RAMNIWAS Vs. SOBHAGMAL
LAWS(RAJ)-1952-12-7
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on December 22,1952

RAMNIWAS Appellant
VERSUS
SOBHAGMAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Bapna, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the decree-holder in execution proceedings.
(2.) THE facts are not disputed and are as follows: - THE appellant obtained a decree for ejectment and arrears of rent against the respondents on 18th November, 1949, from the court of the Civil Judge, Nimbahera. THE suit in respect of arrears of rent was for a period more than seventeen months. An appeal to the District Judge was unsuccessful, and the second appeal filed by the defendants was withdrawn by them on the 12th January, 1951. THE appellant put his, decree in execution on the 26th November, 1949. But the proceedings were stayed on orders of the appellate court. On the 15th January, 1951, the judgment-debtors made an application to the court of the Civil Judge, Nimbahera, which was the executing court, expressing their willingness to deposit the entire rent due up to that date. THEy also intimated to the court that as the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. XVII) of 1950 had come into force, the judgment-debtors decided to withdraw their appeal in the High Court, and were depositing Rs. 318/2/- due on account of arrears of rent and Rs. 31/13/- on account of the cost of the suit. THE Civil Judge, however, was of opinion that as the proceedings in execution has been stayed, he was unable to take an action or direct the judgment-debtors to deposit the money unless he had received orders from the High Court that the order staying proceedings had been vacated. THEreafter, the decree-holder made an application on the 22nd January, 1951, that the stay order passed by the High Court had been vacated and that the decree may be executed. To this application the judgment-debtors objected, and on 28th March, 1951, the learned Civil Judge was of opinion that the judgment-debtors having failed to deposit the amount of arrears on the first date of the hearing of the suit were not entitled to the relief provided by sec. 26 read with sec. 13 of Act XVII of 1950, and he directed proceedings to be taken for ejectment and for the recovery of the arrears of rent. The judgment-debtors filed an appeal and the learned District Judge of Pratapgarh was of opinion that as the decree had been passed prior to the enforcement of Act XVII of 1950, there was no occasion for the judgment-debtors to pay into court the arrears of rent on the first day of hearing of the suit, and that clause (a) of sec. 13, sub-sec. (1), was not applicable. He was also of opinion that as no other clause could be relied upon by, the decree-holder, he could not be permitted to take out execution in respect of the prayer for ejectment of the judgment-debtors by virtue of sec. 26 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the view taken by the lower court is not correct. So far as the interpretation of sec. 26 is concerned, there is no difficulty as it specifically refers to decrees for ejectment passed prior to the date of the commencement of the Act, and it says that decrees passed prior to the commencement of the Act shall not be executed as long as Act XVII remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. The portion of sec. 13, which is relevant for purposes of this case, is as follows: - " (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant, whether or not the period of the tenancy has terminated, so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied - (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of any arrears of rent due within one month of the service on him of a notice of demand from the landlord : Provided that no eviction shall be ordered under this clause if the tenant pays in Court on the first day of hearing such arrears of rent together with the costs of the suit"; or Learned counsel for the respondent wishes the proviso to read so that the first day of hearing mentioned in this proviso should not be taken to be the first hearing in the suit, but the first hearing of the suit or proceedings in execution after the commencement of the Act. Learned counsel argued that if this were not the meaning, how it would be possible for tenants against whom decrees had already been passed to take advantage of this provision, since, according to him, they could not know in 1947 of what was going to be legislated in 1950. The argument is fallacious. The: law was not enacted for the purposes of granting relief to every tenant. This extraordinary legislation restricted the rights of landlords to eject their tenants only in cases which were covered by the Act. If a decree had been passed against a tenant who had complied with the provisions of this section, namely that he had deposited the arrears of rent due against him together with costs of the suit on the first day of hearing; but if the law, which was then in force did not provide for any relief on that score and the plaintiff obtained a decree on that account, he would get benefit of this legislation at the time of the execution of the decree. If the judgment-debtors have been so neglectful of their liabilities as not to have paid rent on notice of demand and even did not deposit the arrears of rent and the costs of the suit on the first date of hearing of the suit but preferred to contest those proceedings right up to the second court of appeal, they have only to thank themselves if the law, as enacted, did not assist them in continuing their possession. The view taken by the lower court that clause (1) of sec. 13 did not apply as the decree had already been passed before the commencement of the Act is not correct. The fact that the judgment-debtors were willing to deposit the arrears of rent on the 15th January, 1951 does not give them any protection under any of the provisions of this Act. The appeal is, therefore, accepted, the order of the lower court is set aside and the order of the Civil Judge, dated 28th March, 1951, is restored with costs throughout. .;


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