Bapna, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision against an order of the learned Munsif of Nawa rejecting an application to amend a decree.
(2.) THE facts of the case are simple and are not disputed. Firm Champalal Suganchand filed a suit against Natthu Beg and his three sons Zahur Beg, Ghafur Beg and Hima-yat Beg in the court of Hakim Sambhar on 1/1/32 for recovery of Rs. 700/ -. On 17/3/33 the parties entered into a compromise, according to which Himayat Beg was absolved. A decree for Rs. 621/- was passed against Zahur Beg and Ghafur Beg, Nathu Beg having died in the meanwhile. THE decretal amount was to be paid by instalments of Rs. 100/- on Phagun Sudi 15 of every year beginning with the Phagun of Svt. 1990, and the last instalment was to be of Rs. 121/- payable on Phagun Sudi 15 Svt. 1995. It was provided that the instalments will be paid on the due dates, but in case of default the decretal amount will carry 18% interest per annum, and will be recoverable en bloc, and certain immovable property of the judgment-debtors was hypothecated for the satisfaction of the decretal amount. THE court, after verification of the compromise, passed a judgment on 15/4/33, the relevant portion whereof is as follows : " During the proceedings a compromise was produced on the earlier date and verified by Zahur Beg, defendant No. 2, and the Mukhtaram of the plaintiff. THE plaintiff has corns today and has withdrawn his suit against defendant No. 4 (Himayat Beg ). THE name of defendant No. 1 (Natthu Begs has been struck off as he has died. Defendant No. 3 Ghafur Beg has also verified the compromise today in pursuance whereof defendants No. 2 and 3 will pay Rs. 621/- to the plaintiff by instalment son the due dates according to the terms of the compromise". THEn follows the operative part of judgment which is as follows :- *** A decree was prepared on the same day and the operative portion was as under: *** The decree-holder filed certain applications for execution, the first being on 10/4/39, and the last one on 23/8/50. In each of these applications the decree-holder claimed interest at 18 percent per annum along with the principal amount decreed. In some of the earlier applications the execution clerk reported that the decreed did not contain any direction as to interest, but in others no other report was made. In the last application, the judgment-debtors preferred objections on 21st November, 1950. The execution was claimed for Rs. 781/- made up as follows : Decretal amount. . . Rs. 621/- Interest as per terms of the compromise. . . Rs. 1400/- Total Rs. 2021/- Less received in previous execution proceeding. . . . Rs. 240/- Balance Rs. 1781/- The objections of the judgment-debtors were that they had paid Rs. 390/- towards the decretal amount and interest was not chargeable as it was of a penal nature, and, in any case, the decree-holder was not entitled to an amount of interest in excess of the amount equal to decretal amount according to the rule of Damdupat. A plea of limitation was also raised. While these objections were being enquired into, the decree-holder filed a petition for amendment of the decree in the court of the Munsif Nawa which was successor court of the Hakim Sambhar on 12/12/50. The judgment-debtors opposed the petition, and the learned Munsif of Nawa dismissed the petition on the ground of laches on the part of the decree-holder. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the judgment was according to the compromise, but the compromise had not been made part of the decree as was intended by the judgment. Even the words "in terms of the compromise" have been left out from the decree, and this must have been due to an accidental slip or omission, as the court did not intend to set aside the terms as to instalments or interest on default or of hypothecation of the property as agreed to between the parties. It was urged that the language of the decree, that the decree was being passed according to the compromise, suggests that the entire compromise had become part of the decree, but the language being ambiguous it was necessary that it should be made clear by a proper amendment. Learned counsel for the opposite party however contended, in the first place, that the application was barred by time having been presented after more than 17 years from the date of the decree and that, in any case, the decree-holder had knowledge that the executing court had in the office report taken objection to the claim of interest, and, there fore there have been laches and delay on the part of the decree-holder which disentitle him to the assistance of this Court, As regards the point of limitation, sec. 152 C. P. C. clearly says that "clerical and arithmetical mistakes in judgments decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip for omission may at any time be corrected by the court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. " The words "at any time" have been interpreted in various authorities, and it has been held that rules of limitation are applicable to acts to be performed by litigants and not to acts which the court may or has to perform suo motu, and that amendment under sec. 152 of the Code falls within the latter class of acts, and there is consequently no limitation for an application for amendment under this sec. The authorities are numerous on the point, and they are all collected in Note 8 to sec. 152 in Chitaley's Code of Civil Procedure, What the petitioners want in this case is that the decree should be in accordance with the judgment, and it was. of course, the duty of the court to draw out the decree in accordance with the judgment. In O. 20, r. 6 it is provided that the decree shall agree with the judgment, and rule 7 it is provided that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced, and when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment he shall sign the decree. Therefore it is the duty of the court to see that the decree is in accordance with the judgment, and an application which purpose to draw the attention of the court to this duty and prays for rectification of an accidental slip or omission is one to which the rules of limitation are not applicable The next point for consideration is whether the decree is drawn up did represent correctly the decision of the court arrived at in the judgment. The omission of the words "hasab Sharayate Sullenama" which find a place in the judgment may be used for the purpose of contending that the decree was only for a sum of Rs. 621/- and the other terms of the compromise did not from part of the order of the court. It may be that the clerk who drafted the decree considered that the words 'baruye Sulenama' may be intended to mean that the entire terms of the compromise formed part of the decree, but the omission of the words Hasab Sharayate Sulenama does raise an apprehension that a contention may be raised as aforesaid, and it is therefore necessary that the decree should be amended, so as to dispel any ambiguity in the decree, or to make it in accordance with the judgment. The lower court has taken into consideration the laches of the decree-holder, and learned counsel for the opposite party also relies on that ground for rejection of the decree-holders application. Learned counsel on both sides have relied upon Sanwaley Rai vs. Sant Rai (I ). In that case Ghulam Hassan J. observed that although after the case has been decided and the decree has been satisfied the court becomes functus officio, yet it does not debar the court, in appropriate cases to rectify an error which has crept into its record either by accident or by design. Reliance was placed on the observations of Lord Watson in Hatton vs. Harris (2 ). These observations are "when an error of that kind has been committed, it is always within the competence of the court, if nothing has intervened which would render it inexpedient or inequitable to do so, to correct the record in order to bring in into harmony with the order which the Judge obviously meant to pronounce. In the words of Lord Herschell in the same case at page 558, 'there may possibly be cases in which an application to correct an error of this description would be too late. The rights of third parties may have intervened, based upon the existence of the decree and ignorance of any circumstances which would tend to show that it was erroneous, so as to disentitle parties to the suit or those interested in it to come at so late a period and ask for the correction to be made. Lord Macnaghten at p. 564 dealing with the argument of the Attorney General that 40 years had passed since the decree and after such a lapse of time the decree must stand whether it be right or wrong observed that lapse of time has nothing to do with the question, and the correction of an error arising from an accidental omission may be made at any time. In Raj Raj Bahadur Singh vs. Shat-runjai (3) it was held at page 229 that sec. 152 makes it obligatory on the court to correct mistakes falling within- the purview of that section Even if it be held that a court has discretion to use its powers under sec. 152 that discretion ought not to be exercised capriciously hut judiciously, and unless it is inequitable to do so mistakes in the judgment arising out of accidental slips or omissions should be corrected, and that lapse of time, however considerable, is no bar to the correction of errors under sec. 152. Learned Counsel for the opposite party also relied on Raja Udaji Ram vs. Rajeshwar Trim-bakrao (4) Koka Adinarayann Rao Naidu vs. Koka Kothandaramayya Naidu (5) K. C. Mukerjee vs. Ainaddin (6 ). In the Nagpur case it was held that the application was not under sec. 152 of the Code. In the Madras case it was doubtful whether the decree as framed did not reflect the intention of the Judge correctly. In the Calcutta case there was difference of opinion between Suhrawardy and Graham JJ. and the case was referred to C. C. Ghose J. who agreed with Suhrawardy J. as to the law applicable in a matter of that kind, and the observations of Suhrawardy J. at page 564 are "in all cases where no equitable considerations intervene to induce the court to refuse to exercise its power of amendment which is necessary for the ends of justice, the court should, or to put it in stronger language, must amend the decree. The discretion, if it has any in the matter, should be exercised judicially and should not be refused except where it will be inequitable to do so. I can conceive of cases where it would not be proper to amend the decree and the English authorities which have been followed here lay down an exception where interests of third parties have accrued since the decree, in ignorance of latent defects in it. " In the present case, no rights of third parties have intervened, and nothing has been shown that it would be inequitable to amend the decree so as to make it in accordance with the judgment. As observed above, the decree specifically says that it is "ba rue Sulenama" but the omission of the words "hasab Sharayat Sulenama" may give rise to the contention that the reaming terms of the compromise were not intended to be incorporated. That was neither the intention of the Judge nor of the parties. 13 The revision is therefore allowed, the decree is amended by insertion of the words "hasab Sharayate Sulenama just after the amount of Rs. 621/ -. It is not necessary for this Court to express an opinion whether the term as to interest of a penal nature and unenforceable. The matter before the executing court, and it is for that court to decide that point as also the other question raised before it. . ;