TYAGI, J. - (1.) PETITIONER Umrao Singh along with five other residents of village Bichpuri, Tehsil Behror, District Alwar have filed this writ application praying that the order passed by the Khudkasht Commissioner dated 30th November, 1968, dismissing the petitioners' appeal be quashed and the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 be restrained from cultivating the land allotted to them as khudkasht lands.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to this writ petition are, in a nutshell, as follows - Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 Vinayak Dutt and Laxmi Kant were the Muafi-dars of certain lands in village Chittor, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Alwar. THEir 'muafi' was resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the Act ). After the resumption of the said 'muafi' lands, the aforesaid Muafidars applied for the allotment of khudkasht lands under the provisions of the Act and they submitted an application before the Deputy Collector (Jagirs), Alwar, on 21st of April, 1962, praying that land bearing Khasra 600 in village Bichpuri measuring 46 Bighas, land bearing Khasra No. 712 in village Jogarwas measuring 20 Bighas be allotted to them as khudkasht land. It is alleged that Vinayak was an influential person and, therefore, he got the allotment of the aforesaid lands made in their favour by the authorities without complying with the requirements of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. THE villagers of village Bichpuri. however, objected to the allotment of 46 Bighas of land in their village to the Muafidars on the ground that no notice was given to them before the allotment was made and that the land was a pasture land and as such it could not be allotted to the Muafidars as khudkasht land. On receiving the objections from the residents of the village, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) issued notice to the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and meanwhile ordered to maintain the status quo as regards the land in dispute in village Bichpuri. After hearing the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) held that the order of allotment was passed without hearing the persons interested and without making any enquiry by the Tehsildar according to the rules regarding the availability of the land, and, therefore, he proceeded to decide the merits of the application filed by the villagers. THE Deputy Collector (Jagirs) framed two issues on 29th of January, 1963 : (1) Whether the allotted land was Charagah of the whole village and could not be allotted ? and (2) What would be the relief? At this stage the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 raised an objection of jurisdiction and submitted to the Deputy Collector (Jagirs ) that he had no jurisdiction to re-open the matter which had once been finalised by the authorities. On hearing the parties, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to re-open the matter and therefore he dropped the proceedings. An appeal was taken against this order of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) to the Khudkasht Commissioner. THE Commissioner was, however, of the opinion that the Deputy Collector (Jagirs ) could review the matter and he passed an order to that effect on 4th April, 1964 which is Ex. 8 on the record, and the case was remanded to the file of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) with a direction that the application for review filed by the villagers may be disposed of after hearing the parties. It appears that after the receipt of the record from the office of the Commissioner, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs ) called for a report from the Tehsildar, Behror and the Tehsildar submitted his report dated 3rd of December. 1966, stating that according to the settlement record the land in dispute, which was allotted to Laxmi Kant & Vinayak Dutt as Khudkasht land, has been recorded as 'charagah'. It was also mentioned therein that in spite of the order of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs ) this land measuring 46 Bighas has been recorded in the name of the allottees in the Government papers and the possession thereof was never handed over to the ex-Muafidars. When the matter came up for final hearing before the Collector (Jagirs), Alwar (the post of the Deputy Collector Jagirs having been abolished), the petitioners sought to adduce evidence in support of their contention before him, but the learned Collector held that the review application pending before him was ordered to be disposed of by him under the directions issued by the Khudkasht Commissioner only after hearing the parties and, therefore, he refused to accept any evidence in support of the contention of the petitioners that the land allotted was a 'charagah' land. This order refusing the prayer of the petitioners to adduce evidence was dated 27th of November, 1967. Thereafter the arguments of the parties were heard by the learned Collector and he ultimately came to the conclusion that the land in dispute could be allotted for Khudkasht and therefore he rejected the review application of the petitioners by his order dated 23rd of May 1968. This order has been placed on record as Ex 12. The petitioners thereupon filed an appeal before the Khudkasht Commissioner, Rajasthan against the said order of the Collector. The Commissioner rejected this appeal observing : "since this is not an appeal preferred against the original order under which allotment of land was made but against the order rejecting the review application, the appeal against such order cannot be entertained as provided under O. XLVII, r. 7 of the C. P. C. the same deserves to be rejected, and accordingly it is rejected. " It is against this order of the learned Khudkasht Commissioner that the present writ petition has been filed by the villagers of Bichpuri challenging that the view taken by the Khudkasht Commissioner of O. 47, r. 7 C. P. C. is erroneous and he was empowered under the law to hear the appeal of the petitioners on merits. It is in these circumstances that a prayer referred to above has been made by the petitioners. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have opposed this writ petition on the ground that the view taken by the Khudkasht Commissioner of the provisions of r. 7 of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is correct and, therefore, this Court should not interfere in this writ petition. The rival contentions made by the parties raise an important question of law regarding the scope of O. 47 C. P. C. whether in such circumstances the appellate court could hear the appeal against the order of the reviewing court when the review application has been dismissed by the reviewing court after having gone into the merits of the case. This requires the examination of O. 47 C. P. C. as a whole and to determine its true scope. While examining the scheme of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure we find that a review petition is dealt with by the reviewing court at three stages after a review application is filed before it. The first stage is when the application for the grant of review is placed before the Judge or Judges under r. 4, sub-rule (1), At that stage if in appears to the court that there is not sufficient ground for a review it rejects the application. If there is a prima facie case for a Judge to entertain the review application as provided in R. 1 of O. 47, then a notice is issued to the opposite party to appear before the Court. Thus, it is clear that the first order is always passed admitting the review application ex parte. The next stage is reached when after hearing both the parties the Judge has to decide whether the review application should further be heard on merits or not. At this stage if the Court is of opinion that there are no merits in the review application and it does not fall within the four corners of sub-rule (1) of O. 47, then after hearing both the parties it dismisses the application and does not enter into the merits of the case. But the third stage arises only when the Court is of opinion that the former order passed by it need be looked into on merits and it is then that the Court further hears the entire case on merits Then the third stage is arrived under Rule 8 of O. 47 after the original case is registered and the Court re-hears it on merits. After re-hearing the case, the court can arrive at three conclusions (1) it may confirm its former order, (2) it may reverse the former order, or (3) it may modify it. The question posed for determination, therefore, is that if the review application is disposed of after the third stage has been arrived at what is the effect of it. This Court in Maji Mohan Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan (l), after considering the decisions of Bombay High Court in Sha Vadilal Hukamchand vs. Shah Fulchand Umedram (2) Calcutta High Court in Gour Krishna Sarkar vs. Nilmadhab Sahaf3) and Madras High Court in Fakkiri Muhammad Howther vs. L. Swaminatha Mudaliar (4), held that in either case whether the former decree is confirmed, reversed or modified, the whole matter is re-heard by the Court and, therefore, whatever order is passed thereafter that judgment of the court results in either a fresh decree or order. It would be useful to reproduce the wordings of S. Jenkins, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court while deciding this question of law in Sha Vadilal Hukamchand vs. Sha Fulchand Umedram (2) - "an application for review commences ordinarily with an ex parte application under sec. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court then may either reject the application at once, or may grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause why the review should not be granted. In the second stage the rule may either be admitted on rejected and it is obvious that the hearing of this rule may involve, to some extent, an investigation into the merits. If the rule is discharged then the case ends. If on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached; the case is reheard on the merits and may result in a repetition of the former decree or in some variation of it. Though in one aspect the result, whether the rule be discharged or on the rehearing the original decree, be repeated, in law there is a material difference, for, in the latter case, the whole matter having been reopened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case the parties are relegated to, and still rest on the old decree. " Learned counsel for the respondents, however, relied on another Bombay case in Achyut Vishnu Patankar vs. Tapibai (5) and urged that where a rule for a review of judgment is granted it has not the effect of reversing the judgment but it holds the judgment in suspense until the review application is heard, and disponed of. On the basis of these observations, learned counsel for the respondents argued that if ultimately the review application is rejected, then the effect of it is that the original decree passed by the revenue court is revived and it cannot be a fresh decree and hence no appeal can lie from the order passed by the revenue court confirming the original decree or order. It is true that their Lordships of the Bombay High Court held that when a rule for a review is issued by the court then it has the effect of keeping in suspense the judgment or order against which a review application has been preferred, but these observations of their Lordships are in different context which have nothing to do with the present circumstances of the case There is a direct ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in Maji Mohan Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan (1) and the view expressed by their Lordships in that case finds support from the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts referred to above. There is another case of the Calcutta High Court in Nibaran Sikdar vs. Abdul Hakim (6) which fortifies the view expressed by the Bench of this Court in Maji Mohan Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan (l ). In my opinion, the consistent view taken by the courts about the scope of O. 47 as discussed above is correct and if the matter is heard by the reviewing court on merits, then the order passed by the reviewing court under all circumstances, whether the original order or decree is confirmed, reversed or modified, the judgment of the reviewing court shall constitute a fresh decree or order and in all circumstances an appeal can lie from the order passed by the reviewing court at the third stage. In the present case, the Collector (Jagirs) who was a successor court of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) dismissed the review application after having reached the third stage before the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) while framing issues referred to above and come to this conclusion that the merits of the case must be reviewed and it was from that point of view that the issues on merits were framed by him. It may also be noted here that after the case was remanded by the Khudkasht Commissioner, a report from the Patwari was called by the Collector which is on the record. This procedure adopted by the Collector shows that he had crossed the second stage of the proceedings and he was, while calling for the report from the Patwari. acting after crossing the second stage. In this view of the matter, even though the Collector had dismissed the review application without recording any further evidence which the petitioners wanted to adduce in support of their contention, it shall be taken that the review application was dismissed by the Collector (Jagir) after crossing the second stage of the proceedings and as such the order passed by the Collector (Jagirs) shall be treated as a fresh decree or order from which an appeal can lie to the Khudkasht Commissioner. In view of these discussions, the order of the Khudkasht Commissioner rejecting the appeal on the ground that he was not empowered to hear the appeal under R. 7 of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is erroneous and it is, therefore, set aside. The case is sent back to the Khudkasht Commissioner with a direction that the learned Khudkasht Commissioner will dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioners against the order of the Collector dismissing the review application of the petitioners. The writ petitioners shall get their costs from respondents Nos. 3 & 4. . ;