Inder Sen Israni, J. - (1.) These six Special Appeals have been filed against the order dated August 22, 1990, passed by the learned Single Judge, by which, respondents Ramkishore Sharma & Ashok Kumar Saxena have been held to be regular employees of the Rajasthan Scheduled Caste Development Co-operative Corporation Ltd. (for brevity, 'Development Corporation') and their termination orders have been set aside. The termination order of respondent Vinay Kumar Audichya has also been set aside and a direction has been given to give him an opportunity to appear in the Efficiency Test. All these special appeals are disposed of by this single order, since common question has been raised. The Nos. of Anxs. mentioned hereunder have been mentioned as given in the writ petition filed by respondent Ram Kishore.
(2.) It may be briefly stated that respondents Ashok Kumar, Ramkishore Sharma & Vinay Kumar were appointed as LDCs. temporarily on ad-hoc basis by the Development Corporation vide order dated May 31, 1985 (Anx.1). The term of appointment of each of the above named respondents was extended from time to time. By order dated August 31, 1985 (Anx. 3), the respondents were called upon to give option either to appear in Type Test or in Efficiency Test. Respondents Ramkishore and Ashok Kumar gave option to a pear in Type Test, whereas, respondent - Vinay Kumar gave option to appear in Efficiency Test. However, admittedly, no Efficiency Test was held by the appellant. The above-mentioned two respondents, who gave option to appear in Type Test, were called upon to appear in the same vide order dated December 5, 1985 (Anx.4), in which it was clearly stated that services of both these respondents shall not be regularised, unless they pass the Type Test. Both of them appeared in the Type Test and passed the same. Thereafter, an order dated February 13, 1986 (Anx.5) was issued, wherein it was mentioned that English type speed of respondent Ramkishore Sharma was found to be satisfactory and he was declared to have passed the said type test. However, in the case of respondent Ashok Kumar, no specific order was issued, but perusal of Anx. 5 in his writ petition shows that the person, who was deputed to hold the type test, reported that he has passed Hindi type test, since his speed was found to be 27.7 words per minute, whereas in the order of Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan, speed of 20 wpm is required. It may also be mentioned that when the above-mentioned three respondents were appointed as LDCs. On temporary ad-hoc basis, it seems that there were no Service Rules in the Development Corporation, which may govern the conditions of service. However, vide order dated June 4, 1987 (Anx. 4), in Writ Petition No. 5177/89, the Probation period of all the three respondents was ex,tended for a period of two months. Thereafter, all the three respondents were discharged from service by the Development Corporation by separate but similar order passed on July 31, 1987 (Anx. 6) in Writ Petition No. 2436/89, with immediate effect. It was mentioned in the said order that the respondents were dis,charged from service, keeping in view the proviso to (1) (d) of the Explanation appended to Rule 28 (A) and Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957. This order was challenged by each of the respondents by filing three separate writ petitions in this Court, bearing DBCWP Nos. 1927/87, 1946/87 and 1947/87. A Division Bench of this Court set aside the order (Anx. 6) and the respondents continued to be in service. The aforesaid three writ petitions were allowed primarily on the ground that the discharge of the respondents was in contravention of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, (for short, 'the ID Act'), 1947. It was, however, clarified in the said order that the respondent-appellants will be at liberty to terminate the services of the petitioner-respondents, after making compliance of the provisions of the ID Act and any other relevant law having bearing on the same. Thereafter, vide separate orders dated June 22, 1989 (Anx. 15), services of each of the respondents were terminated, after complying with the provisions of Section 25 of the ID Act. It may further be mentioned that during the pendency of the earlier writ petitions filed by the respondents before the Division Bench of this Court, it seems that the services of each of the respondents were transferred to respondent No. 2 Rajasthan Handloom Development Corporation (for brevity, 'Handloom Corporation'), because some centres, which were earlier under the Development Corporation, were transferred to the Handloom Corporation and a decision for transfer of the staff was also taken. When the impugned order discharging each of the respondents from service was passed, they were working in the Handloom Corporation.
(3.) It is submitted by Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant-Development Corporation, that it is clear from the order dated February 6, 1989 (Anx.6), by which, the earlier writ petitions filed by the respondents were allowed, that the appointment was held to be on temporary & ad-hoc basis and liberty was given to the Development Corporation to terminate their services as per provisions of Section 25F of the Act and other relevant law. Thus, it is evident that contentions raised by the respondent-petitioners in their earlier writ petitions regarding the regularisation of their services did not find favour with this Court and this controversy, therefore, could not be re-agitated in the present petitions. This aspect of the matter could not be considered by the learned Single Judge and the principle of res-judicata/constructive res-judicata applies with full force. It is further submitted that the respondent- petitioner had raised two grounds in the earlier writ petitions that they are permanent and alternatively, it was also submitted that provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act had not been complied with. Reference was made to Direct Recruit Class II 'Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 , in which, while discussing the principles of constructive res-judicata, it was held by the Apex Court that where High Court dismisses a writ petition on merits, a subsequent writ petition in Supreme Court on the same facts and for the same reliefs by the same parties would be barred. It was further stated that a judgement of High Court under Article 226 passed after hearing on merits must, therefore, bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided in the Constitution and cannot be permitted to circumvent by a petition under Article 32.;