- (1.) BY way of this writ petition, the petitioner, who offered his candidature in response to an advertisement dated 27.02.2012 for the post of Teacher Grade-III Level II (Class VI to VIII), seeks to question the validity of Explanation to Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Rural Development and Panchayati Raj State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1998 ('the Rules of 1998') made under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 wherefor, his candidature has not been considered towards the vacancies reserved for "Outstanding Sportspersons". The petitioner offered his candidature in the recruitment aforesaid in "Backward Class" category; and also claimed his entitlement to be considered in other category as "Outstanding Sportsman" with reference to a certificate said to have been issued by Sanskrit Education Department of the Government of Rajasthan to the effect that he had participated in the State level tournament of Sanskrit Colleges in Kabaddi and was part of the first ranking team. In the result of the written examination taken by the petitioner for the recruitment in question, he was assigned merit number 508. However, his claim for consideration in the vacancies reserved for "Outstanding Sportspersons" category was declined by the respondents on the ground that the documents submitted by him were not certifying him to be an Outstanding Sportsperson at international level. The petitioner made a representation and having failed to get the claimed relief, has filed this writ petition seeking to challenge the validity of the Explanation to Rule 10 the Rules of 1998.
(2.) FOR the questions sought to be raised, appropriate it shall be to take note of the provisions contained in Rule 10 of the Rules of 1998 as under: - "Rule 10. Reservation of vacancies for Outstanding Sportspersons.- Reservation of vacancies for Outstanding Sportspersons shall be 2% of the total vacancies out side the purview of the Commission in that year earmarked for direct recruitment. In the event of non-availability of the eligible and suitable Sportspersons in a particular year, the vacancies so reserved for them shall be filled in accordance with the normal procedure and such vacancies shall not be carried forward to the subsequent year. The reservation for Sportspersons shall be treated as horizontal reservation and it shall be adjusted in the respective category to which the Sportspersons belong. Explanation- "Outstanding Sportspersons" shall mean and include the Sportspersons belonging to the State who have participated individually or in team, in the Sports and Games recognised by the International Olympic Committee and Indian Olympic Association or, in International championships in Badminton, Tennis, Chess and Cricket recognised by their respective National Level Association, Federation or Board; with the following descriptions for each class of the Civil Services:- Class of Service Description Subordinate Service Has represented India in Asian Games, Asian Championships, Common Wealth Games, World Championships, World University Games, World School, SAARC Games or Olympic Games where he (in an individual item) or his team (in a team event) has obtained Ist, IInd or III position. that the very purpose of Rule 10 ibid. stands frustrated by way of the Explanation where the meaning of "Outstanding Sportspersons" has been restricted only to the persons securing 1st, 2nd or 3rd position in international competitions. It is submitted that from the practical standpoint, the benefit of intended reservation cannot be derived because of the Explanation aforesaid; and for this reason, no candidate got selected in this category in the recruitment in question. It is submitted that the object of providing reservation to the sportspersons in the employment is to encourage the sports activities and to uplift the sportspersons but the Rule as framed, particularly the Explanation thereof, run counter to such avowed object. It is also submitted that the Rule is essentially a part of the welfare legislation and the category envisaged therein ought to be given wide meaning because the Legislature never intended that the provision be framed in such a manner that its operation and applicability would be rather impossible. The learned counsel has referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raheja Universal Ltd. Vs. NRC Ltd. & Ors. : (2012) 4 SCC 148 (paragraphs 50 and 64) and in S.K. Gupta and Anr. Vs. K.P. Jain and Anr.: AIR 1979 SC 734 (paragraph 25); and to the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Darbari Lal & Ors. Vs. Smt. Dharam Wati: AIR 1957 Allahabad 541 (paragraph 30). After having given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made and having examined the scheme of the Rules of 1998, we are not impressed with any of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner; and are clearly of the view that this writ petition does not merit admission. A look at the scheme of the Rules of 1998 as a whole makes it clear that Part III thereof provides for the methods of recruitment to the posts of the services, i.e., Rajasthan Rural Development and Panchayati Raj State Services and the Rajasthan Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Subordinate Services. General provisions in relation to the recruitment in Part III, of course, provide for reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (per Rule 7); and for Backward Classes, Special Backward Classes and Economically Backward Classes (per Rule 8). Further, horizontal reservation is provided in relation to the Woman candidates in Rule 9 and for Ex-servicemen in Rule 10-A. In the company of these Rules is the questioned Rule 10 ibid. that provides for horizontal reservation of 2% vacancies for Outstanding Sportspersons (as quoted hereinbefore). It is thus clear that in the scheme of the Rules of 1998, the reservation is otherwise provided for the specific classes and categories of the persons; particularly with reference to the social welfare requirements and objectives for SC/ST and Backward Classes. Horizontal reservation is provided for Woman candidates and so also for Ex-servicemen candidates. In the same scheme of the rules, a special reservation has been carved out which is meant for a very special class of persons, i.e., Outstanding Sportspersons. For the purpose of this special reservation, to be a sportsperson is not sufficient. The reservation is not available to a person merely for being a participant in sports activities or merely for being a sportsperson. The requirement is that he ought to be an outstanding sportsperson. Now, the Legislature, while providing for the meaning of "Outstanding Sportsperson" for the purpose of Rule 10, has inserted the Explanation in the Rule; and the expression has been defined as "meaning and including" such sportspersons who belong to the State and who have participated, individually or in team, in the Sports and Games recognized by International Olympic Committee and Indian Olympic Association or, in the International championships in Badminton, Tennis, Chess and Cricket recognised by their respective National Level Association, Federation or Board. The provision has been made in relation to the subordinate service in the manner that a candidate, to be entitled to claim such reservation under Rule 10, ought to have represented the country in Asian Games or Asian Championships, Common Wealth Games, World Championships, World University Games, World School, SAARC Games Or Olympic Games where he individually, or as a part of the team, had secured 1st, 2nd, or 3rd position. The contention on the part of the petitioner is that the Explanation to Rule 10 ibid. deserves to be declared invalid for it has drastically narrowed down the very meaning of "Outstanding Sportspersons" and has, thereby, defeated the object for which the Rule has been framed, i.e., encouragement of the sports activities and providing job opportunities to the sportspersons. We are unable to uphold the contentions as urged particularly when we do not find any such infirmity wherefor the questioned Rule could be considered offending any of the constitutional provision or any statute. The fundamentals of the law, per Article 16 of the Constitution of India, envisage equality of opportunity in the matters of public employment. Of course, exceptions are provided to the extent of permissible classification and for reservation for specific class of persons; and, as already noticed, the Rules of 1998 have otherwise provided for reservation of vacancies for various classes of persons with reference to the social welfare requirements. So far as the sports activities are concerned, may be that the legislature has thought it fit to make a provision so as to serve both the purposes of providing job opportunities to the outstanding sportspersons and at the same time, to motivate the sportspersons to excel in their respective arena and to bring laurels to the country but, for its very nature, no such intention could be perceived in this Rule as if to create another class of persons for reservation only in the name of sports activities. We need not dilate much on the philosophy behind the Rule in question but this much is clear that only some sportspersons with outstanding achievements are intended to be given the benefit and hence, the reservation itself has been provided only for Outstanding Sportspersons. As to what level of standing or achievement in the arena of sports be treated as 'outstanding' was definitely for the Legislature to provide. Broadly speaking, the explanation to the Rule puts such persons in outstanding category who have obtained some rank in the recognized international competitions. We find nothing of fault or infirmity in such a proposition. We have also examined the submissions as made on behalf of the petitioner as regards the principles to be applied for interpretation of expression "Outstanding" as occurring in Rule 10 ibid.; and find the submissions meritless. It does not appear necessary to dilate on the referred minority opinion as expressed in the Darbari Lal's case in the Full Bench decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court as regards connotations of the expression "means" and "includes" in any statutory provision. It appears, however, apposite to take note of the referred paragraph in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.K.Gupta's case as follows:- "25. The noticeable feature of this definition is that it is inclusive definition and where in a definition clause the word 'include' is used, it is so done in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include (see Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps (1899) AC 99 at p. 105)). Where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires. But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. At any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provisions of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect (see Jobbins v. Middlesex County Council (1949) 1 KB 142). Where the definition of an expression in a definition clause is preceded by the words 'unless the context otherwise requires', normally the definition given in the section should be applied and given effect to but this normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied (see Khanna, J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp. SCC 1 at p. 97 : (AIR 1975 SC 2299). It would thus appear that ordinarily one has to adhere to the definition and if it is an expansive definition the same should be adhered to. The frame of any definition more often than not is capable of being made flexible but the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made loose and kept tight as far as possible (see Kalya Singh v. Genda Lal (1976) 1 SCC 304 at p. 309 : (AIR 1975 SC 1634 at pp. 1637, 1638))." (emphasis supplied) The settled principle of interpretation, as referred in Raheja Universal Ltd. (supra) is that every word and expression used by the legislature has to be given its proper and effective meaning as the legislature uses no expression without purpose or meaning. If we look at the normal and basic meaning of the adjective "Outstanding" in the dictionaries, we find that as per Chambers English Dictionary, the assignable meaning of adjective "Outstanding" in the present context is "prominent: excellent, superior". As per Webster's Dictionary, it signifies something "standing out from a group: conspicuous, prominent." As per Oxford Dictionary, it is: "Noteworthy, remarkable; exceptional". Thus, the expression "Outstanding" by itself well qualifies any particular person or thing as being prominent much away, apart and above the ordinary class; and, for any person to stand in the category of "Outstanding" in relation to any field of activity, he is required to be exceptional and should stand superior to the other persons in the same field. It is but obvious that an "Outstanding Sportsperson" has to be something over and above a mere sportsperson; and for that matter, ought to be over and above even a good or very good Sportsperson.
(3.) A look at the Explanation to Rule 10 ibid. makes it clear that the phraseology employed therein is specifically of the nature as to leave nothing to doubt or guess as to what is intended by "Outstanding Sportspersons" where the meaning has been assigned with the phrase "shall mean and include". Thus, even while applying the principles in cited decisions, it cannot be taken that the phrase has been defined in the manner as to enlarge the meaning of phrase "Outstanding Sportspersons" with the employment of the expression "means". It being not a deeming definition or of stating examples, the meaning as given therein brings about more of certainty and specification, leaving no room for doubt or any other interpretation. It is clear that the definition is clear and specific and no other meaning is to be assigned to the words or expressions defined, then as put down in the Explanation itself. We are unable to find any requirement that the Legislature should always provide for a loose or open definition in the expressions as used in the provisions of the present nature. On the contrary, as noticed from S.K.Gupta's case, the requirement is to provide, as far as possible, such meaning that leaves no room for doubt. In the present case, in our opinion, the legislature has taken care to assign the exact meaning to the expression "Outstanding" for the purpose of Rule 10 so as not to leave any room for guess or implication. As observed, as to what was supposed to be included in such expression "Outstanding" was definitely a matter for the legislature to provide and the rule does not become bad merely because any particular sportsperson is not included therein. If the expression "Outstanding" is to be interpreted to a particular level which the petitioner would suggest, like that of any rank in the States or National level tournament, the scope of the rule would be unnecessarily enlarged and that too at conflict with the fundamentals of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. This particular rule is not meant for providing reservation to any person for merely being a sportsperson or for merely having participated in some tournament at some level. The idea has been to provide limited reservation, only to the outstanding sportsperson at international level; and in case of non-availability of such a candidate, to fill up the vacancies by the other regular categories. In the ultimate analysis, we are unable to find as to how the provision in question could be considered offending any of the constitutional provisions. It remains trite that the provisions as contained in any piece of legislation cannot be assumed to be invalid merely for the same being not of benefit to any particular class of persons; and that any piece of legislation could be considered invalid only if found offending the Constitution of India; or in case of delegated legislation, if found offending the parent enactment; or beyond the authority or competence. We are unable to find any such vice or shortcomings in Rule 10 ibid. The writ petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed. ;