BHARGAVA, J. - (1.) THE only question requiring determination in this revision is whether the prosecution in the case was instituted in accordance with the provisions of sec. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act.)
(2.) SEC. 20 of the Act requires that no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority. The written consent, therefore, of the authorities mentioned in this section is a pre-requisite to the institution of a prosecution under the Act. The authorities, which are competent to give consent are: - (a) the State Government, (b) the local authority, (c) a person to whom this power is delegated by the State Government or the local authority. In the present case, the written consent was given by the Chairman, Municipal Board, Kota. It is not the prosecution case that the Chairman had been authorised by the Municipal Board to give consent for the institution of prosecutions under the Act. The contention of the learned counsel is that the Chairman, unless he is authorised in that behalf, had no authority to give consent for the institution of prosecution. According to the learned counsel, it is the person authorised in that behalf by the local authority who could have given consent for prosecuting the accused. In my opinion, the contention is not tenable. Sec. 23 (1) (d) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, which was the law in force at the time this offence was committed, empowers the Chairman to perform such executive functions as may be performed by or on behalf of the municipal board over which he presides. This is, however, subject to the provision of section 34 and of the rules for the time being in force. It is not shown that the powers of the Chairman have been in any way restricted by sec. 34 or the rules framed by the municipal board. Giving of consent for institution of prosecution is an executive function, and the Chairman by virtue of this provision could perform that function on behalf of the municipal board. Sec. 23 (1) (d) is wide though in its scope and does not limit the powers to the executive functions under the Municipal Act alone but covers all executive functions which may be performed by the Municipal Board. In this connection reference may be made to Municipal Board, Brindaban Vs. State (1), where the same view was taken on the provisions of Sec. 50 (e) of the U. P. Municipalities Act which was in the following terms : - "the following powers, duties, and functions of a board may be exercised, and shall be performed or discharged, by the Chairman of the Board and not otherwise, namely. . . . . . . . . (e) all other duties, powers and functions of a board with the exception of - (i) Where there is an executive officer, those vested in an executive officer by sec. 60 (and where there is medical officer of health, those vested in medical officer of health by sec. 60a), (ii) those specified in col. 2 of Sch. I, and (iii) those delegated by the board under sec. 112. " The provisions of sec. 33 (1) (d) of the Act are in substance similar to sec. 50 (e) of the U. P. Municipalities Act though their language is somewhat different. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention referred to Raghunath Mody Vs. Kurseong Municipality (3 ). But that case is distinguishable because under sec, 44 of the Bengal Municipal Act (1884), which enable the Chairman to transact business of the commissioner, the powers were limited to the transaction of business under that Act, which is not the case under the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951. The prosecution of the petitioner, therefore, which was instituted with the written consent of the Chairman, Municipal Board, Kota, is not open to objection and is valid. It is not disputed that Ghee sold by the petitioner was adulterated. The revision application has no force and is hereby dismissed. . ;