SINGHVI, J. - (1.) IN this petition the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 5/6. 6. 91 and 14. 6. 91 passed by the Executive Director, National Airport Authority, New Delhi and Controller of Aerodrome, Jaipur. These orders have been passed in relation to the transfer of the petitioner who is holding the post of Aerodrome Officer, from Jaipur to Bombay.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the order of transfer has been passed on account of malice. The order is wholly arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. It is a case of malafide exercise of power. According to Shri Upadhyay , a transfer policy has been framed by the Civil Aviation Department, Government of India, whose employee, the petitioner, continues to be and the impugned order has been passed wholesale breach of the said transfer policy, in as much as there are no administrative reasons for the impugned transfer. Transfer has been effected before expiry of the period of five years. It has been ignored that the petitioner has served at unpopular station for two years. From the petition, I find that the petitioner had filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Notices were issued on the injunction application and the suit filed by the petitioner, on 5. 7. 91. On 6. 7. 91 the Respondents (Defendants in that suit) had appeared before the Civil Court and contested the injunction application. In this case the application was dismissed by the Court on 10. 7. 91. According to the petitioner, he has thereafter, filed an application for withdrawal of the suit on the ground of the same and having become infructuous. According to the petitioner he stated in the application that he is seeking to file a writ petition in the High Court. In my opinion, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A litigant has a right to choose the forum where he thinks that he can avail the remedy. Such forum can be that of the Civil Court or the High Court where a Writ Petition is filed directly. The Civil Court is as much competent to pass order of temporary injunction as the High Court in granting interim stay in the writ petition. There is no reason to think that there is any clog on the power of the Civil Court in granting temporary injunctions. After considering nature of the grievance, made by a party, in a civil suit and after hearing the defendants or the non-applicants the civil court can always pass appropriate order after feeling satisfied that a case is made out for grant of injunction. However, merely because the Civil Court declines to grant injunction in a particular case, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to say that the remedy of civil suit is inefficacious. The tendency of the litigants to first make an attempt to file a civil suit for relief along with an application for injunction and then to rush to this court by invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when the Civil Court refuses to grant injunction cannot but be deprecated. The petitioner has not shown any extraordinary situation warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had an effective remedy of appeal before the Additional Civil Judge. There is a further remedy of revision available to him under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure in case the appeal was to be dismissed by the appellate Court. I have considered this aspect of the matter in detail and after examining various facets in (l)Chandra Shekhar vs. State of Rajasthan (1 ). I have observed that normally this Court would not interfere in writ petitions by issuing interim orders at the instance of the party who has failed to get relief in an application for temporary injunction filed alongwith the civil suit. Judicial discipline also warrants that this Court will be too reluctant to grant temporary injunction/stay in the matters where a party invokes jurisdiction of the Civil Court and fails to get relief by way of temporary injunction. Even otherwise, I find that there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of transfer of the petitioner should be declared as bad on the ground of violation of transfer policy. Similar question has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shilpi Bose vs. State of Bihar While refusing to quash the order of transfer on the ground of violation of transfer policy, their Lordships observed as under: - "in our opinion, the courts should not interfere with transfer orders which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of malafide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the courts continue to interfere with day to day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders. " Observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shilpi Bose (supra) are fully applicable to the facts of the present case.
(3.) THE Supreme Court in that case had reversed the order of High Court quashing the order of transfer. This Court has also taken a similar view in Ram Charan Das vs. State of Rajasthan (3)I am in full agreement with the observations made by M. B. Sharma, J. in Ram Charan Das's case that unless the order of transfer is found to be in violation of legal or fundamental right of a servant or it is found that the transfer has been effected due to malice, this Court should not interfere with the order of transfer. The petitioner's contention about his having opted to be absorbed in the National Airport Authority has no relevance so far as the transfer is concerned. If he feels that he does not want to serve the National Airport Authority, he should approach the authorities of the Civil Aviation Ministry and make a prayer for passing of appropriate order for his recall. So far as this petition is concerned, I do not find any ground to interfere with the order of transfer. The writ petition is dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner will make a representation to the authorities of the Civil Aviation Department for his repartiation. If any representation is made, it is expected that the same will be disposed of expeditiously. . ;