CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) BOTH these petitions are being decided by this common judgment, as according to the learned counsel for the petitioners both the petitions are inter-related to each other. Therefore, common arguments have been raised.
(2.) BRIEF facts of the case are that on 24.03.2009, one Prabhu Das sent a complaint to the office of Superintendent of Police, Bikaner, wherein he claimed that the SDO, Khajuwala had announced a scheme for allotment of land situated in the Indira Gandhi Canal Scheme. Prabhu Das, and his brothers, Shanker Das and Bhagwan Singh, were interested in getting certain lands allotted in the canal area. In pursuance of their plan, Prabhu Das wanted an allotment in Chak No.3 RMA, Murabba No. 137/58, Shanker Das wanted the land in Chak No.3 RMA, Murabba No. 137/59, and Bhawan Singh wanted a land in Chak No.3 RMA, Murabba No.137/57. For this purpose, on 03.01.2008 all of them deposited their applications alongwith Rs.500/- each in the office of SDO, Khajuwala. One Mr. Navratan contacted the complainant and his brothers and stated that merely by depositing the applications, they would not be allotted a land. He informed them that they are required "to spend some money". In case, they were willing to spend some money, he would ensure that the land is duly allotted to them. Navratan also informed them that he knows the officers in the SDO office. He further convinced them that if they were willing to give Rupees forty lacs, he could get them the lands as per their desire. He promised them that he would give them the allotment letter. He also promised that he would make sure that the entries in the revenue record were made, and the possession of the land would be given to them. Believing the assurance given by Navratan, on 18.01.2008, they paid Rupees seven lacs to him. Few days later, Navratan met them and told them that the remaining amount has to be deposited with the government by March 2008. Relying on his statement, on 15.03.2008, they paid him the remainder amount of Rupees seven lacs. Navratan promised them that the moment he receives the receipts, he would hand them over to the complainant and his brothers. However, even after a lapse of few months, Navratan did not handover the receipts. Whenever they contacted him, he evaded them. On 19.05.2008, Navratan met them and handed over the copies of allotment letters allegedly signed by Harvindra Kumar Sharma, as the SDO Khajuwala, i.e. by the present petitioner. He further promised that he would give them the original allotment letter as well as the copies of the receipts. Despite his assurances, he never fulfilled his promises. Therefore, in October 2008, the complainant contacted the office of the SDO. The officers at the SDO office claimed that the signatures were, indeed, that of Havindra Kumar Sharma. But they also informed the complainant that the allotment letters were not issued by the office. Meanwhile, Mr. Sharma was transferred out of the office at Khajuwala. Whenever they tried to contact Navratan, he informed them that the needful could not be done as Mr. Sharma has already been transferred and the elections of the Legislative Assembly were to begin. When pressurized, Navratan gave them a promissory note. But despite giving of the promissory note, he never returned the money. Therefore, the complainant went back to the office of the SDO, where he was informed that no such allotment letters had been issued by the SDO office. On the basis of this complaint, a formal FIR, FIR No.40/2009 was chalked out at Police Station, Khajuwala for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 406 IPC. Meanwhile, Prabhu Das also lodged a criminal complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Khajuwala, which was sent for further investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. On the basis of the said complaint, the police registered another FIR, FIR No.7/2010, for offences under Sections 420, 409, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC. According to the complaint, while Mr. Sharma was the SDO, Mr. Dharampal was the LDC in the office of SDO. According to the complainant, he and his brother Shankerdas were interested in getting another piece of land allotted' to them. The complainant was interested in getting a land allotted in Chak No.5, MSM, Murabba No. 198/63 admeasuring 25 bighas, out of which 19 bighas was command, and 6 bighas was uncommand; his brother was interested in getting the land in Chak No.5 MSM, Murabba No. 198/56 admeasuring 20.10 bighas command land, and 4 bighas uncommand land. For this purpose, on 23.01.2008 they had contacted the SDO office ; they had met Dharampal. Dharmpal told them to leave their application in the office and to meet Mr. Sharma. Mr. Sharma informed them that they should leave the application form alongwith Rs.1,25,000/- as it is he who is authorized to allot the land. He further assured them that out of the amount so left with him, 20% of the amount would be deposited by him after the allotment has been made. Subsequently, they could collect the "Patta" from his office. According to the complainant, relying on his assurance, on 25.01.2008 they deposited both the forms alongwith Rs.2,50,000/-with Mr. Sharma . On 23.07.2008, Dharampal gave them a "Patta". The "Patta" showed that an amount of Rs.92,600/- was deposited; it further indicated that through D.D. No.519718 and Challan No.937 dated 11.03.2008 Rs.20% of the amount viz., Rs.92,600 has been deposited. Taking the "Patta" with him, the complainant went to the Tehsil Office. However, an account could not be opened as the relevant papers had not reached from the office of the SDO. Therefore, on 03.07.2009 he went to the office and the account was duly opened. He further claimed that on 08.07.2009 he deposited the next instalment of Rs. 1,11,000/- alongwith an interest of Rs. 15,540/-. However, on that day, he was informed that 20% amount was not deposited by the SDO Office. Therefore, he should go back to the SDO Office and should get the proper correction made. According to him, when he contacted Dharampal, Dharampal told him that there is no need for the receipt and convinced them that the "Patta" was legally valid. Even on 15.09.2009, when they contacted Dharampal, he again told them that the "Patta" was legally valid and they should not bother him in the office. Suspecting that something was amiss, the complainant claimed that he went and sought the original papers of allotment. To his surprise, he learned that according to the original papers, no money had been deposited vide Challan No.937; there was no indication that 20% of the amount had been deposited. Therefore, according to the complainant, the amount that he had left with the petitioner, a criminal breach of trust had been committed and a forged document had been given to him. While challenging the legal validity of both these FIRs, Mr. Manoj Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court: firstly, that both the FIRs are politically motivated. The fact that they are politically motivated is apparent as the petitioner has been transferred five times. Secondly, that in both the FIRs, the complainant is the same, the facts are similar that the complainant was trying to get the land allotted in his favour and in favour of his brothers. In both the FIRs, the petitioner has been named (although in FIR No.40/2009, the main culprit is one Mr. Navaratan) Therefore, both the FIRs are inter-related. Thirdly, both the FIRs have been filed after an inordinate delay. In FIR No.40/2009, Prabhu Das claims that he had given money to Navratan on 18.01.2008 yet the FIR was not" lodged till 24.03.2009. Therefore, the said FIR is belated by one year and two months. Similarly, in FIR No.7/2010, he claims that he had handed over the money to the petitioner on 23.01.2008, yet the FIR was not lodged till 05.01.2010. i.e. after an inordinate delay of almost two years. Hence, the delay clearly proves that the petitioner is being falsely implicated in the case. Fourthly, that the department had filed a criminal complaint against the complainant, Prabhu Das, as he had failed to pay the rest of the instalments. Moreover, in September 2009, he had failed to deposit the amount. Fifthly, although the complainant claims to be a landless labour, but simultaneously he claims that he had paid Rs.14 lacs to Navratan, and Rs.2 lacs to the present petitioner. Yet, the police has not taken any action against the complainant. Lastly, that the ingredients of offences under Section 409, 467, 468, 471 and 406 IPC are conspicuously missing from the FIRs. Therefore, the learned counsel prays that the FIRs should be quashed and set aside. On the other hand, Mr. Anil Upadhyay, the learned Public Prosecutor, has raised the following contentions before this Court: firstly, that the jurisdiction of this Court while dealing with the legal validity of a FIR is extremely limited one. In case the FIR shows the commission of cognizable offence, even on a prima facie basis, this Court should not interfere with the FIR. After all, the arena of investigation is an area reserved exclusively for the police. Therefore, this Court should decline to interfere with the investigation being done by the police. Secondly, merely because the petitioner may have been transferred five times, this fact, ipso facto, would not lead to an irrevocable inference that the FIRs are politically motivated. Thirdly, that in FIR No.40/2009, although the main allegation is against Navratan, but the fact remains that according to the complainant he had been issued photostat copies of certain "Pattas", which contained the signature of the petitioner. Moreover, subsequently, he learnt that no such "Patta" had been issued by the SDO Office. Thus, obviously Navratan had given forged document bearing the signatures of the petitioner. Thus, prima facie, ample evidence does exist for offences under Sections 420, 409, 467, 468 and 406 IPC. Fourthly, even if the FIRs have been filed after some delay, the delay has already been explained by the complainant for he had been waiting for the issuance of the real "Patta", in the first FIR. In the second FIR it was discovered that 20% of the amount, which was supposed to be deposited by the petitioner, was never deposited by him. Moreover, the issue whether the delay is fatal to the prosecution, is an issue which can be decided only by the trial Court during the course of trial. It is is not an issue that can be dealt with by this Court at the initial stage. Fifthly, merely because the police may not have investigated as to how the complainant came about a huge sum of money to pay Navratan and to the petitioner, this fact would not demolish the case of the complainant. Moreover, this fact does not strengthen the case of the petitioner for quashing of the FIR. Lastly, that the complaint lodged by the department on 03.02.2011, infact, had been lodged by the petitioner against the complainant. Therefore, the said complaint seems to be a counter-blast to the FIR lodged by Prabhu Das against the petitioner on 05.01.2010. After all, the petitioner had lodged the complaint after one year and one month of the loding of the FIR on 5.01.2010.
(3.) HEARD the learned counsel and perused both the FIRs. It is, indeed, trite to state that the jurisdiction of this Court in interfering with the validity of an FIR is an extremely limited one. It is also a settled principle that investigation is an area for the police; it is not an area that the courts should ordinarily interfere with. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there are certain illustrative circumstances, enumerated in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajanlal & Ors. (1992 Supp(1) SCC 335), in which the courts would be justified in interfereing with the FIR and in quashing the same. The circumstances are as under: 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. However, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not bring the present cases within any of the seven circumstances enumerated above. The first contention raised is that the FIRs are politically motivated. However, there is neither a thread of evidence, nor an iota of allegation available in both the FIRs, which would lead to such a conclusion. Although the learned counsel has raised a plea during the course of argument that the petitioner was transferred five times, but even this fact would not lead to a logical inference that the FIRs happen to be politically motivated. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that even if a FIR were to be motivated, even then the courts should not quash the FIR. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that both the FIRs are politically motivated. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned counsel is clearly unacceptable. ;