- (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) THE present intra Court appeal was preferred on 23.12.1999, challenging order dated 27.05.1996 passed by the Single Bench in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 816/1981 i.e. with the delay of 1295 days. Counsel for the appellant has filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Paragraph 2 to 6 of the application are reproduced as under: "2. That the appellant had engaged Shri S.N. Pareek Advocate in the aforesaid writ petition which was filed in 1981. The appellant was inconstant touch with her advocate. 3. That the appellant was never informed by his counsel that the writ petition had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 27.5.96. It was only on 18.11.99 that the appellant came to know from his counsel that the writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. His counsel had not informed about the dismissal of the writ petition prior to 18.11.99. 4. That immediately on 18.11.99 itself the appellant filed an application for obtaining the copy of the order of the learned Single Judge which was received by him on 30.11.99. 5. That after receiving the copy of the order of the Single Judge the appellant collected his file and other papers from Shri S.N. Pareek Advocate and contacted another advocate to file a D.B. Special Appeal. 6. That the appeal has been filed by the appellant without any further delay. It will be interest of justice to condone the delay caused in filing the D.B.Special Appeal in the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove. It is submitted that there was no fault or negligence on the part of the appellant and if the delay is not condoned the same will cause irreparable loss to the appellant." From the above averments made in the application, explanation furnished for delay of more than 3 years in filing the appeal is that counsel for the appellant did not inform the appellant about dismissal of writ petition by the Single Bench on 27.05.1996 and the appellant came to know about the same only on 18.11.1999 and thereafter steps were taken and appeal was filed. There is no dispute that the order of Single Bench was passed in presence of counsel for the appellant. The appellant has not given any satisfactory explanation for not filing the appeal at the earliest. He has not mentioned as on which dates he contacted his counsel. The appellant waited for about three years and how he came to know about dismissal of the writ petition has also not been explained satisfactorily. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that order passed by Single Bench is based on order dated 27.05.1996 passed by the Single Bench in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 486/1982, Mod Singh and Others V. State of Rajasthan and Others and the said order has been set aside by the Division Bench and matter was remitted to the Single Bench vide judgment dated 22.02.2007 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 968/1996 and thereafter writ petition was allowed. There is no dispute that so far as D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 968/1996 is concerned, the same was preferred within the period of limitation before the Division Bench. The Hon'ble Apex Court recently in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 479 held that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone, even though relief is granted to other similarly situated person who approached the Court in time. Paragraph 17 of the judgment reads as under: "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 this Court held:(SCC p. 283, para 16) "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction."
(3.) FROM the above discussions, it is clear that the appellant has failed to furnish satisfactory explanation for delay of more than three years in filing the appeal. So far another submission regarding setting aside the order passed in the case of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 486/1982, Mod Singh and Others V. State of Rajasthan and Others(supra) is concerned, there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant in view of the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court in Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, considered its number of judgments and refused to condone the delay of 427 days, even to Government Department. It was also held that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as anticipated benefit for Government Departments. Paragraphs 22 to 24 and 28 to 30 of the judgment read thus: "22. In CWT v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, there was a delay of 264 days in filing the SLP by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay. The explanation for the delay had been set out in the petitioner's own words as under:(SCC p. 604, para 2) "2....(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on 24-6-1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on 9-7-1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on 20-9-1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on 1-10-1993." After incorporating the above explanation, this Court refused to condone the delay by observing thus:(SCC p. 604 para 3) "3. .... Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that the Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. (emphasis supplied) 23. In Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 the question was whether the respondent Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project had shown sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1724 days in filing appeals before the High Court. In para 17, this Court held:(SCC p. 455) "17. .... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and 'do not slumber over their rights'." 24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and the government undertaking, this Court observed as under:(Pundlik Jalam case, SCC pp. 457-58, paras 29-30) "29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the court's discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest." "28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay." In view of above discussion, we are of the view that no sufficient cause is made out, so as to condone the delay of 1295 days in filing the intra Court appeal. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, intra court appeal is also dismissed. ;