- (1.) IN all these four cases the point for determination is whether the copies submitted along with the memos of appeal therein fulfil the requirements of order 41 R. 1 C. P. C. read with R. 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual Part I.
(2.) IN appeal No. 32 Bhilwara, 1959 and appeal No. 20 Chittorgarh, 1959 the copies attached have been attested to be "true copy" by the Officer on Special Duty, Jagir Rajasthan. IN appeal No. 31, Bhilwara 1959 and appeal N0. 32 Tonk 1959 the copies submitted have been signed by the Officer delivering the judgment himself. All these four cases have been referred to the Full Bench for decision whether or not the copies referred to above fulfil the requirements of order 41, R. 1 C. P. C. read with R. 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual. These references have been made by three learned Division Benches of this Board to all of which one of us was a party. Three reference are from one and the same D. B. and the fourth one from a different D. B. In appeals N0. 31 & 32 Bhilwara 1959, the Government Advocate and Shri Narendra Singh Chordia the learned counsel for the Jagirdar were present and have been heard at length. In the other two appeals only the Government Advocate was present, the learned counsel for the Jagirdar not having cared to put in an appearance despite notice. We have, therefore not had the benefit of hearing the latter's views in these cases, but we have heard the Government Advocate. As stated above, the copies in appeals N0. 31 Bhilwara 1959 and No. 32 Tonk 1959 are signed by the presiding officer of the learned lower court himself as if they were original ones. Obviously, they cannot be said to be the original judgments, the latter being kept on the record of the learned lower court itself. They can at best be called carbon copies prepared during the course of typing the original judgment itself. They should have been as a matter or fact, signed as copies. But it appears that they have been signed by the presiding officer in the same manner as he signed the original judgments kept on record. A 'certified copy' is a copy signed and certified as true copy by the Officer in whose custody the original is entrusted and it is admitted upon the credit of such Officer without comparing with the original. Phipson E. V. VII Edition 519. "see page 515 of the law of Evidence by M. Munir, III Edn. Vide Sec. 63 (2) of the Indian Evidence Act" Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy or the copy and copies compared with such copies "form good secondary evidence. On this basis it may be said that a typed copy signed by the Presiding Officer in the same manner as the original one and prepared through the carbon process is a true copy of the judgment appealed against. An endorsement to the effect that it is certified to be a true copy in so many words may be missing from such a copy but the veracity of such a copy cannot be doubted, if it bears the signatures of the Presiding Officer. It can, therefore be very well treated in the same manner as a "certified true copy" of the impugned judgment. The learned Government Advocate has not questioned this position in law, and to our mind rightly so. Now for the copies presented in the other two appeals which have been attested to be true copies by the Officer on Special Duty Jagir Rajasthan. The learned counsel for the Jagirdar has very vehemently contended that such a copy cannot be called a certified true copy. He has not been able to state specifically the authority on which he advances this argument. All that he does is to rely on Sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act which lays down the procedure for obtaining a copy and also prescribes the endorsement to be made thereon. The argument is that as the copies presented by the appellant in those appeals do no bear any such endorsement nor have they been obtained form the custody of the Presiding Officer himself, they cannot be treated have been issued in a regular manner, and as such they cannot be treated as copies of the impugned judgements. To our specific question, however, as to whether his stand would be that it was only under sec 76 of the Indian Evidence Act that a copy a judgment could be obtained, he did not like to give a specific reply. The obvious reason was that the copies referred to by us in the preceding paragraph (prepared through the carbon process and signed as original are also not copies obtained in the manner and according to the procedure laid down in sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Government Advocate has drawn our attention to A. I. R. 1940 Madras, 308, A. I. R. 1944 Allahabad, 114 A. I. R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 202; and A. I R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 486. On the basis of these authorities he has contended that sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act is not the only provision under which a copy of a judgment to be impugned by way of appeal can be obtained. He has developed the argument that sec. 76 is an 'enabling' section and not a "mandatory" section. We have gone through these rulings. The judgment reported at A. I. R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 485 Mohan Reddy versus Nila Giri Murlidhar Rao does not, however, seek to examine whether sec. 76 is an 'enabling' section or a "mandatory" one. What has been decided therein is that as the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act were not applicable to all the proceedings under the Peoples Representation Act before a Tribunal, there was no reason for insisting the production of a copy having the attributes of a certified copy under sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act in the proceedings in that case. In A. I. R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 200 Somana versus Subha Rao, the principle laid down was that a certified copy of a public document should be presumed to be what it purported to be. This authority also therefore does not go to help us to decide the point in issue before us. In A. I. R. 1940 Madras 308 the import of sec. 76 Indian Evidence Act was examined. It was observed that sec. 76 was only an enabling section as regards the issue of certified copies. It cannot be read as an exhaustive provision, much less as a provision declaring the grant of copies illegal in any particular case. " In A. I. R. 1944 Allahabad 114 the point for examination and decision was whether the particular from of endorsement prescribed in S. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act was necessary to be made in every case. It was held by one of the learned judges that "in the Civil Courts a mere endorsement that it was a true copy signed by an authorised Officer was sufficient. " The other learned judge forming the Bench observed,what the law required was "that certified copies must be certified to be correct" and that the form of the certificate was doubtless of not much importance. What was required, it was further observed, was only that "there must be a certificate purporting to be signed by some responsible official. " It may be observed that these Allahabad and Madras authorities referred to above do not bear directly on trie point in issue. In these cases it was not required to be decided whether a copy with a faulty endorsement or a copy not obtained under sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act could be treated to be a certified true copy, if it bore a certificate that it was true copy, under the signatures of some responsible Officer for the purpose of being attached with a memo of appeal. These cases related only to the admissibility into evidence of the certified copies of certain public documents. In Isharam Vs. State, appeal N0. 70 (Jaipur 1959) decided on 23. 7. 60 by a D. B. of this Board, to which one of us was a party, it was held in respect of a copy (filed with the memo, of appeal) which had not been obtained under Sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, that it did not fulfil the requirements of order 41, rule 1 C. P. C. read with rule 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual.
(3.) THIS point again came for examination before a D. B. of the Board in Appeal No. 3 Bhilwara 1961, State versus Guman Singh decided on 12. 5. 61 to which also one of us was a party. The appeal No. 70 (Jaipur 1959) referred to in the preceding paragraphs was distinguished in this judgment. It was found that the copy submitted in that appeal nowhere bore any certificate that it was a "true copy" but that it was only a copy endorsed to the appellant in accordance with the relevant provisions of the relevant law. In this appeal it was a copy which was attested to be a true copy by the presiding Officer delivering the judgment himself. The provisions of Sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act were examined in this appeal and it was held that sec. 76 was only an enabling section and no:"exhaustive"provision for the obtaining of copies of judgments. It was further observed therein that if the copy presented with a memo, of appeal bore a certificate that it was a true copy of the judgment it served the purpose to ensure the correctness thereof and that the purpose for which it was required to be filed was served. It was held that "what is most important and most necessary for the purpose of assuring the appellate court that it could without any doubt and With certainly take the copy produced before it along with the memo of appeal to be the correct copy of the judgment under appeal is that it should bear a certificate of the officer that it was a true copy and no other endorsements are required to be made thereon. They are endorsements that the officer granting copies should generally make and if they do not care to make them, they can be taken to task for the default. But an appellant cannot certainly be penalised for the absence of such endorsements due to the default of the Officers issuing the copy. If the copy produced does bear a certificate that it is "true copy" the requirement of the law in this behalf should be taken to have been fulfilled and the absence of other endorsements alone should not in any way be taken to take away the value of such copy being a "true copy. " What sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down is only that every public Officer having custody of a public document which any person has right to inspect shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such Officer with his name and his official title and shall also be sealed whenever such officer is authorised by law to make use of a seal, and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies. Any Officer authorised in the ordinary course of official duty to deliver such copies shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section. Examining the copies attached to the memo, of appeals preferred by the Government which have been signed by the Officer on special Duty, Jagir from the point of view discussed above, however we find that these copies cannot be held to have been attested and certified to be a "true copy" by any authorised Officer. Neither could the learned Officer on special duty jagir be called to be an officer having the custody of the record nor could it be taken that an application could have been made to him for obtaining the copies of the judgment. The copies attested by the Officer on Special Duty Jagir to be true copies cannot, therefore, be called to be the certified copies of the judgments required to be produced vide order 41, Rule 1 C. P. C. read with Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual Part. I. To conclude therefore the reference be answered as follow: - (1) The typed carbon copy signed by the presiding Officer himself in the same manner as the original one be treated to be certified true copy. (2) The copy verified to be a true copy by the Officer on special Duty, Jagir, Rajasthan, be not treated to be a certified true copy. for the purposes of Order 41, Rule 1 C. P. C. read with Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual. . ;