- (1.) THIS is a revision preferred against the order of Sub-Divisional Officer, Nohar, dated 25.4.61. The brief facts of the case leading to this revision are that a suit was instituted by the applicants in Tehsil, Nohar on 9.12.43 in which, inter-alia, a prayer was also made for the ejectment of the opposite party from the suit land. It dragged on for a number of years, and on 27.9.49 it was consigned "temporarily" to record under the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, The applicants preferred an application to the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Nohar (probably because of change of jurisdiction since) on 11.1.61 making a request that the case which had been consigned "temporarily" under the terms of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance be restored to its original number because of the Ordinance having been repealed since. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer asked the learned counsel for the applicants to produce law in support of their application. Finally, after a few adjournments, he passed the impugned order on 25.4.61 to the effect that there was no provision in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 for restoring to its original number a case consigned to records under the terms of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, 1948 which has been repealed by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 and, therefore, directed the dismissal of the application with the observation that the applicants could bring a fresh suit for the ejectment of the opposite party if they so liked. It is against this order that this revision has been preferred.
(2.) IT has been contended on behalf of the applicants that the learned Sub-Divisional Officer had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him inasmuch as he had rejected the application for the restoration of the suit consigned "temporarily" in terms of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) only because the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter reference to as the Act) repealing the Ordinance d:d not contain a provision for the restoration of the suits so consigned "temporarily". The contention is that there was no need of their being any such provision in the Act; and that it would be the provisions of the Ordinance alone which shall govern the consignment to records or otherwise of the proceedings or suits pending at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. In reply, it is being contended on behalf of the opposite party that on account of having been consigned to records, the suit of the applicants should be deemed to have been rejected and decided finally and, therefore, it cannot be restored to its original number even after the repealing of the Ordinance. Now, sec. 4(1) of the Ordinance laid down that so long as that Ordinance was in force no tenant was liable to ejectment or dis-possession from the whole or a part of his holding on any ground whatsoever except as provided by sub-sec. (2) thereof with which we are not concerned here. Sec. 5 of the Ordinance provided that all suits, appeals, revisions, references, applications and proceedings for the ejectment of tenants pending on the date of the commencement of the Ordinance shall be "temporarily consigned to records except as provided in the proviso thereto which is again not material for purposes of this case. These two sections read together would go to show that a dis-possession and ejectment of a tenant could not be ordered or decreed so long as the Ordinance was in force ; and it was for this reason that the suits etc., relating to such ejectments and dis-possession were required to be consigned to the records, but only "temporarily". This indicated that the consignment to records could not be a final disposal of the suits and other proceedings, but only a stay of the proceedings therein "temporarily". We are fortified in the above view by the following provisions of law as well: - The bar against the dis-possession or ejectment of the tenant operated in terms of the Ordinance itself only so long as the Ordinance was in force and not thereafter. - (See sec. 4(1) of the Ordinance) Section 3(1) of the Act brought about the repeal of this Ordinance along with all amendments and that completely without any reservation whatsoever. This sec. 3 did not lay down any savings against such a repeal either. Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act lays down the effects of the repeals of the statutory enactments by any new Act. It saves, "unless a different intention appears", the effect of the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment; and the penalty forfeitures, punishments incurred in respect of any offence committed against the repealed enactment; and the investigation legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation, liability penalty for-feiture or punishment as aforesaid. It also allows the institution, continuance and enforcement of any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy as well as the imposing of the penalty forfeiture or punishment under the repealed enactment even after its repeal. But a "temporary" consignment to records of a pending suit, or proceeding fall under neither of the above categories. Sec. 206 of the Act is also relevant in this context, specially because the learned Sub Divisional Officer has made an observation that the applicants could bring a fresh suit for ejectment if they felt so advised. This section provides that all suits etc. relating to matters dealt within the Act and pending before a Revenue Court on the coming into force of this Act shall be deemed to have been commenced under this Act and shall be tried, heard and determined in the manner prescribed by or under this Act. That a suit of the nature preferred by the applicants is covered by the provisions of the Act and that it would be deemed to be pending before a Revenue Court on the coming into force of the Act as soon as it was revived and restored to its original number goes without any contention. There was, therefore, no necessity for the applicants to bring a fresh suit as observed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer. The old suit itself when revived and restored would be dealt with in terms of sec. 206 of the Act in the manner prescribed by or under this Act. By passing the impugned order the learned Sub-Divisional Officer has, therefore, very clearly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and an interference by way of revision is warranted. We, therefore, accept this revision, set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, and direct that the previous suit of the applicants consigned "temporarily" under sec. 5 of the Ordinance shall be revived and restored to its original number and be now tried, heard and determined as laid down by sec. 206 of the Act. ;