BAPNA, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE petitioner Deo Daman was employed as a permanent employee an the then Bikaner State and at the time of integration of the various States was working as Assistant Collector of Rationing. He was later posted as District Supply Officer, Ganganagar. Certain complaints were received against him by the Government and he was suspended on 1st September, 1951 and certain charges were framed against him and enquired into by Mr. Shiamdas Joshi, Deputy Commissioner, Civil Supplies, Bikaner. Mr. Shiamdas Joshi submitted his report to the Government and the petitioner was informed by the Secretary to Government on 2nd May, 1952 that it was proposed to dismiss him from the Rajasthan Service with effect from the date he was suspen-ded and while enclosing a copy of the Rajasthan Public Service Commissioner he was required to show cause why he should not be dismissed. THE petitioner said in reply that he had not been supplied with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer and in its absence he was not at all aware what charges had been held proved against him put he submitted his remarks on each one of the allegations on the basis of evidence recorded at the time of the open enquiry and prayed that his remarks be kindly considered simultaneously with the remarks of the Enquiry Officer. THE petitioner was ultimately dismissed from service by the Government on the 11th of June, 1952. It is alleged that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to defend himself on the charges and in any case was not given a reasonable opportunity, to show cause against his dismissal under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. On behalf of the Government it was pleaded that the procedure relating to departmental enquiries had been fully complied with and full opportunity was given to the petitioner for his defence and that the notice to show cause given to the petitioner was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. A plea was also taken that the proper remedy for the petitioner was to file a civil suit and the petition was not maintainable. Copies of the various documentary relating to the departmental enquiry and the final orders were produced by the Government. Learned Government Advocate relied on the cases of Naubatrai vs. Union of India and another (1) (AIR 1953 Punjab, 137.); D. Parraju vs. General Manager, B. N. Railway and anothers (2) (AIR 1952 Cal. , 610.); Raghunandanprasad vs. Income-tax Commissioner, U. P. , Lucknow and another (3) (AIR 1953 All. , 399.) and Mr. Lilawati Mutatkar vs. State of Madhya Bharat (4) (AIR 1952 M. B. , 1905.) in support of his contention that the petitioner had another remedy by way of a regular suit and therefore this Court should not interfere in exercise of the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the case of Naudatrai several facts were in dispute between the parties as, for example, whether the petitioner was or was not a Gazetted Officer, whether the petitioner was or was present during the course of enquiry, when did the petitioner attain a particular age and the court held that in deling with the petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution it would not turn itself into a Court of original jurisdiction and proceed to inquire into the various issues which arise on the pleading of the parties. In Parraju's case the parties were again in dispute on several questions, as for example, the authority by which the petitioner was appointed, the nature of the enquiry, if any, made in the case, the denial of a right of appeal, the alleged imperfect nature of the enquiry and the alleged arbitrary conduct of certain officers of the administration and it was difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on these matters on mere affidavit. The Court therefore declined to exercise its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution and left the petitioner to his remedy by a civil suit where, it was observed, the parties would have ample opportunity to examine their witnesses and the Court would be better able to judge which version was correct. In the case of Raghunandan Prasad the petitioner was reverted to a substantive post by an order dated the 12th October, 1946. The petitioner challenged the validity of the order by a civil suit and on 4th April, 1951, a decree was passed that the said order was illegal and void, but certain other reliefs were not granted. The plaintiff filed an appeal but in the meanwhile an order was passed by the Central Board of Revenue on 10th March, 1950. directing reversion of Raghunandan Prasad from 16th November, 1949. On a petition having been presented under Art. 226 of the Constitution it was held that the Court was not satisfied that the order of 10th March, 1950, was a fresh order and it appeared to have been issued as a matter of extra precaution to prevent any technical objection being raised on the ground that the order of 12th October, 1946, was passed without an opportunity being given to show cause against the reversion, the competent authority having taken steps in the meanwhile to give a chance to the petitioner to show cause against the order of reversion. It was further observed that the point might probably arise in the first appeal, also and in a civil suit, it any, filed by the petitioner and in the special circumstances of the case declined to interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the case of Mrs. Lilawati it was held that the question whether the applicant had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause as required under Art. 311 (2) was a question of fact or a question of law arising out of interpretation of facts proved, and as the applicant's right to come to the High Court depended on certain facts which had been proved, the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution was inappropriate. Such facts can be proved by the petitioner in a regular suit in a civil court having the jurisdiction. These authorities only show that in case the facts are in dispute and an elaborate enquiry is required for elucidation of the facts the remedy provided by Art. 226 of the Constitution was not available. In the present case, the facts are not at all in dispute. It is common ground between the parties that the petitioner was holding the post of District Supply Officer when on receipt of complaints a departmental enquiry was ordered by the Government by their order dated the 17th September, 1951. A copy of the order is on record. Mr. Shiam Das Joshi after conducting the departmental enquiry on the charges submitted his report to the Government on the 8th February, 1952. There were 20 allegations against the petitioner and Mr. Joshi gave his finding in respect of every one of the allegations. He held some of the allegations proved, some as not proved and some as disproved. A copy of the report of Mr. Joshi was not supplied to the petitioner. The Government forwarded the report to the Public Service Commission for their advice, and the relevant portion of their advice, which is important, is reproduced here: - 4. "we have gone through the report of the Enquiry Officer on each allegation and charge. There is sufficient evidence in several cases to prove that Shri Go-swami issued permits in the name of bogus firms or to firms of doubtful existence. The procedure adopted by Shri Goswami to issue permits on unsigned applications appears to have been adopted by him to prevent easy detection and the plea made by him at the time of the enquiry that honest mistakes might have been made in the names of the firms is too lame to be taken into account. 5. "the written statement submitted by Shri Goswami after the enquiry has not produced any new evidence to lessen his guilt. We, therefore, recommend that Shri Dev Daman Goswami may be removed from service and his name black-listed for any further service under Government. " On receipt of the advice the Government passed an order on 2nd May, 1952, as follows: - ''government have carefully gone through the case relating to the enquiry held against you and on the advice of the Public Service Commission, propose to dismiss you from the date you were suspended. "a copy of the advice of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission is enclosed. "you are required to show cause why you should not be dismissed accordingly. Your reply should reach the undersigned on or before 10th May, 1952 If your reply is not received on the due date, it will be presumed that you have nothing further to plead. " The petitioner gave his reply on the 9th May, 1952, to the effect he had done nothing improper or misused the privilege of the District Supply Officer which might necessitate the Government to go to the extent of dismissing him from the Government service. He added that the facts appeared to have been put up by the Enquiry Officer entirely on the basis of the prosecution points of view. It was therefore requested that before passing final orders the remarks enclosed by the petitioner might kindly be considered. In the opening paragraph of the remarks he said that in the absence of a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer he was not at all aware as to the cases in which permits are alleged to have I been issued to the bogus firms or firms of doubtful existence but that he was submitting his remarks on the basis of evidence recorded at the time of the open enquiry. He gave remarks in reply to all the 20 allegations and at the end stated that the award of punishment if thought inevitable should be commensurate with the negligence, if found, and should not be out of proportion to the extent of dismissing him from the Government service which would ruin his career. On 5th June, 1952, the Government passed an order as follows : - "the Government have considered your reply dated the 9th May, 1952, and found that you have not been able to rebut the charge which now stands proved against you. They have therefore decided that you should be dismissed from the Rajasthan Service with effect from the date you were suspended. "
(3.) THE petitioner thereafter again asked for a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer on the 8th of July, 1952, in order to enable him to file an appeal. To this a reply was sent by the Government that no appeal lav against the order of the Government under the Rajasthan Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1950. THE petitioner filed this petition thereafter on the 13th October, 1952. These five facts are not disputed and they are clear from the documents which have been produced on behalf of the Government. The authorities cited by the learned Dy. Government Advocate are of no assistance as no further enquiry for elucidation of facts is necessary. In our opinion, the petition cannot be thrown out on this ground. On the merits we find that full opportunity was given to the petitioner to make his defence on the charges in the departmental enquiry made by the Enquiry Officer, Mr. Joshi. It was however strenuously argued that the petitioner should have been supplied with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer when asked to show cause against his dismissal so that in showing cause he would have concentrated his attention to those charge only which were found by the Enquiry Officer to have been proved,, against the petitioner. In the absence of that report the petitioner was not in a position to know which of the 20 allegations had been held proved against him and to give any explanation of the circumstances which may have been considered by the Enquiry Officer as pointing to the guilt of the petitioner on those charges. In dealing with this aspect of the case it was held by the majority judgment of the Federal Court in Secretary of State vs. I. M. Lal (1) (AIR 1945 F. C. 47.) that "a person who is to be dismissed or reduced must know that that punishment is proposed as punishment for certain acts or omissions on his part and must be told the grounds on which it is proposed to take such action and must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why such punishment should not be imposed. In all cases where there is an inquiry and as a result thereof some authority definitely proposes dismissal or reduction in rank, the person concerned shall be told in full or adequately summarised form, the results of that inquiry, and the findings of the inquiring officer and be given an opportunity of showing cause with that information why he should not suffer the proposed dismissal or reduction of rank". The view taken by the majority was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in The High Commissioner for India and another vs. I. M. Lall (2) (AIR 1948 P. C. 121.) In the present case, the petitioner was not supplied with a copy of the findings of the inquiring officer and the copy of the advice of the Public Service Commission was not a proper substitute for the same in as much as the latter did not mention specifically which of the charges had been proved. The observation by the Public Service Commission that "there is sufficient evidence in several cases to prove that Shri Goswami issued permits in the name of bogus firms or to firms of doubtful existence" does not definitely indicate which were those cases in which the petitioner was found at fault. It must therefore be held that the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. The order of dismissal of the petitioner passed by the Government of Rajasthan dated the 11th of June, 1952, is therefore set aside and a direction is given to the Government to give that opportunity now before passing the final orders in the matter. This would include the supplying of the copy of the findings of the inquiring officer in continuation of the notice to show cause given by the Secretary to the Government on 2nd May, 1952. We make no order as to costs. . ;