MODI, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant tenant's second appeal in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment.
(2.) LEARNED counsel has raised two points in this appeal. The first is, that even though it is accepted that his client had failed to pay rent for a period of seven months on end as held by the courts below, she was not a defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to S. 13 (4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The second point is that the defendant was unable to pay rent to the plaintiff because during the period of seven months in question, there is evidence to show that she had left her usual place of residence, and, therefore, rent could not be paid to her. I am of opinion that there is no substance in any of these two points. I shall briefly deal with them in the order in which I have set them out above. As for the first point, the contention of learned counsel is that in order that a tenant can be properly held to be a defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to S. 13 (4) of the Act of 1950, the defaults must be separated from each other by payment of rent in between on the part of the tenant, such defaults ofcourse occurring within a period of eighteen months, and it is only in a case like that that it could be legitimately said that the tenant has defaulted in payment of rent on three occasions but not otherwise. The argument is indeed ingenious but I am entirely unable to accept it. The simple reason, to my mind, is that if the interpretation put by learned counsel on the proviso were to be accepted as correct, then the position would be that a tenant who has never paid rent on a single occasion during the prescribed period of eighteen months will have to be put on a preferential footing as against a tenant who has paid rent during that period even though irregularly so as to have been guilty of non-payment of rent on three separate occasions. Such a position, to my mind, would reduce things to a state of absurdity and I do not think for a moment that that could have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting this proviso. I may also point out in this connection that it is perfectly clear from clause (a) of sub S. (1) of S. 13 that a tenant who fails to pay or tender the rent due from him for any two months at the time due for such payment, strictly speaking, disentitles himself to the protection afforded to him in the matter of ejectment. In other words, he must be held to have defaulted in the payment of rent on one occasion. Where, therefore, a tenant has failed to pay or tender rent for seven months on end, I have no hesitation in holding that thereby he becomes guilty of non-payment of rent on three occasions of two months each within the meaning of the proviso to S. 13 (4 ). In other words, in such a case he must be held to have defaulted in payment of rent on three occasions. And the consequence is that thereby he "completely disentitles himself to the benefit of any protection under the Rent Control Act. That is the obvious meaning and effect of the proviso to Sec. 13 (4 ). I hold accordingly. This contention of learned counsel therefore is without any force and I hereby over-rule it. In the second place, learned counsel contended that the defendant was unable to pay rent for the period in question because, for a part thereof, the plaintiff had left her usual place of residence, and, therefore, it was not possible to pay or tender rent to her personally. This contention is also without any substance. Sub-section (3) of S. 13 clearly provides what a tenant must do in a contingency of that kind, and the course enacted is that the tenant must have remitted the amount to the landlord by a postal money-order at his ordinary address. It is not the case of the learned counsel that his client ever did that. This point therefore, also fails. The result is that there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs. . ;