MILAP CHANDRA JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Udaipur dated February 25, 1991 by which he has dismissed the defendant-appellant's appeal against the judgment of the learned Munsif, Jhadol dated April 15,1988, decreeing the suit for the recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus.
(2.) IN the year 1986, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant in respect of the suit shop situated in the village Jhadol (Udaipur), with the allegations, in short, that on July 3, 1985 the suit shop was let out to him on monthly rent of Rs. 10/- on the terms and conditions that it would be vacated on oral notice of one week, rent would be paid regularly and no construction would be raised therein and a rent note was executed embodying all these terms. He served a notice upon him on January 13, 1986 determining his tenancy with effect from February 2, 1986 or on the date on which he considered his monthly tenancy to expire. Despite notice, he did not tender the amount of rent and vacate the suit shop. The defendant admitted in his written statement that he is in occupation and possession of the suit shop as a tenant of the plaintiff on the monthly rent of Rs. 10/-, he duly executed the rent note and duly received the notice of ejectment. The remaining allegations of the plaint were denied. The trial court framed the following issues: ******** On April 6, 1987, the learned counsel for the parties stated before the trial court that they did not want to produce any evidence as all the issues framed are legal and accordingly the case was fixed for final arguments. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court decided all the issues against the defendant and decreed the suit as said above. The defendant preferred an appeal and it was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Udaipur by his judgment dated February 25, 1991. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the learned lower courts have seriously erred to read the rent note and the copy of the notice of ejectment despite the fact that both of them were not duly proved. The execution of the rent note and the receipt of the notice of ejectment are admitted by the defendant in his written statement. If the rent note is not looked into, the defendant has nothing to urge in this appeal. His main contention is that this rent note shows that the demised shop was let out for one year and the suit was filed before the expiry of this period of one year and as such it was pre-mature. On the basis of the rent note, this plea was taken by him in the written statement. It is the admitted case of the parties that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 was and is not applicable in the village of Jhadol. The suit could be filed after determination of the tenancy under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act and has actually been done so. It is admitted by the defendant in his written-statement that he duly received the notice of ejectment dated January 16, 1986 requiring him to vacate the suit shop on the expiry of February 2, 1986 or any date on which he considered his tenancy to expire. It is thus clear that 15 days, notice was duly given and it expired with the end of tenancy as required under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. If the rent note is taken into consideration, all its terms and conditions have to be considered. According to the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, the duration of lease was one year from July 3, 1985 to July 2, 1986 and the suit was filed in March 1986, In view of the provisions of Section 107, Transfer of Property Act its registration was not necessary. It was not for a term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent. It also provides that the tenancy may be terminated by oral notice of a week. The provisions of Section 1)6, Transfer of Property Act are subject to the contract to the contrary. As per the terms of the contract of tenancy in between the parties, defendant's tenancy could be terminated by oral notice of one week. Admittedly, the plaintiff has served a written notice giving more than 15 days, time to him. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the tenancy was for fixed term of one year and could not be terminated during this period by serving a notice. (The question of termination of tenancy arises only during its subsistance. After the expiry of the period of lease, the tenancy comes to an end and no notice to determine it is required. Section 111, Transfer of Property Act makes this position quite clear By serving a notice of ejectment, the tenancy of the defendant came to an end before the expiry of period of lease of one year which is itself disputed by the plaintiff. As such it cannot be said that the suit for ejectment was pre-mature. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the learned lower courts were not justified to decide the issues without taking evidence as they were not purely legal. As already observed above, on April 6, 1987, the learned counsel for both the parties categorically stated before the trial court that they did not want to produce any evidence in the case and requested the trial court to decide the issues after hearing the arguments. When the parties themselves did not produce any evidence, the trial court cannot be blamed for deciding the issues without evidence.
(3.) IT was lastly contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the defendant-appellant is a very poor person and he should be given adequate time to search another shop for carrying on his business. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the defendant deserves to get time upto December 31, 1991. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. The defendan-appellant is given time upto December 31, 1991 to vacate the suit shop and to deliver its actual and physical possession to the plaintiff-respondent, provided he pays to the plaintiff the entire decreetal amount and costs and arrears of mesne profits upto December 31, 1991 by the end of July 31, 1991. He may adjust the amount deposited by him in the court towards rent and mesne profits. .;