- (1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) THE petitioner filed an Original Application No. 103/2007 before Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, with the prayer that respondent be directed to pay the basic pay scale to the applicant as per order passed in Original Application No. 351/1992 and respondent may further be directed to pay the basic pay scale of Rs. 260-350 (950-1500) per month from his date of appointment. THE Tribunal dismissed the Original Application of the petitioner vide order dated 25th May, 2007, on the ground that the petitioner has approached the Tribunal after a delay of six years. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he prayed before the Tribunal for grant of same relief, which was granted to other similarly situated persons, but the Tribunal instead of granting the same relief, dismissed the Original Application on the ground of limitation. Learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. First of all, it is relevant to mention that the order of Tribunal dated 25th May, 2007 dismissing the Original Application of the petitioner has not been challenged in this writ petition. The only prayer made in the writ petition is that the respondents be directed to grant same relief, which was granted in Original Application No. 351/1992 and Original Application No. 165/1996 vide order dated 25th April, 2000. Therefore, for want of prayer, the relief sought cannot be granted as order of Tribunal has not been challenged.
(3.) THAT apart, the Tribunal was absolutely right in dismissing the Original Application of the petitioner on the ground of principle of delay and laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in S.S. Balu and Another Versus State of Kerala and Others reported in 2009(2) Supreme Court Cases 479, held that the delay defeats equity and relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated person who approached the court in time. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed, "it is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, relief prayed for, may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates, who obtained the benefit of the judgment." The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:- "It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government order was issued on 15.01.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtained the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC v. Pan Singh this Court held: 16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction." ;