- (1.) THIS is a revision, petition by a tenant. The proceedings are pending in execution of a decree for eviction passed in favour of the landlord. The decree for eviction was passed on the basis of a compromise. The plaintiff - landlord filed suit for ejectment on the ground of personal necessity as contemplated by Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter called as the Act of 1950 ). THIS decree, was passed in the year 1974. In terms of decree, 7 years time was granted to the tenant to vacate the premises.
(2.) THE plaintiff alleged bona fide and personal necessity and though initially the suit was contested on this ground, but before any evidence could be recorded, the defendant agreed and filed a compromise in which he admitted the personal necessity of the landlord. Certain other terms were incorporated regarding the compensation of use of land in a phased manner and the right to execute the decree before 7 years in case of default in payment of rent. However, the crux of the compromise was that the benefit of 7 years was allowed to the tenant on the basis of payment of increased rent in phased programme THEre was a clear averment that the decree can be executed earlier in case of default in payment of rent and the maximum period permissible was 7 years. In this court, in the grounds of revision petition the petitioner undertook to file and keep ready true copier of compromise and decree as also objections filed in execution case, but as the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, certified copies could not be retained and therefore, uncertified copies consisting of the office file of the learned counsel were shown to me. The uncertified copy of the decree and the relevant portion reads as under:- " A decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant in respect of the eviction of the shop in question is hereby given and 7 years time is allowed for vacating these premises. The defendant agrees that the plaintiff has got personal necessity. " Then there were certain conditions about the rent in which it was mentioned that if according to this compromise decree the rent is not paid then the decree holder plaintiff would be entitled to execute the decree on default even before the expiry of 7 years. On the expiry of 7 years, when the execution was proceeded, the judgment-debtor filed objections which have been rejected and hence this revision Mr. Garg, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner submitted that unless there is a clear finding of bona - fide and personal necessity and comparative hardship in favour of the landlord no decree of eviction can be passed. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Khub Chand vs. Tulshi Ram (1) and Mattu Lal vs. Radhey Lal (2 ). He also pointed out that according to the judgment of Bahadur Singh's case (3) and Kaushalya Devi's case (4) in the matter of rent restrictions Laws,a compromise would be nullity if it is against the public policy and no decree can be executed if it fails to fulfill the conditions of relevant laws. Mr. Garg further submitted that since rent was increased it was a new agreement and new contract and there was no decree in the eye of law. Reliance was placed on decisions in Khalli Nath vs. Ram Chandra (5), Kanmal vs. Hukam Chand (6)and Sudhir Kumar vs. Baldev Krishna Thapar (7 ). It was argued that this agreement in the form of a compromise resulted in a new lease deed which was neither registered nor stamped. It was also pointed out that the executing court has failed to decide all the points raised before it and therefore, also the order is liable to be quashed.
(3.) I have carefully considered the above submissions of learned counsel and have also gone through the various decisions referred to above. Both in Bahadur Singh's case and Kaushalya Devi's case, it was not in dispute that the decree which was passed was not on any of the grounds mentioned in section 13 of the Act. In Bahadur Singh's case the decree was passed on the basis of an award under Section 17 off the Arbitration Act, in a proceeding to which the landlord was not a party without satisfying itself that a ground of eviction existed and therefore, it was held to be nullity. Similarly in Kaushalya Devi's case (supra) a decree was passed on the basis of the compromise but there was nothing to show in that compromise that any of the conditions of Section 13 of the Rent Control Act is fulfilled. In both the above cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that since a decree cannot be passed except on the ground mentioned in Section 13 clause (1), a compromise decree simpliciter and a decree passed on award without reference to the condition of Section 13 is a nullity. In the instant case, but situation is different. The plaint specifically mentions the ground of bona fide and personal necessity and the defendant in the compromise admitted the same in express words. Mr. Garg emphasized that the words bonafide and personal necessity have not been mentioned in the compromise and therefore, the conditions of Section 13 are not fulfilled. This according to me is an argument of despair, after having taken the advantages for 7 years, of remaining in possession. Firstly, in the absence of a certified copy of the compromise and the compromise decree which have not been produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is not possible to be exact about the words. Secondly, even if the rough copy which was shown to me is taken to be correct, the words used are: *** In the compromise deed which was filed in the form of an application the following was mentioned: *** ;