JUDGEMENT
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(1.) THIS petition has been filed challenging the order dated 26th April, 2012 passed by the Rajasthan Housing Board informing the petitioner Rajasthan Aawasan Board Karamchari Sangh ('petitioner Sangh' for brevity) that consequent to de-registration of its earlier registration (10 of 1973) under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (hereinafter to be referred in short 'the Act of 1926') recognition thereof by the Board was being withdrawn and further noting/recording the that subsequent registration of the petitioner Sangh effective 5th June, 1978 (20/78) had not at any point of time been recognized by the Rajasthan Housing Board (in short RHB).
(2.) MR. R.N. Mathur Senior Counsel with MR. Punit Singhvi appearing for the petitioner Sangh submitted that the impugned order dated 26th April, 2012 is bad inasmuch as the RHB in spite of the petitioner Sangh's registration under the Act of 1926, does not recognize it. It is submitted that for the last about 40 years since the first registration of the Sangh under the Act of 1926 in 1973, the petitioner Sangh has been recognized and consequently, it was and should be entitled to participate in collective bargaining with the RHB. It is further submitted that the impugned order dated 26th April, 2012 takes away the right of the petitioner Sangh to operate as a recognized Union and consequently, the impugned order having been passed without an opportunity of being heard, to the petitioner Sangh (as would be evident from the impugned order itself) is liable to the quashed and set aside on this count also. It has been further submitted that the order dated 26th April, 2012 is mala fide and for the purpose, the Chariman of the RHB was also impleaded as party respondent but has chosen not to file a counter to the writ petition at his own peril.
Per contra, Mr. U.N. Bhandari Senior Counsel with Dr. P.C. Jain appearing for the respondent would submit that the impugned order dated 26th April, 2012 is being misconstrued by the petitioner Sangh. Counsel submitted that the impugned order merely records the factum of the earlier registration of the petitioner Sangh (100/73) having been cancelled by the Registrar of Trade Unions under his order dated 30th March, 1978 and the consequent effect of recognition by the RHB of the said Union itself having lapsed. Counsel submits that there is no doubt that the petitioner Sangh was subsequently registered under the Act of 1926 afresh on 5th June, 1978 (20/78) and the RHB accepts and admits this fact but no more.
Senior Counsel states that law does not provide for formal recognition by an establishment of a Trade Union registered under the Act of 1926. He submits that neither the Act of 1926 nor the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act of 1947' for brevity) provide for such a recognition by the establishment. Counsel has submitted that the order dated 30th March, 1978 passed by the Registrar of Trade Union de-registering the petitioner Sangh qua its earlier registration 100/73 was not put to challenge at any point of time and consequently, the said order has attained finality. As a result the aforesaid de-registration, the recognition qua the said registration for whatever its worth, stood lapsed. It is further submitted that for the purpose of collective bargaining in a situation of multiple registered Trade Unions operating in an establishment, in terms of Section 9D of the Act of 1947, a registered Trade Union has to apply afresh for further registration as a representative Trade Unions to be authorized to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of all workers of an establishment with the management. He submits that Section 9D of the Act of 1947 provides that any union which has for whole of the period of at least three months during the period of six months immediately preceding the calendar month in which it so applies (under the aforesaid section) has a membership of not less than fifteen per cent of the total number of workmen employed in unit of an industry, can apply in the prescribed form to the Registrar for registration as a representative Union. It is submitted that the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 have been framed by the State Government in the exercise of powers under Section 38 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in terms of Section 9D of the Act of 1947 and rule 2(A)(2) of the Rule of 1958 an application for registration of Union as a Representative Union has to be filed in Form 2 as appended to the said Rules of 1958. Counsel submits that it is only after a Trade Union is registered as a Representative Union with reference to Section 9D of the Act of 1947 and the Rules of 1958 does the trade union become a Representative Union for the purpose of collective bargaining on behalf of all workers of the establishment with the management. Counsel submits that in this view of matter, only a Representative Union can be entitled to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of all workers of the establishment with the management and purported recognition of the petitioner Sangh earlier granted, later withheld is of no avail.
Senior Counsel submits that by challenging an innocuous order dated 26th April, 2012 recording a past and a present fact, the petitioner Sangh is seeking to perpetuate one time erroneously granted hollow inconsequential 'recognition' without legal foundation, under the order of this Court. It is submitted that consequently, in the context of obtaining legal position, the order dated 26th April, 2012 does not take away any legal right of the petitioner Sangh and in fact, the petitioner Sangh has no cause of action to approach this Court as neither any of its fundamental or legal right have been infringed or contravened or the RHB acted in violation of an statutory interdict. Counsel submits that if at all the petitioner Sangh is intent upon collective bargaining on behalf of all workers employed with the RHB with the management, it is required to be registered as a Representative Union under Section 9D of the Act of 1947 read with the relevant Rules of 1958.
Senior counsel of RHB has further submitted that in these facts, the allegation of legal injury to the Sangh is a non-sequitor in the present case. It is submitted that no legal right of the petitioner Sangh has been taken away nor in fact was it so argued by the counsel for the petitioner Sangh with reference to any statutory provisions. Counsel submitted that past practice for whatever its worth, on which the petition is purported to be founded and which has been invoked and emphasized by the Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner Sangh, is of little relevance to confer any right to collective bargaining in a situation where a specific statutory provision under Section 9D of the Act of 1947 obtains provides for a mechanism to confer such privilege on a registered Trade Union operating in an establishment. It is submitted that no legal right of the petitioner has been taken away and consequently, no prejudice caused and as such, the argument based on natural justice in vacuous and cannot come to rescue the petitioner Sangh. It is submitted that the impugned order only recognizes a factual position wherefrom no illegality accrues to warrant any interference by this Court.
As far as allegation of mala fide against the Chairman of RHB is concerned, the Senior Counsel for the RHB submits that issue in the present petition is an issue of pure law which the Chairman of the RHB was advised not to address and hence no reply has been filed on his behalf. Counsel submits that the impugned order is only a statement of fact without more and consequently no mala fide against the Chairman of RHB can be made out.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned order dated 26th April, 2012, I am of the view that the petitioner Sangh has no case whatsoever. It is the specific case of RHB that the petitioner Sangh is indeed a registered Trade Union under the Act of 1926 albeit in its new Avatar with reference to the Registration 20/1978 effective 5th June, 1978. The RHB only further refuses to recognize the petitioner Sangh as a representative union in view of it having not availed of the provision for registration as a representative union under Section 9D of the Act of 1947 read with Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958. In my considered opinion, in the facts of the case, the petitioner Sangh had no legal right to operate as a recognized Union for such a term (recognized union) does not find any place under the Act of 1926 and the Act of 1947. Sr. Counsel for the petitioner Sangh could not draw the attention of this Court to any such provision in spite of a specific query. The order dated 26th April, 2012 thus, does not take away any legal right of the petitioner Sangh. Consequently, in fact, the petitioner would have no cause of action to agitate before this court - claim of recognition based on past practice notwithstanding, which cannot sustain in the face of Section 9D of the Act of 1947, which duly provides for registration of representative Unions which alone have been conferred the privilege of collective bargaining. It is trite that past practice cannot constitute law contrary to a specific statutory provision for conferment of a right privilege.
In the instant case, in a regime of multiple Trade Unions registered under the Act of 1926 operating within RHB, for the purposes of obtaining the right for collective bargaining registration under Section 9D read with Rules of 1958 is essential. No such registration has been obtained by the petitioner Sangh. I am of the considered opinion, that in the facts of the case, no rights of the petitioner Sangh have been taken away nor any prejudice caused to it by the impugned order dated 26th April, 2012 recording the fact of the petitioner Sangh not being recognized for no such 'recognition' simpliciter is, provided for in law. The impugned order is an innocuous order recording a redundancy and a fact. The impugned order thus, cannot be set aside. The writ petition has no force and stands dismissed, accordingly.
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