- (1.) BOTH these appeals filed under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act ") arise out of the same award dated 28.7.1992 made by the Civil Judge and Addl.Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur District, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the "Reference Court ")in Reference Case No. 18 of 1983, by which the Reference Court had allowed the reference made under section 18 of the said Act against the award dated 29-30/6/1983 passed by the Officer on Special Duty, Urban Development and Housing Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur in case No. 1 of 1982.
(2.) AT the outset, it may be mentioned that the learned counsel Dr. P.C. Jain appearing for the Rajasthan Housing Board in S.B.Civil Misc. Appeal No. 303 of 1996 has submitted that in view of the cognate civil Misc. appeal preferred by the State of Rajasthan, he does not press for the appeal filed by the Housing Board. Accordingly, the Civil Misc.Appeal No.303 of 1996 preferred by Rajasthan Housing Board is dismissed as not pressed for. For the purpose of appreciating the contentions raised by the learned counsels for the parties in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 402 of 1993, few dates and events are required to be narrated, which are as under: 3(i) Notification under section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rajasthan Act, 1953 "), was published in 1982, by which certain lands of village- Jhalana Chod, Sanganer were intended to be acquired for public purpose. Notification under Section 6 for acquiring the said lands including the land of the respondent was followed. The Officer on Special Duty passed the award dated 29-30/6/1983 awarding compensation to the tune of Rs.9,30,206/- to the respondent claimant Shri Raj Singh. The said award passed by the Officer on Special Duty was subsequently amended vide the order dated 31.8.1988. 3(ii) It appears that thereafter the respondent-claimant had filed the writ petition being No. 4464 of 1988 raising the dispute with regard to interest payable under section 34 of the said Act and solatium under section 23(2) of the said Act. This court vide order dated 15.3.1991, partly allowed the said writ petition and directed the Officer on Special Duty to re-determine the amount of interest in the light of the observations made in the order. The Officer on Special Duty therefore again modified the award pursuant to the order passed by the High Court. 3(iii) It appears that thereafter a reference was made under section 18 of the said Act to the Reference Court, which was registered as Reference No. 18 of 1983. The said reference came to be allowed by the Reference Court vide the judgment and award dated 28.7.1992. 3(iv) It further appears that against the said award dated 28.7.1992 appellant-State had preferred the SB Civil Misc. Appeal No. 402 of 1993 before the High Court, without furnishing the certified copy of the decree. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the High Court vide the judgment and order dated 4.10.1993 on the ground of being barred by limitation. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that the State Government had also filed an appeal being S.B.Civil Misc.Appeal No. 631 of 1993 (defect)the judgment and award dated 28.7.1992 passed by the Reference Court in Reference Case No. 18 of 1983 in case of the claimant Raghuveer Singh, and the said appeal being No. 631 of 1993 (defect) was also dismissed by the High Court vide the judgment and order dated 15.12.1995. The State Government being aggrieved by the orders passed in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 402 of 1993 and in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 631 of 1993 (defect) had preferred the Special Leave to appeal before the supreme Court, which were registered as Civil Appeals No. 9783 of 1996 and 9522 of 1996. The Supreme Court vide the common judgment and order dated 8.7.1996, (in the case of State of Rajasthan and others vs Raj Singh and Another, (1996) 5 SCC 516), allowed the said appeals and set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court and also directed the High Court to dispose the appeals on merits according to law. In the said order it was observed: "It would thus be seen that an appeal filed under Section 54 of the Act shall be accompanied by a memorandum of grounds together with the judgment and decree as envisaged under Order 41 Rule 1 CPC unless the copy of the judgment is dispensed with. Thus, filing of a decree along with the appeal filed under Section 54 of the Act is a pre- condition for taking further steps in an appeal filed under Order 41 Rule 1 CPC. It is true that by fiction of law the award of the civil Court made under Section 26(1) shall be deemed to be a decree. The statement of the grounds in the said award shall be a judgment. But there is no inconsistency in the provisions of the Act and Order 41 and the provision of the Act as regards the appeal filed under Section 54. It would thus be clear that a formal decree in terms of Section 2, clause (2) CPC as mandated by Order 41 Rule 1 shall be drawn by the civil Court. When it supplies a memorandum of the award which is a judgment for filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act, a copy of the decree duly certified is required to be supplied and filed with memorandum of grounds of appeal. Admittedly, the civil court had not supplied the decree drawn as required under Order 2 Rule 2. The limitation begins to run from the date of the supply of the certified copies of the judgment and decree. The time taken by the court for their supply from the date of application till the date of supply should be excluded in computation of the period of limitation. Even if application for certified copies of judgment and decree were separately filed, the combined period would be excluded. Therefore, the right to file an appeal arises only from the date when the decree was supplied.It is seen that the High Court had passed a judicial order on January 11, 1995 directing the trial Court to prepare the decree and supply the same within four weeks. Earlier, it was not supplied though the appellant had applied for. Accordingly, the decree was prepared on January 31, 1995 and the same was filed as soon as it was supplied. It would thus be clear that no delay was brooked in filing the appeal since the appeal must be deemed to have been filed after the supply of the decree by the trial Court. The learned single Judge had no power to recall the orders passed by the High Court on October 6, 1993 and January 11, 1995 except in accordance with due procedure. Dismissal of the petition in the impugned order is obviously illegal. The learned single Judge was oblivious to and has not addressed himself to the correct legal position in proper perspective. " 3(v) In view of the said common order passed by the Apex Court, the S.B.Civil Misc. Appeal No. 631 of 1993 (D) was renumbered as S.B.Civil Misc. Appeal No. 994 of 1997 and the same was heard along with Civil Misc. Appeal No. 402 of 1993. The learned Sr. counsel Mr. N.K. Maloo for the respondent-claimant raising a preliminary objection submitted that the appellant had not filed the decree along with the Appeal and hence the appeal itself is not maintainable in view of section 34 of the said Act read with Order XLI Rule 1 of CPC. He also submitted that the State Government being not 'the person interested' could not have filed the appeal. In this regard, Mr. Maloo has relied upon the decision of the Apex court in the case of Union of India vs Sher Singh and others (1993) 1 SCC 608. The court however does not find any substance in the said preliminary objections raised by learned Sr. counsel Mr. Maloo. So far as the objection with regard to the non-filing of decree is concerned, the same has already been set at rest by the Apex Court in the decision dated 8.7.1996 in the case of State of Rajsthan and ors vs Raj Singh and another(supra) arising out of the present proceedings. The Apex Court having remitted the case to the High court with a direction to dispose the appeal on merits according to law, the objection raised by Sr. counsel Mr. Maloo does not survive. So far as the other objection with regard to filing of appeal at the instance of the State is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the State of Rajasthan along with the Rajasthan Housing Board was the party before the Reference Court, and therefore the appeal at the instance of the State would be maintainable under section 54 of the said Act, challenging the award made by the Reference Court, enhancing the compensation to be paid to the respondent-claimant. The decision of the Apex court in the case of Union of India vs Sher Singh (supra) relied upon by learned counsel Mr. Maloo has no application to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in the said case, the Apex Court has interpreted the words 'any person interested' contained in section 18 of the said Act. In the said case, during the pendency of the landowners' reference petition under section 18, an application was moved by Union of India for being impleaded in the array of respondents, on the ground that the land was acquired for the purpose of National security guard as desired by the Union of India and therefore the order enhancing the compensation would adversely affect the Union of India. In the facts of the said case, the Apex Court allowed the contention raised by Union of India by holding that "any person interested " includes the person for whose benefit the land is acquired. In the instant case, apart from the fact that the Rajasthan Housing Board for whose benefit the land was acquired had preferred appeal, the State Government which is the acquiring body has also preferred separate appeal, and had also approached the Apex Court when the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground on being barred by limitation. As stated earlier, the Apex Court having remanded the case for deciding the appeal on merits filed by the State Government, and even otherwise the State Government being the acquiring body, the appeal at the instance of the State Government against award of Reference Court enhancing the compensation would be maintainable in the eye of law. The learned Sr. counsel Mr. Maloo had also relied upon the decision of Apex court in the case of Sharda Devi vs State of Bihar and another (2003) 3 SCC 128. However, the said case also has no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the said case the dispute between the Circle Officer, Kuru Anchal (on behalf of the State of Bihar) and Smt. Sharda Devi as to title over the acquired land, was sought to be referred for adjudication to the Civil Court u/s 30 of the said Act and the Apex Court had observed interalia that the State was not "the person interested " as defined under section 3 (b) of the said Act. In none of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel Mr. Maloo, it has been held by the Apex Court that the State Government which is the acquiring body could not file the appeal against the award made by the Reference court enhancing the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimant with regard to the acquisition of the lands made for public purpose. In that view of the matter, it is held that the appeal at the instance of the State of Rajasthan is maintainable. So far as the merits of the appeal are concerned, it was sought to be submitted by learned Addl. Advocate General Shri S.N. Kumawat with Dr. P.C. Jain for the appellants that the Reference Court had enhanced the compensation awarded by the Officer on Special Duty, on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. According to learned counsels for the appellants, the land in question was a Barani land and not irrigated land and the Reference Court had wrongly compared the market value of the land in question with the market value of lands which were situated far away from the lands in question. Relying upon the provisions contained in Section 23 of the said Act and upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Chandra Shekar (dead) by LRs. and others vs Land Acquisition Officer and another, (2012) 1 SCC 390 and in the case of National Fertilizer Limited vs. Jagga Singh (deceased) through LRs and another, (2012) 1 SCC 74, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Reference Court had overlooked the settled legal position for determining the market value as well as potential value of the land in question and had awarded the compensation on a very higher side. Taking the court to the evidence of the respondent-claimant, the learned counsel submitted that even according to the claimant, the market value of the land was not more than Rs.10,000/- per bigha whereas the Reference Court has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.30,000/- per bigha, without any cogent evidence on record. The learned counsel Mr.Maloo for the respondent-claimant however submitted that neither the State Government nor the Rajasthan Housing Board had adduced any evidence to rebut the sale instances given by the claimant before the Reference Court. According to him, the market value of the irrigated agricultural lands in the nearby area of the acquired lands was about Rs.50,000/- per bigha whereas the compensation has been awarded only at the rate of Rs.30,000/- per bigha which was just compensation. He also stated that the Reference Court has rightly taken into consideration the sale instances and the the awards made by the courts in other cases of the lands acquired from the nearby area of the present lands in question and therefore the award made by the Reference Court does not call for any interference of this court. The learned counsel Mr. Maloo has relied upon the decision of the Apex court in the case of Udho Dass vs State of Haryana and others (2010) 12 SCC 51, to support his submission that the potentiality of the land acquired must be adjudged keeping in view the development in the area after a long time and should not be limited to the near future alone. He also submitted that the land in question acquired by the State Government was situated at a very prime location in the city of Jaipur and it had the potential for the urbanization and commercialization and therefore also it could not be said that the compensation enhanced by the Reference Court was on higher side. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and to the record of the case, it appears that the original award made by the Officer on Special Duty was amended for two-three times, prior to the impugned order passed by the Reference Court. The said proceedings were proceeded separately before the Officer on Special Duty and before the High Court in the writ petition no.4464/88,which pertained to the interest to be paid on the amount of compensation awarded by Officer on Special duty. This court in the instant appeal is called upon to examine as to whether the Reference Court was justified in enhancing the amount of compensation awarded by the Officer on Special Duty or not. In the instant case, it is required to be noted that the respondent claimant had produced the documentary evidence of the sale instances and the awards made in respect of the lands situated about 12 to 18 Km away from the acquired lands and had also examined himself and other witnesses in support of his claim. As against that, neither the appellant-State Government nor the Rajasthan Housing Board, at whose instance the land was acquired, had adduced any evidence to show that the compensation awarded by the Officer on Special Duty did not require any further enhancement.
(3.) IT cannot be gainsaid that while determining the market value of the acquired land, the sale instances of the lands situated at the nearby area and of the nearby period of acquisition are considered to be the relevant and reliable evidence. Of course, the comparative details of the lands acquired and of the lands pertaining to the sale instances would also be a material evidence which the claimant is required to adduce for claiming enhancement in the compensation. From the record, it appears that the respondent-claimant had relied upon the award passed in respect of the land of village Bambala which was 15 Km away from the acquired land and for which the compensation at the rate of Rs.45,000/- per bigha was awarded in the year 1983. The claimant had also relied upon the award in respect of the land situated at village Gajsinghpura which was 12 Km away from the land acquired and in which compensation at the rate of Rs. 49,000/- per bigha was awarded. The respondent-claimant had also relied upon the sale deeds of the lands situated at village Keshavpura, which were about 13 Km away from the lands acquired and also relied upon one agreement to sell of the land of village Gopalpura, in which the land was valued at about Rs.30,000/- per bigha. All these documents adduced by the claimant have been considered and relied upon by the Reference Court while enhancing the compensation at the rate of 30,000/- per bigha. IT is true that the Reference Court has not taken into consideration as to whether the lands in question and the lands for which the said instances and awards were relied upon were comparable or not, so far as the nature, size and location of the lands were concerned. Nonetheless, the Reference Court having taking into consideration the market value and the potential value of the lands in question, awarded the minimum price of sale instance of the land which was at the rate of 30,000/- per bigha, this court does not find any gross illegality or perversity in the impugned order which would require the court to take a different view. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to impress the court as to how and to what extent the amount of compensation enhanced by the Reference Court was illegal or perverse. In that view of the matter, this court is not inclined to interfere with the award made by the Reference Court. Appeal being devoid of merits stands dismissed accordingly.;