Ranawat, C. J. - (1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner Chandra Kant Rao held a Jagir which was resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (No. VI of 1952) hereinafter referred to as the Act, on the 1st of August, 1954, and the compensation, payable to him, was determined by the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 32 of the Act. The State Government claimed an amount of Rs. 67,495/2/- from the petitioner and a certificate for its recovery was issued by the Finance Department under rule 37 C of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Rules, 1954, which shall be referred to as the Rules in this judgment. Before that, a notice was given to the petitioner to pay up the dues or to file his objections, if any, but as the Rajasthan Jagirdar's Debt Reduction Act (No. IX of 1957) had not come into force till then, the petitioner did not raise any objection as he did not want to dispute the liability to pay the amount as such. After the coming into force of Act IX of 1957, the petitioner made a representation on the 28th of March, 1960, to the Jagir Commissioner, claiming the benefit of sec. 8 read with Schedule III of that Act (No. IX of 1957 ). On the 30th of March 1960, the Jagir Commissioner refused to grant any such relief and directed the petitioner to make his representation to the State Government in that connection. That order is Ex. P. 4 and its' perusal shows that the Jagir Commissioner felt that he had no jurisdiction to go into the petitioner's claim, presumably on account of the clear provisions of rule 37 C (4) of the Rules. The petitioner then approached the Government on the 14th of April, 1960, but finding that the Government was not going to do anything in the matter, he has come to this Court by away of this writ petition.
(2.) THE petitioner has prayed that a mandamus may be issued to the Jagir Commissioner or, in the alternative, to the Government, to hear his representation and to decide it on merits before recovering the arrears of the State loans under sec. 22 (i) (e) of the Act. He has also prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari setting aside the decision of the Jagir Commissioner for the deduction of Rs. 67,455/2/- from the compensation payable to the petitioner, without first determining his claim for the reduction of his debt under sec. 8 of Act No. IX of 1957 by entering satisfaction at 5/3 times for every one rupee of the face value of the bond. No reply has been filed on behalf of the State. Mr. Rajnarain has not disputed the facts alleged by the petitioner. The main argument of Mr. Tyagi is that rule 37 C (4) of the Rules leaves no discretion with the Jagir Commissioner to redetermine the amount recoverable from a Jagirdar under sec. 22 (1) (e) of the Act and is invalid being inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act, particularly with sec. 32 (1) (b) thereof. He has also contended that this Court has held in Mukanchand Vs. Rao Raja Inder Singh (l) that the proviso to sec. 2 (e) of Act No. IX of 1957 is discriminatory and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. By that decision, the debts of the Government and the local authorities etc. were placed at par with those adjudged by civil courts in private cases. The learned counsel has therefore urged that the claim of the State against the petitioner should have been scaled down according to the provisions of Act No. IX of 1957. He has further argued that even though sec. 8 of Act No. IX of 1957 has been so worded as to make it expressly applicable to court decrees, it should be interpreted liberally so as to allow the benefit to persons against whom proceedings for recovery of State dues have been taken under R. 37-C of the Rules. For this, the learned counsel has invited attention to the definition of the term "suit to which this Act applies" in sec. 2 (n) of Act No. IX of 1957 and has urged that the meaning of the terms "court" and "decree" in sec. 8 should be so construed as to place the proceedings of recovery of State dues otherwise than by recourse to a civil court at par with those taken in execution of a decree of such court; so that full effect may be given to the principle laid down in Mukanchand's case (l ). The counsel for the State has urged that rule 37-C (4) is not inconsistent with any provision of the parent Act and that the Jagir Commissioner had no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the petitioner under sec. 8 of Act No. IX of 1957. According to him, it is open to the petitioner to file a regular suit if he has any grievance against the State. He has also urged that the' word "court" used in sec. 8, and the definition of "decree to which this Act applies" in sec. 2 of Act No. IX of 1957, have been used in narrow sense and cannot apply to the tribunal of the Jagir Commissioner or to the authority referred to in rule 37 C. He has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. , Vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala (2) to explain the meaning of the term "court". R. 37-C of the Rules relates to the recovery of the loans advanced by the State and referred to in sec. 22 (i) (e) of the Act. It is provided in the rule that a notice shall be issued to the Jagirdar by the Collector or by the Head of the office or the department concerned or by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary etc. calling upon him to pay up the dues and debts within one month, and it is open to the Jagirdar either to admit the claim or to file an objection which has to be determined by the authority issuing the notice. The concerned authority has been given the power to issue a certificate in Form No. 10. Then comes the following provision which is relevant for our purposes : - "37c (4) On receipt of the certificate in Form No. 10 sent under sub-r. (3), the Jagir Commissioner shall effect the deduction of the amount as entered in the certificate from the compensation (including rehabilitation grant) as provided by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 34 and sec. 38c of the Act. He shall also send an intimation of such deduction to the authority issuing the certificate in Form No. 10. That authority shall take necessary steps for adjustment of the recovery so effected, and further recovery of the balance, if any, that might remain outstanding against the Jagirdar. " We may, in this context, also quote the following provisions of sec. 22 (1) of the Act: "22 (1) As from the date of resumption of any jagir lands notwithstanding anything contained in any existing jagir law applicable thereto but save as otherwise provided in this Act : - (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . (e) All arrears of revenue, cesses or other dues in respect of any jagir land due from the Jagirdar for any period prior to the date of resumption including any sum due from him under clause (d) and all loans advanced by the Government or the Court of Wards to the Jagir dar shall continue to be recoverable from such Jagirdar. " Sec. 32 (1) of the Act comes next in sequence and it provides as under: "32 (1) On receipt of a statement of claim under the last preceding section or if no such statement of claim is received within the period specified in that section, upon the expiry of that period the Jagir Commissioner shall, after making such enquiry as he deems necessary, by order in writing, provisionally determine : - (a) the amount of compensation payable to the Jagirdar under sec. 26; (b) the amount recoverable from the Jagirdar under cl. (e) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 22 and the Second Schedule; This provisional determination under sec. (32) is finalised by the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 32 (2) after giving a notice to the Government and all concerned. It is thus apparent that it is for the Jagir Commissioner to determine the amount recoverable from the Jagirdar under sec. 22 (l) (e) and he cannot be debarred by rules from exercising that jurisdiction. A perusal of the Rules shows that after the Collector or the other concerned officer has issued a certificate in Form No. 10, the Jagir Commissioner has no discretion under R. 37-C (4) to examine whether the amount mentioned in the form is recoverable in full or is liable to be reduced or scaled down under any law applicable to the case. Thus it is evident that R. 37-C (4) so far as it purports to take away the jurisdiction conferred on the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 32 (1) (b) of the parent Act is invalid. It is well settled that the rules framed under an Act cannot run counter to the provisions of the parent Act and that if there is a conflict between the rules and a section of the Act, the subordinate provision must give way. • We have therefore no hesitation in holding that in so far as R. 87-C (4) ousts the jurisdiction of the Jagir Commissioner to enquire into and determine the amount recoverable from the Jagirdar under sec. 22 (l) (e), it is void. It is the duty of the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 32 (1) (b) of the Act to determine the amount recoverable from a jagirdar and he cannot be permitted to refuse to discharge it. In the instant case, the petitioner filed his representation before the Jagir Commissioner claiming the benefit of the provisions of the Rajasthan Jagirdars' Debt Reduction Act (No. IX of 1957) but the Jagir Commissioner refused to consider it, obviously for the reason that R. 37-C (4) of the Rules left him with no discretion. As explained above, that rule is inconsistent with the main Act and is not valid in this respect. We would therefore hold that it was the duty of the Jagir Commissioner to hear and determine the objections of the petitioner in order to determine the exact amount recoverable from him under the law. As pointed out earlier, the petitioner could not have raised any objection with reference to the provisions of Act No. IX of 1957 when the notice was first served upon him under r. 37c (1) because that Act had not come into force by then and there is nothing wrong if he made a representation before the Jagir Commissioner in that respect at a later date. The petitioner cannot be deprived of a benefit under Act No. IX of 1957 merely because the said Act came into force later. This Act does not contemplate any such discrimination among Jagirdars. How far the decision of this Court in Mukan Chand's case (l) could help the petitioner, and how far he could succeed in claiming the benefit of sec. 8 of Act No. IX of 1957, are points that cannot be considered by us, for they have to be examined by the Jagir Commissioner under sec. 32 (l) (b) of the Act. We would therefore go no farther than to hold that the petitioner's representation ought to have been considered by the Jagir Commissioner under sec, 32 (l) (b) of the Act. We may point out that the petitioner is not even in a position to file a suit to substantiate his claim as sec. 46 of the Act debars him from doing so inasmuch as his claim for the determination of the amount recoverable from him relates to a matter which is required to be decided by the Jagir Commissioner who is an authority under the Act. Moreover, we find that the Finance Department has also paid no attention to the petitioner's representation and it cannot be said that substantive justice has been done in this case. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Jagir Commissioner determining the amount recoverable from the petitioner under sec. 22 (l) (e) of the Act is set aside and he is directed to entertain the representation of the petitioner and to determine what amount is recoverable from the petitioner under sec. 22 (1) (e) of the Act and how it should be adjusted. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. . ;