MODI, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant tenant's second appeal in a suit for arrears of rent and eviction against a judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge Kishangarh dated the 17th November, 1961.
(2.) THE facts in so far as they are material for the purposes of this appeal may shortly be stated as follows. It is admitted that the defendant was a tenant of the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff Mst. Mohani Bai and became her tenant by operation of law with respect to the suit premises after these had been purchased by her. THE plaintiff's case was that the defendant was a monthly tenant at the rate of Rs. 4/8/- per mensem and that the latter had defaulted in the payment of rent from the 26th November, 1959, to the 25th May, 1960, with the result that a sum of Rs| 27/- was due from him on that account. Her case further was that as the tenancy commented on the 1st of an English month, she had given a notice to the defendant on the 2nd April, 1960, which had been served on him on the 7th April, 1960, and there by the defendant was asked to quit on the 30th April, 1960 or on any other date when the defendant thought his tenancy terminated. As the notice was of no avail, the plaintiff instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, in the court of the Munsiff Ajmer City for recovery of the arrears of rent as well as for eviction. Eviction was broght on three grounds : (1) that the defendant had defaulted in the payment of rent; (2.) that the plaintiff reasonably and bonafide required that suit premises for the use of herself and her family dependent on the plaintiff's husband and (3) that the defendant had caused image to the property. It may be stated at once that the plaintiff gave up the two grounds it default and damage and consequently the only question which is in controversy between the parties is whether she has succeeded in proving that the property was required by her reasonably and bonafide for the use of herself or her family as alleged by her. THE defendant resisted the plaintiff's suit on all the grounds, and his case on the ground which now survives was that the plaintiff did not reasonably and bonafide require the suit premises for the use of herself or her family as alleged in the plaint THE trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for eviction. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Additional Civil Judge Kishengarh allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for ejectment. Aggrieved by this decision, the defendant has now come up in second appeal to this Court. Now the case of the plaintiff on the question of her bonafide and reasonable necessity for the occupation of the suit house was that the same was required for being occupied by the widow' and children of one Lalchand and his mother in law, this Lalchand being a cousin of the plaintiff's husband Lilaram, and that the members of the family of Lalchand were dependent on Lilaram. When Lilaram came into the witness-box, he deposed that Lalchand's widow was his 'bhojai' (brothers wife) and that he had left behind four children and that none of them was an earning member and he (Lilaram) was maintaining them. He further stated that Lalchand's widow was living with her children in rented house. The evidence of two other witnesses of the plaintiff Kewalram and Lachhi-ram is also to the effect that Lalchand's family was being maintained by Lilaram. It further clearly appears from the evidence of Kewalram that Lalchand was not a real brother of Lilaram but was his uncle's son. Unfortunately the evidence on this aspect of the case is so meagre that it is not possible to say with any definiteness whether Lilaram and Lalchand were cousins in the first degree or were more distantly related. I shall, however, assume for the purposes of the appeal that the deceased Lalchand was a first cousin of the plaintiff's husband Lilaram, as that seems to have been the footing on which the learned Additional Civil Judge seems to halve proceeded. The precise question which arises in these circumstances is whether it can be postulated in this case that the suit premises are required for the use of the plaintiff's family within the meaning of sub-clause (i) of clause (ii) of sub-sec. (i) of Sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XVII of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act ). What is the meaning of the word 'family' as used in this context ? Unfortunately,the Act contains no definition of this expression, and therefore, it does not give us any guidance in interpreting this word. Again, the word 'family' is a very elastic one, and it is some times used in a narrow sense which simply means the two parents and all their children, and at other times it is used in a very comprehensive sense so as to include within its meaning a body of persons descended from a common ancestor as well as those united together owing to a tie of marriage or even affection and living under one root and forming, as it were, a single household. Be that as it may, there seems to be a consensus of judicial opinion that as used in the context with which we are concerned, the term "family" should be given a broad and a liberal meaning. Even so, with utmost respect, it seems to me that it is not possible to reconcile all the cases which one comes across on this subject. Thus in Jones V. Whitanill (1), the facts were that the defendant, a niece of the deceased tenant's wife, went to live with the tenant of a dwelling house to which the Rent Restrictions Act applied, and nursed him and his wife until their deaths between eighteen months and two years later. At the time of his death, the tenant had become a statutory tenant of the premises. In an action by the landlord for possession, the defendant claimed the protection of the Rent Act on the ground that she was a "member of the tenant's family within the meaning of sec. 12 (1) (g) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. It was held by Sir Raymond Evershed M. R. that the defendant was a "member of the tenant's family" within the meaning of sec. 12 (1) (g), and, therefore, was entitled to the protection of the Rent Acts. The ratio of the decision was that the word "family" was not a technical term but it was used in a popular, loose and flexible sense and that the question whether a particular individual was a member of the family of the tenant or the landlord should be answered according to the ordinary sense of the term. The learned Master of the Roll then observed as follows: - "i am not suggesting necessarily that all nephews and nieces by marriage should be regarded as members of the tenant's family, but be it observed here that the defendant, a niece of Mrs. Bailey, assumed, put of natural love and affection, the duties and offices peculiarly attributable to members of a family, namely, she went to live with her uncle and aunt and cooked after them in their declining years. On those facts I think that, if it were asked in an ordinary conversation: Was the defendant a member of Mr. Bailey's family ? an affirmative answer would be given. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the defendant should be regarded as within the protection of sec. 12 (l) (g) and that this appeal should be allowed. " In a subsequent case reported as Langdon V. Horton (2), it was held by the same Master of the Rolls that a first cousin residing with a tenant for a number of years could not be accepted as a member of the tenant's family. The facts in this case were that the tenant lived with her husband in the house till he died in or about 1920. There were no children of the marriage and after her husband's death, the tenant invited the defendants, two of her first cousins, to live with her. They lived in the house until the tenant died some time in 1950. The plaintiff then brought an action to recover possession of the house from the defendants wherein they contended that they were tenants as being members of her family, and it was held that they were not. I have no desire to multiply examples. I shall content myself at this place by generally referring to a number of decisions of the High Courts in our country which established the proposition that the word 'family' should be interpreted in a liberal and generous sense. See Institute of Radio Technology Vs. Pandurang (3), Ram Pershad Vs. Mukandlal (4), Balabhadra Vs. Premchand (5), Manakchand Vs. Tara Devi (6) and Bidhubhusan Vs. Commissioner, Patan Division (7 ). While it may be accepted, therefore, particularly having regard to the social habits and conditions and the modes of living in our own country that the intention of the Legislature would be best served by putting an extensive meaning on the word 'family' as used in our Rent Control Act, it would still be a question as to how far it would properly be permissible to extend the meaning of this word and where one may have to stop. For, if the intention of the Legislature was that the expression was to include all blood relations or other relations, then there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from saying so. Therefore, the word 'family', if I may say so with all respect, cannot be used to include all such relations without any qualification whatsoever, and some sort of a limitation will have to be put on it to prevent an utterly promiscuous use being made of it. As I look at the matter, broadly speaking, the word 'family' would include a person's wife or husband and their children; or his or her parents living with them as members of a common household; his or her brothers and sisters constituting a joint Hindu family; a widowed daughter or her children, a widowed sister or her children, a deceased brother's wife or her children, all these being dependent on and living with him or her. But again, broadly speaking, it will be hardly permissible to include other relations as falling within this phrase except perhaps under very very exceptional circumstances which for obvious reasons it is impossible to mention exhaustively. In its ultimate analysis, therefore, whether a person is a member of the family of another is a question which must be decided having regard to the surrounding circumstances of a case. Bearing these general principles in mind, can it, therefore, be said that the deceased Lalchand's widow and her children and his mother-in-law are members of the family of Mst. Mohani Bai who is the plaintiff? There is material in this connection on the record that these persons have been living separately from Mst. Mohani Bai in another rented house, and there is no evidence whatsoever that they ever lived together under the same roof or management. Mst. Mohani Bai's husband Lilaram his undoubtedly come into the witness-box and deposed that Lalchand's widow and her children and her mother are being maintained by him and that they have no independent means of livelihood. That may be so. But can it be said on that account that they are dependent for their maintenance on Mst. Mohani Bai to whom the suit house belongs and whether she is under any obligation to maintain them. After ail is said and done, Lalchand's widow is only her husband's cousin's wife and I cannot possibly accept that she owed any obligation to the former to maintain her or her children or the other members of her family. In these circumstances, I find it extremely difficult to hold that Lalchand's widow and her family can be accepted to be the members of the family of Mst. Mohani Bai, the plaintiff, if we are to give a reasonably sensible meaning to this term. This conclusion is not, in my opinion, in any appreciable manner affected by the circumstance that Lilaram, husband of Mst. Mohani Bai has been maintaining the widow of Lalchand and her family. For it seems to me that apart from the factor of maintenance, there must be yet a certain positive tie of close relationship between two persons concerned before it can be said that the one is a member of the family of the other. That tie I am unable to discover in the present case with all the sympathy which I may have for the respondent, and, therefore, the only conclusion to which I feel persuaded to come is that the finding of the learned Additional Civil Judge on this point was wrong and cannot be upheld, so that the sort of requirement which was sought to be established by the plaintiff in the present case is not sufficient to hold that it was a requirement of her own family. In the result, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge and dismiss the plaintiff's suit for eviction. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout, Leave to appeal is refused. . ;