JUDGEMENT
N.K.JAIN, J. -
(1.) THIS miscellaneous petition is directed against the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaur whereby the revision of the petitioner against the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagaur dated 23. 2. 82 was dismissed.
(2.) BRIEF facts giving rise to this petition are that on report of Gaffar dated 5. 9. 78, a case was registered u/s. 307, 148, 149, 147 in the P. S. Nagaur and after investigation challan was filed against Abdul Khalid, Jabrudin, Fakrudin, u/s. 325, 323/34 IPC and against Nasir Ahmed u/s. 325, 323/34 and 30 Arms Act. On 15. 7. 78, the parties made an application that they entered into compromise which was verified on 20. 12. 79 by the court, and in terms of the compromise the accused persons were acquitted but against Nasir Ahmed trial was pending u/s. 30 of the Arms Act. An application was filed for adding section 307 during the pendency trial u/s. 30 of the Arms Act which was replied by the accused. After considering the evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 23. 2. 82, ordered that no case is made out against the accused u/s. 307 and observed that the accused are discharged in view of the compromise dated 20. 12. 79. The State against which has also filed a revision, was dismissed on 11. 9. 84. However, on the request of Assistant Public Prosecutor he has taken cognizance against Nasir Ahmed u/s. 27 of the Arms Act. The petitioner filed a revision which was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 19. 10. 85 being an interlocutory order. Hence this petition.
Mr. T. S. Champawat, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that framing of charge u/s. 27 of the Arms Act without there being any material on record is an abuse of the process of the court and deserves to be quashed as there was compromise between the parties and the offences u/s. 325,323/34 IPC were compounded by the court thereby it tantamounts to acquittal.
Mr. P. C. Sharma, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the learned trial court has power to frame charge as the petitioner was in possession of the gun.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
It would be proper to read Sec. 27 of the Arms Act, which runs as under: - "27 - Punishment for possessing arms etc. , with intent to use them for unlawful purpose-whoever has in his possession any arms or ammunition with intent to use the same for any unlawful purpose or to enable any other person to use the same for any unlawful purpose shall, whether such unlawful purpose has been carried into effect or not, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. "
(3.) IT is to be noted that Section 27 of the Arms Act is in two parts, first part speaks of using the arm himself while the second part relates to enabling some other person using the arm, so, for framing the charge u/s. 27 of the Arms Act, it must be proved that arm was in possession for 'any unlawful purpose', although such unlawful purpose has been carried out or not. In the instant case, as per prosecution, the petitioner was holding a licence of the gun which was used to scare and the petitioner was acquitted of the offence u/s. 325, 328 and 34 IPC on the basis of compromise, so, it cannot be said that the possession was unlawful, more particularly when the offence has been compounded, on the basis of compromise. The compoundation of an offence u/s. 320 (8) Cr. P. C. shall have the effect of acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded, and it tantamount to acquittal, which has become final. Thus, the learned trial Judge has erred in converting the charge of 30 Arms Act to 27 Arms Act without there being any evidence that the petitioner carrying the gun with unlawful purpose. IT is true that inherent powers are used very sparingly and they are used only if it is necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. They cannot be invoked in respect of any matter of the court nor they can be exercised to over-ride express provisions of law prohibiting the interference, if their exercise would be in consistent with any of the specific provisions of the court. In the present case, if converting the charge of Sec. 30 to 27 of the Arms Act is allowed, in my opinion it will amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Thus, there is no bar to invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court and to secure ends of justice, the proceedings deserves to be quashed. In this view of the matter, this application deserves to be allowed.
Accordingly, the application is allowed and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner u/s. 27 of the Arms Act are quashed. .;
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