MOHAMMED YAMIN Vs. OM PRAKASH BANSAL
LAWS(RAJ)-1981-5-17
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on May 27,1981

MOHAMMED YAMIN Appellant
VERSUS
OM PRAKASH BANSAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) A notice to show cause under section 15 read with s. 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was given to Shri Om Prakash Bansal, an Editor, Printer and Publisher of the weekly newspaper "prasant Jyoti" for the news item published in the said paper dated 30th March, 1981. In the opinion of the court, the news item as a whole was prima facei contemptuous of this court and of the subordinate courts. This news item scandalised the former judges and the present judges of the High Court Rajasthan. It also scandalises 32 judicial officers mentioned in the said news item. The District Judge, Jaipur City, the District Judge, Jaipur District, the Additional District Judge of Court No. 4, 6 and 7 had made reference to this court complaining that the publication of the aforesaid news item constituted criminal contempt of Court. It was further mentioned that in the show cause notice that the portions marked A to B. C to D, E to F, and G to H were in our opinion prima facie sufficient to take cognizance of the Criminal contempt committed by Shri Om Prakash Bansal. Thus taking cognizance of criminal contempt committed by Shri O. P. Bansal. a direction was given to issue a notice to Shri O. P. Bansal as to why he should not be published for the contempt of this Court and the subordinate courts Copies of the references made by the subordinate court, copies of the news item published in 'prasant Jyoti' dated 30th March, 1981, and copies of the portions marked A to B, C to D, E to F, and G to H were sent to the contemner Shri O. P. Bansal. In compliance to the show cause notice Shri Bansal appeared in this Court and filed a written reply. Arguments in this case were heard on 14th and 15th May, 1981. Shri Bhagirath Singh Shekhawat Advocate, appearing on behalf of the contemner closed his arguments on 15th May 1981 and at the close of arguments submitted an application praying that he may be given an opportunity to summon certain record and to produce witnesses Arguments were heard on this application also and it was ordered that the application shall be decided along with the main order. At this stage Shri O. P. Bansal also moved an application praying to stay the contempt proceedings so that he may obtain transfer order from the Supreme Court. This application was dismissed by us on the same day.
(2.) BEFORE dealing with the merits of the case we deem it necessary to reproduce the news item as a whole published in 'prasant Jyoti' dated 30th March, 1981 with portions marked A to B, C to D, E to F, and G to H : *** In the reply to the show cause notice Shri Bansal raised several grounds, the substance of which is as under : (1) The procedure adopted before giving notice was not proper according to law. (2) The so called reference do not come within the purview of reference and even the name of the non-petitioner has not been mentioned in this reference and no action has been sought against the non-petitioner as such the proceedings are not maintainable against him. (3) The persons making references and not supported the same with affidavits. (4) The matter published in the Article does not relate with any proceedings pending in any court and in case the matter published is considered to be false and defamatory, no proceedings for contempt can be taken but the remedy lies for taking proceedings for defamation by the persons who are alleged to have been defamed. (5) The allegations made by the news item are the contents of representation given by 25 advocates of Jaipur in 1977 to the President of India, the copies of which were also given to other high dignatories. In case any contempt has been committed of Hon'ble Judges it had already been committed on 5th November, 1977 by advocates of Jaipur and a proceeding for contempt of court after 3 1/2 years is barred under section 20 of the Act The advocates, who made the aforesaid representation are necessary parties in this case and in case the non-petitioner is held responsible and called upon to give a reply, in that case he wants to produce all the advocates who had signed the aforesaid representation, the President of India, the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of India, the Prime Minister of India, Home Minister and Law Minister of the Central Government, and Hon'ble Justice P. N. Shinghal as his witnesses. (6) As regards portion marked A to B, the contents of which are true and its truthfulness can be ascertained from the record of the High Court. In this regard the then Registrar Vigilance, his inquiry report and the entire concerning record is necessary to be attached with these proceedings and in order to prove the aforesaid documents, the Vigilance Registrars holding such office after 1977 shall be produced in defence. (7) As regards portions marked C to D, the contents are the same which were given in a representation by 16 Advocates of Bikaner to the Hon'ble Chief Minister Rajasthan and which were widely circulated in October, 1978. The action sought to have been taken against the aforesaid 16 advocates at that time and not after 2 1/2 years against the contemner it is wrong and illegal to make it a basis for contempt of Court which is barred under section 20 of the Act. In case any action is still taken against the non-petitioner then he may be granted an opportunity to produce the aforesaid 16 advocates, the then Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, the then Registrar Vigilance and the then Administrative Judge in his defence, As regards E. to F and G to H it is mentioned that these are the portions of the representation submitted by the Jaipur Advocates on 5th November, 1977 as mentioned above. (8) The reference made by the various officers of the subordinate court are the result of a pre-planned conspiracy and creation of the mind of one person as the language used in all the references is almost identical. The reference sent by S/shri S. R. Kothari, Radhey Shyam Sharma and Vasudeo Vyas have been typed on one type machine and appears to be a reflection of some controversy having arisen after the elections of 1977-78 for the office bearers of Rajasthan Judicial Service. (9) In the aforesaid reference different dates i. e. 9, 10, 13 and 15th April, have-been mentioned and no action could be taken by amalgamating all such reference in one. (10) The non-petitioner had no concern with Shri M R. Mitruka District Judge nor he got any information through him before publishing the news item in question. Whatever information has been derived by the non-petitioner, it is on the basis of representations and other matters already published and from the advocates for which it would not be proper to implicate Shri Mitruka with whom the non-petitioner had no acquaintance. (11) The subject matter of the news item cannot be said to be a civil contempt nor a criminal contempt. The reference were not addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice but only addressed to Registrar High Court. (12) The show cause notice should be discharged on the basis of the preliminary objections and in case this proceeding is not dismissed on preliminary objections in that the non-petitioner can bring other facts on record including the record of this Court for which proper opportunity may be granted. Mr. Bhagirath Singh during the course of arguments pressed the following points: The proceedings are barred by limitation under section 20 of the Act as they relate to a period of 1977-78 and being beyond one year, no proceedings for contempt can now be taken. In this regard it is contended that the matter contained in portion marked C to D relates to the representation made by advocates of Bikaner in 1978 and the portion contained in E to F relates to the representation made by the Jaipur advocates in 1977. Reliance is placed on the language of Section 20 of the Act and also Baradakhanta Mishra vs. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra C. J. of the Orissa High Court (1 ). We find no force in this contention of Mr. Bhagirath Singh. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceedings for contempt whether suo-moto or on a motion or a reference. The terminus-a-quo for the period of limitation provided in Sec. 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. It is not in dispute that the present news item has been published by the non-petitioner in the weekly news paper 'prasant Jyoti' dated 30th March, 1981 and the proceedings for contempt has been initiated by this Court on 4th May, 1981. Though there is nothing on the record to hold that the non-petitioner only published the contents of the representations made by Jaipur Advocates in 1977 or Bikaner Advocates in 1978, but that apart every publication itself gives a fresh ground for taking proceedings for contempt and the present proceedings cannot be held to be barred by limitation even though the news item might relate to the same subject matter which were given in the representation of 1977 and 1978 as alleged by Shri Bansal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baradkanta Mishra's case (Supra) has observed that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt whether suo-moto, or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus-a-quo for a period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. In our view the above observations do not render any assistance to the arguments advanced by Mr. Bhagirath Singh as regards limitation. It was next contended by Mr. Bhagirath Singh that no proceeding for contempt could be initiated as no case or proceeding were pending before any court and the news item did not make any comment with regard to a pending proceeding or cases for hampered the course of justice in any manner. There is no force at all in this submission of the learned counsel. It is not necessary that in order to make a criminal contempt, the act or publication should be in relation to a pending proceeding or case in the court. Clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act defines criminal contempt as under "criminal contempt means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatever which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner". A bare perusal of the above definition shows that a publication whether by words, spoken or written, of any matter or the doing of any other act whatever which scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court also amounts to criminal contempt in the above definition.
(3.) IT was next contended by the learned counsel for contemner that the news item in question could only amount to defamation of the judges named in it and the proper course could have been of taking defamatory proceedings against the non-petitioner and not the proceeding for contempt of court. IT is contended that the offence of defamation under the Indian Penal Code was punishable with a higher penalty than the contempt of Court and in case the non-petitioner had committed any offence of defamation he is ready to face the higher penalty. IT is further argued that the proceedings for contempt of court are of summary nature and the non-petitioner has been put to a disadvantage and in case proceedings for defamation are launched against him he would be able to bring forth the oral and documentary evidence to show the correctness and the truthfulness of the allegations published in the news item. There is a difference between the law of libel and contempt of court. We are not at all impressed by the aforesaid argument advanced by Shri Bhagirath Singh. It is correct that not all defamatory matter can amount to contempt of court. Whether defamatory matter amounts to contempt of court in any particular case is a question of fact or degree and of circumstances. The defamatory statement scandalising a judge in his official capacity calls for an action in contempt. But if the impugned article attacks the judge personally and not on account of any of his official actions, it can only be questioned by liable action. However, venomous and sarcastic an article may be, if it is only an attack on the judge in his personal capacity and not in the capacity of a judge, there is no contempt. But if the impugned article attacked the judge ascribing to him favouritism in his judicial or official capacity, it is contempt. Critisism of judges always welcome within legitimate limits. As Frank Furter J. puts in Pennekemp v. Florida: (2) as follows : " If men including judges and journalists were angels there would be no problems of contempt of court. Angelic Judges would be undisturbed by extraneous influences and angelic journalists would not seek to influence them. The power to punish for contempt as a means of safeguarding Judges in deciding on behalf of the community as impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide is not a privilege accorded to judges. The power to punish for contempt of court is a safeguard not for Judges as persons but for the function which they exercise. It is a condition of that function indispensable for a free society that in a particular controversy pending before a Court and awaiting judgment, human beings however strong should not be torn from their moorings of impartiality by the under tow of extraneous influence. " It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Brahma Par-kash vs. State of U. P. (3) that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by 'scandalising' the court itself. In the first place the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duty, would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the fight of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created. In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt. Thus, in our opinion it can not be laid down as a rule of law that action alone can be taken by proceeding in libel and no action can be taken for contempt of court even though the action scandalise the action of a judge in his official or judicial capacity. Keeping the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in mind we shall examine at appropriate place whether the news item in question amounts to contempt of court or not. It was contended by Mr. Bhagirath Singh that the reference made by the various judicial officers were addressed to the Registrar and not to the Chief Justice. No reasons have been given by Hon'ble the Chief Justice as to why action should be taken against Om Prakash Bansal alone. It is vehemently urged that copy of office note put by the Registrar before the Hon'ble Chief Justice has not been supplied to the contemner and in any case such office note should be called by the court for its perusal. In our opinion addresses in official communication by the lower officers of the judiciary are addressed to the Registrar and not to Hon'ble the Chief Justice directly. There is nothing wrong if the reference were addressed to the Registrar and the same were subsequently brought to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justice by the Registrar. The Chief Justice only constituted a bench according to the Rules of this Court and sent the matter for its consideration. The court after going through the news item in question was satisfied that prima facie a case of contempt of Court was made out against the non-petitioner and after taking cognizance issued a notice to show cause. In our view it is a case of taking cognizance on a news item which has been brought to the notice of the Court and the Court is satisfied to take cognizence. It is immaterial who made the references and what procedure was followed before taking cognizance. The Court is entitled to take cognizance either suo-moto or on motion or on a reference. It is only under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, in the case of any criminal contempt to a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate Court or on a motion made by the Advocate General or in relation to a Union territory by such law Officer as the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette specify in this behalf. In this case on the basis of the contents published in the news item this Court was satisfied prima facie that it scandalises the former judges and the present judges of the Rajasthan High Court. The court before taking cognizance was also satisfied that it also scandalises 32 judicial officers mentioned in the said news item for which reference were made to the Court We thus hardly find any irregularity or illegality in taking cognizance of criminal contempt against Shri Bansal on account of the news item published by him in weekly newspaper lprasant Jyoti' dated 30. 3. 1981. In our view, the note put up by the Registrar placing reference before the Chief Justice has hardly any relevance in the matter of taking cognizance by the Court. We thus do not find it necessary to call the office note and place it on record or to peruse it. We may further mention that in the matter of procedure to be followed in taking proceeding for contempt of court no particular procedure has been prescribed. The court is guided by its own procedure to be followed in the facts and circumstances of such individual case and to see that the contemner is getting full opportunity to make his defence and no principle of natural justice is violated in following such procedure. In our opinion, if a copy of the note put by the Registrar, bringing the reference to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, is not supplied to the contemner, it does not prejudice the defence of the contemner in the facts of this case. ;


Click here to view full judgement.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.