K. S. SIDHU, J. - (1.) AFTER hearing learned counsel for the appellant in this second appeal and perusing the record, I am of opinion that it raises no question of law much less a substantial question of law to justify its admission and, therefore, it must be dismissed in limine. It will be seen that the appellant Balvir Kumar Arya was employed at the material time as a Conductor with the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. Jaipur, respondent 1 herein, and that as a result of a domestic inquiry, he was dismissed from service vide order, dated, April 5, 1976. The appellant filed a civil suit against respondent 1 and its Regional Manager, respondent 2. challenging his dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that the domestic inquiry was not held in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshops Employees Standing Orders and that, therefore, he was entitled to be reinstated in service. He further pleaded that even assuming that the inquiry was held in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Standing Orders, the act which was charged as misconduct did not amount to misconduct in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 34 and, therefore, he could not lawfully be dismissed from service.
(2.) THE defendants contested the suit and pleaded that the misconduct committed by the plaintiff was serious inasmuch as on September 20, 1975, while he was on duty as Conductor of Bus No. 6341 on Jaipur-Chandigarh route, he was found to be carrying 23 ticket less passengers out of whom three had already paid fare. This act on the part of the plaintiff clearly amounted to misconduct. THE defendants further pleaded that the domestic inquiry had been held according to law. The trial court framed the following issues : (i) Whether the dismissal of the plaintiff from service is illegal ? (ii) Whether the domestic inquiry was held against the plaintiff without complying with law and relevant Standing Orders ? If so, what is its effect ? (iii) Whether the court fees paid is proper ? (iv) Whether the plaintiff was dismissed from service by an authority not competent to do so ? (v) Whether the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit ? By its judgment, dated, August 18, 1979, the trial court recorded the following findings : - (i) According to Standing Order No. 35 a duty is cast on the competent authority to give atleast a week's time to the workman to make his reply to the charge-sheet. A further duty is cast on the competent authority to consider the said explanation personally before making over the case to the Inquiring Authority for holding domestic inquiry. (ii) The Competent Authority did not give the workman a week's time to make his reply to the charge-sheet. Further, it did not apply its mind to the explanation submitted by the workman before the Inquiring Authority commenced the domestic inquiry into the charges framed against the workman. (iii) The fact that the workman was carrying 23 passengers in the bus without issuing tickets to them is an act of omission which does not amount to misconduct as defined in the Standing Order No. 34. (iv) There is no evidence on record to prove that three of the passengers had already paid the fare to the workman before the checking. (v) The domestic inquiry was held in contravention of the Standing Orders. (vi) The court fees paid is proper. (vii) The workman was dismissed from service by the competent authority. (viii) The civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was on the basis of these findings that the trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit with costs and consequently declared that the order of dismissal passed against him by the defendants is illegal and that he still continues to be in the defendants' service and as such entitled to pay and allowances admissible to him. The defendants appealed from the aforementioned decree. By its judgment dated March 10, 1981. the lower appellate court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and instead dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. The appellate court has recorded the following findings ; (i) There is evidence on record to prove that the plaintiff had not issued tickets to three of the passengers who had already paid the fare before the checking. The finding of the Inquiring Authority in that behalf could not, therefore, be legally interfered with by the trial court in this suit. (ii) The domestic inquiry was held according to law and the Standing Orders applicable to the case. (iii) The act of not issuing the tickets to as many as 23 passengers including those three who had already paid the fare before the checking amounts to misconduct within the ambit of Standing Order No. 34. It was on the basis of these findings that the learned lower appellate court reversed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.
(3.) AGGRIEVED by the decree of dismissal passed by the lower appellate court, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. Mr. P. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, canvassed for admission of this appeal on two grounds. First, he contended that the act charged as misconduct against the appellant is not "misconduct" as covered by Standing Order No. 34 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders inasmuch as it does not fall within the ambit of any of the twenty two clauses of the Standing Order. After going through these twenty two clauses, i. e. clause (a) to clause (v) of the definition of "misconduct" as given in the Standing Order No 34, I am of opinion that the allegations made against the appellant in the charge-sheet served upon him, if proved, could clearly constitute misconduct as covered by clause (i) which lays down that "dishonesty, fraud, theft, malpractice or mis appropriation of cash or property" shall be treated as misconduct. The act of carrying 23 passengers in the roadways bus without ticket certainly amounts to a "malpractice" within the purview of this clause. The further act of charging fare from three passengers without giving any ticket to them amounts to "dishonesty" and "misappropriation of cash" within the ambit of that clause. Mr. Sharma further argued in the context of his first contention that there is no evidence on the record of domestic enquiry to support the finding that the appellant had realised fare from three passengers without issuing tickets to them. This argument is also not convincing. The lower appellate court has pointed out that there is both oral and documentary evidence to prove that the appellant had realised the fare from three passengers without issuing tickets to them. It may be right away pointed out that technical rules of evidence, like the best evidence rule, enacted in the Evidence Act are not applicable to domestic enquiries. It was permissible to the Inquiry Officer to rely on the statement of the checking staff that the passengers had told them that they had paid the fare to the appellant and that he had not issued any ticket to them, Of course, it would have been much better if the Inquiry Officer had insisted on the production of at least one of such passengers who had paid the fare as a witness in the inquiry. That does not, however, mean that if, in the facts and circumstances of this case, he felt satisfied on the statement of a member of the checking staff that the appellant had committed the dishonest act of charging fare from three passengers without issuing tickets to any of them and his Judging in that behalf is necessarily vitiated merely because none of the passengers concerned was examined as a witness in the enquiry. ;