ISRANI, J. - (1.) THIS Writ Petition has been filed with a prayer that the order discharging the petitioner from service passed on March 9/10, 1978 be quashed and declared illegal and the respondents be directed to re-instate the petitioner in service, with all consequential benefits.
(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the petitioner was appointed as Constable by order dated January 2, 1976 (Anx. l) passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bundi. He was appointed on Probation for two years, which was extended for two months more, i. e. , upto March 31, 1978. Thereafter, vide order dated March 9/10,1978 (Anx. 2), he was discharged from service under Rule 36 (1) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1974 (for brevity, 'the Rules, 1974' ). It is contended by Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel, on January 20, 1978, a case for attempt to commit suicide was registered against him under Section 309, IPC. On April 1, 1986, he was convicted, but was given benefit of Probation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal, in which, vide order dated March 3,1989 (Anx. 3), he was acquitted. He reported back to duty and gave representations vide Anxs. 4 & 5 dated March 5 and 7, 1989 respectively. Since no action was taken on his representations, the petitioner filed D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1014/89 (Mahesh Kumar Goyal v. State of Rajasthan & another), which was decided on May 17,1985, in which, a direction was given that the representations of the petitioner, pending before the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kota, be decided within one month. However, it is pointed out that in the return filed by the respondents it has been stated in para 6 that no representations were received. It is, further contended by the learned counsel that the Probation period was extended for two months after the expiry of two years, which could not have been done. It is also contended that, in fact, the petitioner was removed from service, on account of a criminal case pending against him, under the provisions of Section 309, IPC. Therefore, since he has been acquitted in appeal, he is entitled to be re-instated in the job. It is submitted that the order, discharging the petitioner from service (Anx. 2), is not simpliciter, but, in fact, he was discharged from service as a criminal case was pending against him. Once an allegation is made, assailing the order of termination/discharge, the Court is entitled to lift the vice and see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order. It is further submitted that the reason, regarding extension of the Probation period of the petitioner, has been described to be on administrative grounds as mentioned in Anx. R/2. which also shows that there was nothing against the petitioner to discharge him from service. It is submitted by Mr. Sharma, learned Additional Government Advocate, that the petitioner was not discharged from service on account of any criminal case pending against him. It is further submitted that the reason for extention of Probation period is rightly shown to be due to administrative grounds. Anx. R/2 gives the details of several punishments, on account of which, the petitioner was penalised on different occasions for his wilful absence & indiscipline conduct. Therefore, the only reason for his discharge as mentioned in Anx. R/3 dated August 12, 1989, passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bundi is that he was discharged on account of unsatisfactory performance during his Probation period. It has been further made clear that he was not discharged, on account of any proceedings pending against him under Section 309, IPC. It is also submitted that the petition suffers heavily from laches, as the petitioner approached this Court in the year, 1989, giving challenge to the order of discharge passed in January, 1978. I have heard both the parties and gone through the documents on record. A perusal of Anx. R/2, which runs in 15 pages, shows that on several occasions, the petitioner was penalised for his wilful absence and indiscipline in his conduct. He was also given warning on account of his indiscipline conduct, with regard to another constable. The order dated June 12, 1989 (Anx. R/3) was passed, after direction was given by this Court in earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner, referred to above. After considering the whole matter again, it has been specifically mentioned that the petitioner was not discharged on account of criminal case pending against him under the provisions of Section 309, IPC. I am in agreement with the view bf the learned counsel for the petitioner that when allegations are made assailing the order of termination/discharge,' which was passed in innocuous terms, the Court is entitled to see the substance of the order, i. e. , the attending circumstances as well as the basis of the order. I have, therefore, carefully gone through all the documents placed on record by both the parties. I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner was not discharged on account of any criminal case pending against him, but was discharged on account of his unsatisfactory performance & conduct during the probation period. Since he was not discharged on account of any pendency of criminal case, he was entitled to have challenge the order of dischange soon after it was passed and not after the passage of elevan years, as has been done by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Manni Lal vs. Parmai Lal (1), in which, it was held by the Apex Court that when the services of the petitioner are terminated, on account of pendency of a criminal case/ conviction, the disqualification is wiped out and does not exist at all when an appellate order sets aside the conviction. However, this authority is of no help to the petitioner, since he was not discharged on account of any conviction or pendency of a criminal case. It may also be pointed out that in Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy (2), it was observed by the Apex Court that where appointment is made on Probation and the services of the employee were terminated, before the expiry of the extended period of probation, such termination could not be said to be illegal. The petitioner was discharged from service during the period of Probation for the reasons, which are clear from the documents placed on record by the respondents. In the result, I do not find any force in this writ petition, which is dismissed, with no order as to costs. . ;