- (1.) THIS application in revision is directed against an order of the Additional Commissioner Kota dated 24. 8. 1961. By this order the learned Additional Commissioner reversed the order of the Assistant Collector, Court No 4, Kota dated 1. 3. 61.
(2.) THE facts leading to the revision are that Ram Nath the non-petitioner brought a suit against the petitioner under sec. 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) along with sec. 183 of the Act. Under sec. 188 of the Act a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's right to cultivate Khasra No. 347 was sued for. Along with the suit an application purporting to be for grant of temporary injunction pending decision of the suit under Sec. 212 of the Act was also made. THE trial court after having granted ad-interim injunction as applied for vacated it after hearing the parties. THE non petitioner carried the matter to the Additional Commissioner, Kota, who after reviewing the circumstances and facts of the case came to the conclusion that it was a fit case for the grant of temporary injunction and accordingly reversing order of the trial court ordered that the temporary injunction granted in the first instance would continue. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. THE contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the first appellate court in the first instance should not have interfered with the discretion of the trial court who had decided the matter after hearing the parties. It was next urged that under Sec. 212 of the Act a temporary injunction cannot be granted unless the conditions specified and enumerated therein are shown to be existing by the party who claims a temporary injunction. We would like first to dispose of the second contention. Taking up the question whether or not a temporary injunction can be granted on any other ground than mentioned under Sec. 212 we have been referred to the previous decisions of the Board. They are as follows : - 1. R. R. D. 1956 page 173 2. R. R. D. 1956 page 273 3. R. R. D. 1957 page 68 4. R. R. D. 1957 page 72 5. R. R. D. 1957 page 236 6. R. R. D. 1958 page 5 7. R. R. D. 1958 page 111 The principal enunciated in all of them except one i. e. RR. D. 1957 page 72 is that Sec. 212 of the Act provides for the grant of temporary injunction and no temporary injunction can be granted unless one or more of the circumstances specified in the section are forthcoming. Thus Sec. 212 of the Act has been treated to be exhaustive law enabling a court sitting under the Tenancy Act to grant a temporary injunction in a dispute arising under that Act. However, in Manoharlal Chopra Vs. Seth Heeralal as reported in A I. R. Supreme Court 1962 page 527 it has been held that the legislature cannot be aware of all the circumstances under which a temporary injunction may be granted. The Supreme Court in this case was examining the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 and 2. By a majority decision it was held that temporary injunction can be granted under any of the provisions specified in Rule 1 and 2 of Order 39 and also under the inherent power of the Court under Sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The provisions of Sec. 212 of the Act as a matter of fact are more restricted in effect than the combined provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 and 2. Therefore, according to our mind if Order 39, rule 1 and 2 combinedly do not exhaust the circumstances in which a temporary injunction could be granted we are inclined to feel that Sec. 212 of the Act is much less so. Sec. 212 of the Act to our mind comes into play only when injury to property is alleged. In a suit for permanent injunction an injury or invasion of the right is alleged. Therefore for a party coming to the court seeking relief under Sec. 188 of the Act it would never be possible to make out a case for grant of a temporary injunction. But we feel that the very purpose of Sec. 188 of the Act would be defeased if the court having come to the conclusion that the invaded right should be protected from the commencement of the suit should find itself incompetent to make that order. Thus we are convinced that when an invasion of a right is pleaded and protection is sought against such invasion, although Sec. 212 of the Act may not be applicable it would be a fit case for the grant of a temporary injunction under the inherent power of the Court. Since the learned Additional Commissioner in this case found that it was a fit case for the protection of a person in possession whose very possession was forcibly taken, we feel that he exercised his inherent, jurisdiction correctly and in accordance with judicial principles. For these reasons we find no justification for interfering with the order and dismiss the appeal as having no force. .;