- (1.) THIS is a special appeal by the plaintiff against the decision of C. B. Bhargawa J whereby he reversed the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jaipur, in favour of the plaintiffs and, instead, dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs to the defendants throughout.
(2.) THE suit which was dismissed as aforesaid was brought by firm Ram Narain Damodar and its proprietors, Dwarka Das and Gordhan Das, against the defendant, Damodar Das for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts on the averments that in July 1941, the parties entered into an oral partnership thereby agreeing to share profits and bear losses of the business of import from George Lambercier of Geneva, Switzerland, of rough synthetic stones, in the ratio of six annas and ten annas, respectively It was agreed that the defendant who was already in correspondence with George Lambercier for such import would inform the plaintiffs about the arrival of the consignment in India and thereupon the parties were to share the costs price of the goods in proportion to their respective shares. Acting on behalf of the partnership firm, the defendant placed an order with George Lambercier in July, 1941, for the supply of 10 lac carats of white stone and 1 lac carats of yellow stone. George Lambercier despatched from Geneva 9 lac carats of white stone in November 1941. THE goods were despatched in three different wooden cases marked GL/ 11, GL/12, and GL/13. It appears that out of these three wooden cases, only one viz, GL/11 shipped on board SS loch Dee, arrived in Bombay in February 1943. THE defendant repudiated the partnership in April 1943, and refused to give the plaintiffs their share of six annas out of the white stone contained in this case. THE plaintiffs referred, the dispute for settlement by the Jewellars' Association Jaipur on May 19, 1943. THE said Association expressed its inability to settle it on November 24, 1943. THE plaintiffs filed the suit, giving rise to this special appeal, in the court of District Judge, Jaipur on April 13, 1944. One of the reliefs they sought was a declaration to the effect that they were entitled to a six annas share in the semiprecious stones received by the defendant in the wooden case, marked GL/11. THEy also prayed for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts of this transection. The defendant contested the suit and filed a written statement in answer to it. He admitted that in July, 1941, he had agreed to give the plaintiff, Gordhan Das, six annas share out of the semi precious stones for which he had already placed an order with George Lambercier. He however pleaed that one of the conditions of this partnership with Gordhan Das was that the latter would give him 2000 tolas of imitation stones imported by him at pre-war prices. He further pleaded that he had not imported any semiprecious stones from George Lambercier as alleged, and that the plaintiffs did not give him 2000 tolas of imitation stones as promised. He also averred that George Lambercier was declared by the Central Government in 1941 to be an "enemy" under the defence of India Rules, 1939, and that therefore the partnership between the parties for importing semi-precious stones from him had become unlawful and void. He pleaded that the suit based on the partnership in question which had become unlawful could not be maintained. Learned District Judge tried the suit on the following issues: - 1. Whether in July 1941 a partnership was formed between the parties in terms of para No. 2 of the Plaint ? 2. Whether in pursuance of the contract and past correspondence, an order for 1-0 lakh carats white and one lakh carat of lemon colour imitation stones was placed with George Lambercier? 3. Whether case No. GL/11 imported by the defendant belonged to the partnership? 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable ? 5. Whether in 1941 George Lambercier was declared enemy firm, and therefore no partnership could be formed for importing stones from that firm, nor a suit is maintainable on the basis of such a partnership. 6. Whether because the goods have been imported from outside the country, this court has no jurisdiction ? 7.Relief? By his judgment, dated, March 30, 1962 learned District Judge recorded his findings inter alia, as follows : - (i) The parties entered into a partnership in July, 1941, for the import of imitation stones, from George Lambercier. The plaintiffs* share in the said stones was fixed at six annas and the defendants' at ten annas. (ii) Case marked GL/11 was received by the defendant in July, 1943. It was imported from George Lambercier and therefore belonged to the partnership. The plaintiffs were entitled to a six annas share in the said goods. (iii) George Lambercier was not declared to be an "enemy" by the then rules of Jaipur. Of course, he had been declared an "enemy" by the Central Government of British India on December 22, 1941. A person declared to be an "enemy" by the British Government could not ipso facto be deemed to be an "enemy"' qua the Jaipur Government. It was on the basis of these findings that learned trial Judge passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiffs declaring that they were entitled to a six annas share in the semi-precious stones received by the defendant in wodden case markad GL/11. He dissolved the partnership and appointed a Commissioner to go into the accounts of the transaction and report within a period of two months from the date of the preliminary decree.
(3.) ON appeal by the defendant from the aforesaid decree, a Single Judge of this court by his Judgment, dated April 30, 1970, affirmed the findings of the trial court mentioned at Nos. (i) and (ii) above. The opinion of the learned Single Judge in respect of the points covered by the findings of the trial court enumerated at No. (iii) above may be summarised as follows : - (a) George Lambercier was not declared to be an enemy by His Highness Government of Jaipur State, as such. (b) The Jaipur State was under the Paramountcy of the British Indian Government. The subjects of Jaipur State could not therefore legally carry on trade, with a person declared to be an 'enemy" by the Central Government under rule 97 (d), Defence of India Rules, 1939. (c) All States, Soverigns, individuals and corporations who were enemies of His Majesty, the King-Emperor of Great Britain and Dominions automatically became enemies of the Ruler of Jaipur State at that time. (d) George Lambercier who had been declared on December 22, 1941 to be "enemy" by the Central Government of British India under rule 97 (d), Defence of India Rules, 1939, was also therefore, an "enemy" within the meaning of that rule as applied to Jaipur State. (e) Trading by the Subjects of Jaipur State with George Lambercier after December 22, 1941, when he was declared to be an "enemy" by the Central Government became unlawful. It, therefore, follows that the contract of partnership between the parties for trading with George Lambercier became void and incapable of performance. (f) The fact that the goods, which were first detained by the controller of enemy property, were subsequently released by him on payment of their value into a blocked account-could not and did not have the effect of reviving the contract of partnership which had already become "unlawful and void" on the declaration of George Lambercier as an "enemy". (g) The suit by the plaintiffs for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts against the defendant necessarily involves the enforcement of a contract of partnership which had already become unlawful and void. A contract which is unlawful and void, cannot be legally enforced. The plaintiffs suit is therefore not maintainable. The learned Single Judge therefore, allowed the defendants's appeal on his view that the contract of partnership between the parties had become unlawful and void on the declaration of George Lambercier to be an enemy by the Central Government of British India on December 22,1941, and that therefore, the plaintiff's suit which is based on a void contract is not maintainable. Consequently the learned Judge set aside the preliminary decree, passed by the trial court, in favour of the plaintiffs and instead dismissed their suit with costs to the defendant throughout. As already stated, the plaintiffs have challenged the appellate decree of dismissal of their suit passed by the learned Single Judge. ;