- (1.) THIS is an appeal preferred by the parent jagirdar against the order of the Additional Jagir Commissioner, Jaipur, dated 28. 5. 62 ordering the payment of maintenance allowance of Rs. 200/- per month provisionally to his mother, respondent Smt. Pritam Kanwarji leaving it to be determined finally thereafter at the time of the final award. The contention of the appellant is that such an order could not have been passed by the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner without letting him have an opportunity of being heard and that the order was even otherwise defective and unjustified. The cross-objections have been filed against this very appeal contending that the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner should have fixed a maintenance allowance of Rs. 279/-per mensem, which she had been getting, instead of Rs. 200/- only as he had done. A brief reference to the facts shall be useful here. The jagir has been resumed about 4 to 5 years back. The claim has not yet been finalised, perhaps not even determined provisionally. As for the grant of the maintenance allowance under dispute, the matter was under enquiry. The evidence of the respondent had been concluded. The case had been adjourned for the recording of the evidence of the appellant. On the date the case was so adjourned, it appears after the adjournment, the respondent filed an application that she should be granted a maintenance allowance as an ad interim measure. It is on this application that the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner has, without hearing the parties in any manner whatsoever, passed the order which is impugned before us. The office note obtained by the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner before passing his order does go to show that the appellant had been getting Rs. 279/- per mensem when the jagir was resumed and that she had not been granted, although about 4 years had elapsed since, any month by way of maintenance allowance. It also showed the appellant too had drawn by way of interim compensation a much less amount than what he could have drawn, thereby perhaps giving a hint that there were available funds to be paid to the respondent out of the interim amount of compensation so payable. The order does not contain the section under which it was purported to have been passed. Nor does it say that it has been allowed as an interim measure. It employs the expression "provisional" leaving the matter to be determined finally in due course. It is in this context that the whole matter has to be examined and determined.
(2.) NOW, Sec. 36 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 provides for the grant of interim compensation to a jagirdar if his claim is not finalised within six months of the resumption of his jagir. The Government is authorised to impose conditions on such payments. They may include the condition of obtaining a security or indemnity bond. Under these very circumstances, Sec. 36a authorises the grant of a maintenance allowance on an application made in that behalf by way of interim measure. Sec. 36 provides that the interim instalment of compensation paid to the jagirdar shall include the amount of maintenance allowance besides the share of the co-sharer also. It means when the interim instalment is to be paid, the amount of maintenance, if payable, to that extent is to be deducted therefrom unless it is shown that the jagirdar himself will pay such amount of maintenance to the person claiming it. An interim maintenance allowance can, therefore, be paid if the claim remains undecided for a period of more than six months. Rule 40 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Rules, 1954, lays down the conditions subject to which interim compensation under Sec. 36 of the Act may be paid. Sub-rule (3) thereof makes it obligatory upon the jagirdar to pay to persons entitled to receive a maintenance allowance from time to time such sums as may be fixed on a temporary basis or specified. Sub-rule (6) also authorises the Jagir Commissioner to pay in the case of a widow or a minor or any other person entitled to receive a maintenance allowance to pay the whole or part of such allowance "on a provisional basis" after taking into consideration the minimum requirements of the widow or minor or of such other person even before the payment of interim or final compensation to the jagirdar. He has only to get a bond executed by such payee promising to indemnify the amount paid if this is not found payable on the determination of the compensation. The amount so paid to be adjusted towards the amount finally determined. The above discussion leads to establish that a maintenance allowance can be paid ad interim or on a provisional basis in the same manner as a compensation can be paid ad interim. There cannot, therefore, be called to have been committed any impropriety or illegality by the Additional Jagir Commissioner in ordering the payment of interim maintenance allowance, as has been conceded to, and so rightly, by the learned counsel for the appellant as well. It is being, however, very seriously contested by him that the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner could have passed this order only after granting a hearing to him or subject to the hearing of the objections raised by him against it. Anyhow, it is being contended, the order should have contained the reasons prompting it. The argument is that as the impugned order does not contain any reference to the considerations prescribed by sec. 36 A and R. 40 referred to above, it cannot betaken to have been passed correctly, validly and legally, even though it might have been within the competence of the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner to pass such an order. The point for determination that emerges thus is whether it was necessary for the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner to grant any hearing to the appellant before passing the impugned order or to let him have an opportunity of being heard against this order or to mention the circumstances and considerations that weighed with him in giving the order being impugned. A study of the whole Act will go to show that the scheme thereof is that the enquiry to be made by the learned Jagir Commissioner and for that matter any other officer acting in his behalf, for taking any decision under this Act upto the stage the award is made provisionally is only such as be deemed fit or necessary by him. The discretion has thus been left with the officer required to make a provisional determination; and no particular mode of enquiry has been prescribed. The logic also is clear. Against every award made provisionally the jagirdar, the maintenance-holder, the co-sharer arid every other claimant as well as the State Government is required by law to be given an opportunity to lodge an objection; and such an objection is required to be heard and determined vide sec. 32 (2) of the Act. It is mandatory that a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter should be given to all these persons before making any final order in the matter. It is when this opportunity is given that every person can raise objection, when the other party can be asked to reply to it in writing, and the points on which the parties be found at issue maybe fixed and determined finally after letting them have an opportunity of producing their evidence. Vide R. 45 of the Rules referred to above, the enquiry at this stage is to be conducted in contested cases in the manner provided by law for the trial of a suit in a revenue court and in other cases in the manner provided by law for the trial of an application by a revenue court. At no o:her stage has it been made necessary to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this manner. It was not, therefore, necessary to hear the parties at every stage. As for incorporating in the order the considerations that might have weighed with the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner in passing the order, it is very doubtful if a simple absence thereof can make such an order unlawful or incapable of being maintained. The mention and discussion of such considerations in the order is necessary to help the appellate court judge the propriety and legality thereof. But a mere absence thereof cannot make such an order unlawful. The simple reason is that the order is passed on a "provisional" basis, which could always be challenged by way of filing objection against it before the officer passing it himself. While deciding such an objection all matters deserving of mention could be discussed and incorporated in the order, When the person feeling aggrieved with such an order has got an opportunity to question it before the officer passing it himself, there could not be always a necessity of incorporating all the reasons and considerations prompting it in the order. Such an order could be passed on "provisional" basis in exercise of powers under R. 40 (6) referred to above. Against what has been laid down above, only one objection can be raised, viz. , as to why the order under sec. 36-A of the Act has been made appealable under sec. 39 thereof then ? This provision will certainly be necessary to meet the situation when the order incorporates all the considerations that might have weighed with the officer passing that order. In that case, it would be no use preferring objections before the same officer. The appeal will certainly be a more profitable remedy in that case. And the appellate court will need all considerations stated. Now, about the main point for determination whether the impugned order should be upheld or should be set aside only in order to enable the appellant have his say and have an opportunity of being heard against it by the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner, as is being contended by the learned counsel appearing for him as a last resort. The learned counsel has himself conceded, although it is a concession only in law which may not bind his client, that the Jagir Commissioner and an officer acting in his behalf under the Act can pass at any stage an order for payment of a maintenance allowance by way of interim instalment and or on a provisional basis under the circumstances stated in the law referred to above. He does not, however, concede that it can be so done without hearing or at least without affording an opportunity of being heard even after passing that order. He has not, however, been able to meet the position discussed above that when it is open for a party feeling aggrieved by such an order to raise objection before the officer passing the order himself and know the reasons impelling him to pass that order as well as have decided his objections against the same, why should an interference be made by way of an appeal. In this particular case the order has been passed for payment on a provisional basis of a sum much less than what was being paid to the respondent as the mother of the jagirdar subject to re-examination and re-determination finally when objections are made against it. This has been done, we should not forget, after the laps of about five years of the resumption of the jagir and about four years of the presentation of her application for the grant of such maintenance. We do not, therefore, find any justification for interfering with this order at this stage, specially when the appellant can himself go and file objections against this order to the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner himself. The appellant shall be free to file such objections as he may deem necessary against this order before the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner who shall have to determine them in accordance with law after giving full hearing and opportunity of producing evidence to all the parties concerned. It may also be mentioned here that the whole matter of the grant of maintenance to the respondent is under enquiry and as stated above the evidence of the respondent having been completed the appellant has to produce evidence in rebuttal thereof. If he is able to rebutt the case made out by the respondent, this order also which is after all an interim and a provisional one will be set aside. It need not be stressed here that the payment contemplated by the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner through the order being impugned is to be made subject to the condition that the respondent furnished a security to indemnify the appellant if her claim is found to be baseless. In the result this appeal is hereby dismissed. .;