of loan which took place on 23rd February, 1954, that the entry relates to the loan, that the defendant signed it with the intention of admitting the relationship between the parties as being that of debtor and creditor and further with the intention of admitting his liability under the Khata of 23rd February, 1954. For, otherwise there was no need for him to sign an entry showing that a sum of Rs. 18/- had fallen due as interest on the loan of Rs. 300/- advanced on 23rd February, 1954 at 6 per cent per annum interest. If the loan had been repaid and only interest remained due, the defendant would have expressly stated in the entry about it. For that would have been the natural conduct of a man who had repaid the principal under Khata Ex. I. Similar reasoning was adopted in Maniram's case (3 ). I accordingly hold that the decision of the court below is correct and dismiss the revision application with costs. .;