MILAP CHANDRA JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS revision petition has been filed by the plaintiff against the order of the Munsif City (North), Udaipur dated December 11, 1990 by which he has closed his evidence. The facts of the case giving rise to this revision may be summarised thus.
(2.) IN the year 1982, the plaintiff filed a suit against the Municipal Council, Udaipur and the Assistant Engineer, National Highway, Udaipur for injunction in respect of a piece of land given to him for temporary use as a licencee by the Municipal Council. The defendants are contesting the suit. The plaintiff did not produce his evidence despite innumerable adjournments and ultimately his evidence was closed by the trial court on December 11, 1990 by its impugned order. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner that the learned trial court has acted with material irregularity and illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction in closing the plaintiffs evidence, the plaintiff was not going to gain anything by not producing evidence, the trial court has acted technically and rules of procedure are hand maids of justice and they are not to trap the licencee. He relied upon the Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Katiji (1), Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal Kota (2), Surjan vs. Raghunandan (3), Rupendra Deb vs. Ashrumati Debi (4) and Shiv Sharan Sharma vs. Umed Chand Kasliwal (5 ). The ground on which the impugned order has been assailed is mentioned in para no. 4 of the revision petition. It would be best to quote it here. It runs as under: - "that in any case the learned court below has failed to consider the repeated exposition of law as made in various judgments of this Hon'ble Court, other High Courts and Hon'ble Supreme Court namely that all rules of procedure are intended to be hand maids of justice and the rules should be so interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice and not allowed it to be throuled promptitude and despatch are desirable things but not at the cost of the justice. In Satya Narain Transport Company's case it has clearly been held that fullest opportunity should be given to the party to produce the evidence and the evidence should never be closed unless of course the Court feels bound having no other way out. Howsoever negligent the earlier Omission may have been whether to produce evidence or even to furnish process fees and notice the evidence should not be closed if the other party can be adequately compensated by costs. In Sangram Singh's case the apex Court has observed that the rules of procedure are not of public use to trip and drip litigants. The Courts are required to and expected to do substantial justice and not to administer discipline. Likewise the latest pronouncement of the apex court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, the appellant gain fully invokes where it has been observed that judiciary is respected not because it is capable of legalising in justice on technical grounds but because it is capable of doing substantial justice and is expected to do so. It has further been observed that where the considerations of technicalities of law and substantial justice are pitted against which other the formers should yield to the later. if all these cases are considered in their right perspective and spirit it is more than clear that a year, poor homage has been paid to the dictates of the apex Court which is law of the land, and this impugned order is liable to be set aside. Admittedly, the suit is pending since 1982 and temporary injunction has been obtained by the plaintiff. The impugned order dated December 11, 1990 recites that last opportunities were given to the plaintiff-petitioner on payment of costs to produce his evidence on August 25, 1989 and also on April 23, 1990 and the plaintiff had two more opportunities to produce his evidence between April 23, 1990 and December 11, 1990. The question of giving last opportunity for producing evidence arises only after a party fails to produce his evidence despite fixing several dates for this purpose. Much has been said in the lengthy revision petition for taking libera! view but the most crucial and important fact about the number of dates fixed in the case for the plaintiff's evidence after the framing of issues and before August 25, 1989 has not at all been mentioned. A good number of dates for this purpose must have been fixed as the suit is pending since 1982. Adjournments are sought frequently and granted liberally. As a result thereof, the average age of a case is increasing in geometrical progression. In other sphares life, speed and despatch have greatly increased. Subsequent adjournments are responsible to a great extent for the increasingly heavy pendency in law courts. It is resulting in denial of justice to greater number of litigants. It is dangerous to be too liberal. It hampers administration of justice. Seeing the too liberal attitude of the courts, the legislature intervened and brought significant amendments by adding several proviso in Rule 1 of Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure by C. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976. The provisos (b), (c) and (d) are as under:- " (b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. (c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment. (d) Where the illness of pleader or his inability to conduct the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in another Court is put forward as a ground for adjournment, the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time. " In the name of 'interest of Justice,' adjournments are very frequently sought and very liberally granted, observing the above quoted provisions in their breach. Indeed it is a sad commentary. Laws are made in the interest and for the welfare of the society. A litigant better knows the inconvenience, troubles and expenses which he is compelled to face on account of repeated adjournments. The presiding officers of the Courts and lawyers are not to face any such ordeal. In the paramount interest of the society and also to save the system of the administration of justice from disrepute, it is expedient and necessary that the above-quoted provisions of O. XVII Rule 1, C. P. C. are complied with in letter and spirit. It is better that lawyers and litigants who are interested in delay should soon come to know that adjournments can be granted if it is permissible under the above quoted provisions and not otherwise.
(3.) IN Rupendra Deb v. Ashrumati Debi (supra) relied by the learned counsel, it has been observed as follows: "after all the procedure of the Court is to aid the administration of justice and not to hamper it. The law of procedure must be followed as it represents experience of ages and helps the administration of justice. But I apprehend wherein the peculiar circumstances of a case, there is a conflict between the law of procedure and the substantial rights of the parties, the Court or a Judge is justified in ignoring, I should say it is the duty of the Judge or the Court to ignore, the procedure. IN this case, though the Judge was strictly right in the view he took, I think he should have shown a little more for bearance (to see the words of Mac-pherson J. IN Kapilnauth's case (10 Beng. L. R. 168 ). and allowed the new matters to go in. " It was not and could not be the contention of the learned counsel that it is the substantial right of a party that his case should continue for recording his evidence till he himself closes his evidence and the court cannot close his evidence and proceed further even after fixing several dates for this purpose. It has rightly been observed that law of procedure must be followed as it represents experience of ages and helps the administration of justice. As a matter of fact the learned trial court did not follow the law of procedure (above quoted proviso (b) when it granted adjournments after adjournments as there is nothing on the record to indicate that adjournments were granted as the circumstances were beyond the control of the plaintiff on these dates. The mandatory provisions were breached and betrayed (1979 (2) RCJ 375 para 21) (6) by it. Great reliance was placed on paras 16 and 17 of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kota (supra) runs as under: "15. We now turn to the decision of the Tribunal. The procedure of these tribunals is governed by S. 90 of the Act. The portion of the section that is relevant here is sub-s. (2) which is in these terms. "subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (Act 5 of 1908) to the trial of suits". We must therefore direct our attention to that portion of the Civil Procedure Code that deals with the trial of suits. "16. Now a Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure' something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to 'both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. " Reliance has also been placed on the below noted observations made in Surjan v. Raghunandan (supra): "regarding the summoning of the Secretary, Municipal Committee, it can be said that the defendants had committed a default in not producing the certified copy of the document earlier but that by itself would not warrant the resort to the drastic provisions of Order 17 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it has been time and again help by this Court that the parties should be given fullest opportunity to produce their evidence at the trial State. If the defendants had committed a default, the other party could be compensated with costs for the adjournment". These observations do not go to help the petitioner. Admittedly, several dates ranging over many years were fixed for his evidence. It has been observed in para 17 of Sangram Singh's case that the clearly defined exceptions must be given effect to. Proviso (b) clearly enshrines that no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. In Surjan's case, the defendant committed only one default and in the instant case, the plaintiff-petitioner has committed repeated defaults over many years. ;