Sharma, J. - (1.) THESE are two revision applications purporting to be filed by Thakurji Shree Radha Ballabhji through Devi Sahai and Surya Narain against the order dated 20th September 1950, of the learned Munsif, Bandikui, in two connected suits, one for ejectment and the other for arrears of rent filed on behalf of Thakurji Shree Radha Ballabhji against Hazarilal.
(2.) IN both the suits, Ram Bilas Chowdhry, opposite party No. 2 in these applications, raised an objection that Devi Sahai and Surya Narain had adverse interest against the idol, and were not the proper persons to represent the deity, in the two suits. It was also alleged that the management of the temple was made by a committee known as Shri Radha Ballabhji Prabandhkarini Committee, of which the opposite Party No. 2 was the secretary. He should, therefore, be allowed to represent the deity as its next friend. The learned Munsif held that Devi Sahai and Surya Narain had interest adverse to the deity, and that the opposite party No. 2 was the Secretary of the Committee, which was managing the temple. He, therefore, removed Devi Sahai and Surya Narain, and ordered that Rambilas Chowdhry be made the next friend. Against this order, these two revision applications have been filed by Devi Sahai and Surya Narain, who will hereinafter be referred to as the applicants. It was argued by Mr. Sharma Ramesh Chandra appearing on behalf of the applicants that Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to suits by idols, and, therefore, the learned Munsif was wrong in removing the applicants from the next friendship of the deity. He also argued that there was no evidence to show that the applicants had interest adverse to the deity or that Ram Bilas was the Secretary of any committee which was managing the temple. On behalf of opposite party No. 2, it was argued that although Order XXXII did not apply in terms to suits by or on behalf of idols, yet by analogy it applied to such suits. It was further argued that the learned Munsif, on the material before him, held that the applicants held interest adverse to the idol, and, therefore, he was perfectly justified in removing them for the protection of the interest of the idol. He further argued that there was also material to show that the committee known as Shri Radha Ballabhji Prabandhkarini Committee was managing the temple, and the opposite party No. 2 was its secretary. He, therefore, exercised a discretion in appointing opposite party No. 2 as the next friend in place of the applicants, and this order cannot be challenged in revision. If the applicants want to establish their rights in the temple, it was open to them to file a suit for the vindication of those rights. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. Of course Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not in terms apply to suits by or on behalf of idols, but idols are considered to be perpetual minors in the eye of law, and as they cannot bring suits themselves, somebody has to bring suits on their behalf. When such suits are brought, it is as much necessary for a court of law to see that the interests of the idol are protected just as in the case of suits by or on behalf of minors. It is its duty to see that their interests are safeguarded. Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the procedure by which the interests of minors can be safeguarded, and on analogy, its salutary principles can be applied by courts of law to suits by or on behalf of idols. In the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick vs. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullick and another (1) (A. I. R. 1925 P. C. 139.), It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that "hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of Law, a 'juristic entity'. It has a judicial status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the Deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir. " In the case of Mahant Nandki, shordas vs. Kola Bai (2) (A. I. R. 1926 Nag. 351.), It was held by the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court that the manager of the properties of the deity was in the position of the next friend of an infant plaintiff and the court should allow him to sue as representative of the deity. Thus, there should be somebody to represent the idol, which is not a living being, and if somebody is allowed to represent the interest of another person, who is not able to take care of his own-self, it is necessary that courts of law should apply by analogy the principles which are applicable to minors, who are living beings. I, therefore, do not think that the learned Munsif went outside his jurisdiction or committed any illegality or material irregularity when he applied by analogy the principles laid down in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure to the present case. As to whether the applicants had interests adverse to the idol, the lower court has held on certain materials before him that the interests of the applicants were adverse to those of the idol. He has, therefore, not considered it safe that the applicants should represent the deity in the two suits. On the affidavit filed by opposite party No. 2 as well as some documentary evidence, the lower court came to the conclusion that the opposite party No. 2 was the secretary of the managing committee of the temple, which was known as Shri Radha Ballabhji Prabandhkarini Committee. In this too, I do not think that he has done anything outside his jurisdiction or committed any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. The applicants, if they have any right in the temple, can file a suit to establish their right. I do not think that the order, which has been made by the learned lower court, should be vacated in revision. Both the applications for revision are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. . ;