- (1.) THIS appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is directed against the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, dated February 22, 2002. The appellant has framed as many as nine substantial questions of law in para. No. 10 of the memo of appeal. However, learned counsel has pressed only question Nos. (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v). The said questions as reproduced are as under : "(ii) Whether the income of the excess of receipts over expenditure of the appellant-union was not exempt under Section 10(24) of the Income-tax Act, particularly when the appellant-union was duly registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 ? (iii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant-union, a union of truck owners was not a union of workers within the meaning of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (primarily formed with the view to regulate the relations between its members and the employers, namely, the transporters), was not entitled to claim exemption of income as provided under Section 10(24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? (iv) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned authorities below were justified in holding that the Assessing Officer has rightly issued notice under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act particularly when the limitation for issuing notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act had not expired ? (v) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the income of the appellant-union was not exempted on the principles of mutuality in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Chelmsford Club v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 89 and CIT v. Bankipur Club Ltd. [1997] 226 ITR 97?"
(2.) AS regards questions Nos. (ii) and (iii), it is contended by learned counsel that the appellant being a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act is entitled for exemption under Section 10(24) of the Income-tax Act. In order to claim exemption, the following conditions are required to be satisfied : (i) the trade union should be a registered union within the meaning of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 ; (ii) the trade union should have been formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relation between : (a) workmen and employers, or (b) workmen and workmen. It is submitted by Mr. Mehta that the appellant trade union has been primarily formed for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers. This aspect has been dealt with by the Tribunal and it is held that the truck operators can neither be termed as employees nor they can be termed as employers. The bye-laws of the union have been placed on record as annexure 1. The object of the truck operators' union is to raise the social and economic level of the truck operators with co-operative feeling. The objects clause of the bye-laws in Hindi is extracted as follows : Thus, the appellant-union has been formed primarily to protect the interest of the truck owners. Thus, we find no substance in the contention of learned counsel pertaining to questions Nos. (ii) and (iii). As regards question No. (iv), it is submitted by Mr. Mehta that the assessing authority has committed error of jurisdiction in issuing a notice under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act. He placed reliance on the proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act. It is submitted that the order of assessment is a condition precedent for issuing notice under Section 147. It is further submitted by Mr. Mehta that the Assessing Officer can issue notice under Section 147, where he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. The expression "may assess or reassess such income" under Section 147 is of great significance. The Tribunal on a perusal of the entire record found that : "... from the perusal of the facts of the case and the legal provisions, it is evident that even if assessments are completed in summary manner under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act, the Assessing Officer can reopen the assessment under Section 147 of the Act even if the assessee has disclosed all material facts in the returns filed by the assessee." Since Section 147 contemplates not only reassessment but assessment as well, it cannot be said that the assessment is a condition precedent. No substantial question of law arises as framed on this court. Lastly, it is contended by learned counsel that income of the appellant-union could not be taxable on the plea of mutuality. The plea of mutuality can be attracted only where there is complete identity between the contributors and the participants. The bye-laws of the union show that ordinary membership can be given to persons residing outside Sumerpur. In view of this also no substantial question of law arises on question No. (v).
(3.) AT this stage, learned counsel has also pressed questions Nos. (vi) and (vii). The findings being purely findings of fact, no interference is called for. Putting of the parameters laid down by this court for entertaining an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, laid down by this court in Deputy CIT v. Marudhar Hotels (P.) Ltd. [2000] 245 ITR 138 no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Thus, the appeal stands dismissed.;