D. C. Joseph - (1.) THE respondent Ram Lal filed a suit under secs. 183 & 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against the present appellants in the court of the Assistant Collector, Jhalawar on 3-8 62. It was stated in the plaint that Ram Lal was khatedar of 12 bighas 6 biswas of land in village Doongargaon, Sub-tehsil Asnawar of which 1 bigha 6 biswas in khasra No. 1112 was recorded as bir. His father had died about 14 years back and he had accompanied his mother to another village to live with his uncle. Taking advantage of her absence and the fact that Ram Lal was a minor, about 10 years back the appellants began to cut the grass in khasra No. 1112 and took unauthorised possession of it. Now that he had become a major, he had tried to stop them cutting the grass but they refused to leave the land, hence he had been compelled to bring the suit In their written statement, the appellants denied the story given by Ram Lal and claimed that they had been in possession for more than 30 years. THE trial court framed seven issues, the most important of which were - Issue No. 1 Had the defendants been in unauthorised possession of khasra No. 1112 for about 10 years ? Issue No. 2 Did the petitioner attain the age of majority only a year ago ? Issue No. 3 Was the omission of a specific date of cause of action in the plaint fatal to the suit ? and
(2.) ISSUE No. 5 Were the defendants in possession of the land for 30 years ? After hearing the parties, the Assistant Collector decided in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit for eviction and permanent injunction. In appeal, the Revenue Appellate Authority upheld the decree, hence this second appeal. Counsel for the appellants has strongly urged that the case be remanded to the Revenue Appellate Authority because the judgment passed by him was not a judgment in the eyes of law and not at all in accordance with O. XLI, R. 31 C. P. C. In this connection he has cited 1970 R. R. D. 38 Parbati vs. Shivkaran. Counsel says that when as many as seven issues were framed by the trial court on the decision of which depended the answer to the crucial question whether the suit was within limitation or not, it was incumbent on the Revenue Appellate Authority to have discussed these issues. A perusal of the lower court's order shows that it runs only to six lines and it has been observed that the appellants were not able to show that they were khatedars or sub-tenants of the land or paid the rent. They were claiming possession for 10 years but their possession could only be that of trespassers and for these reasons the appeal had no force. Counsel for the respondent says it was not necessary for the Revenue Appellate Authority to have discussed all the issues framed by the trial court because he concurred with its findings and in a judgment of concurrence there was no need to discuss issues. Counsel has cited AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1124 in this connection. We have considered the matter. The Supreme Court ruling does not in our opinion help the respondent. It has been laid down therein that when the appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court-an expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the court the decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. In this particular case the learned Revenue Appellate Authority has made no reference to the reasoning given by the lower court. The appeal lying before him has been dismissed in a most perfunctory manner on the ground that the appellants have not been able to establish their right. Apart from the fact that he has not discussed the evidence at all, or even made reference to the trial court's judgment, the Revenue Appellate Authority has failed to appreciate that it was for the plaintiff and not the defendant to prove his case. Thus the judgment of the lower court cannot be said to be a reasoned legal judgment and must be set aside. However, in view of the fact that this suit was instituted as far back as 1962, and to avoid the further delay that a remand order would entail, we have decided to look into the evidence ourselves. The basic question for determination in this case is whether the suit was filed beyond limitation. As per the Third Schedule of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the limitation for suits for ejectment of a trespasser under section 183 of the Tenancy Act is 12 years from the date on which the cause of action arises. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the defendant - appellants were in possession of khasra No. 1112 for about 10 years as alleged by the plaintiff or for 30 years or more as alleged by them. A connected question which has been gone into by the trial court is whether the petitioner attained the age of majority only a year prior to the institution of the suit. The trial court held from the statement made by the plaintiff Ram Lal and the evidence of witnesses that it was established that he was about 20 years old at that time, i. e. , on 28-10-64. This is in conformity with the stand taken in the plaint that as soon as he became a major the petitioner tried to stop the defendants from cutting the grass on the land. However, the trial court has not really discussed the evidence in regard to age. P. W. 2 Nanu Ram in his statement says that when the petitioner's father died he (Ramlal) was three or four years old. He also says that Ram Lal's father died about 20 years back which suggests that, according to P. W. 2, Ram Lal sit the time of the statement should have been 23 to 24 years old, i. e. , 21 or 22 on the date of institution of the suit P. W. 3 Gopilal, however, says that Ram Lal's father died about 16 years back and this supports the statement of Ram Lal himself that he was 20 years old and his father died 15 or 16 years back. On behalf of the defendant there was no rebuttal on the point of Ram Lal's age and so it may be assumed that he became a major not more than 3 or 4 years before the institution of the suit. As regards the date of the cause of action, D. W. 1 defendant Gulab Chand says that he was in possession of the land for 30 to 35 years and before that there was the possession of his father. D. W. 2 Champalal speaks of the defendant's possession for 30 years and D. W. 3 Kalu says he has seen him on the land for 20-22 years. D. W. 3 4 is a former patwari Devilal who has been brought to prove certain entries in the khasra teep from St. 1995 to 1998. A scrutiny of this official's evidence shows that it was in regard to khasra No. 973, the area of which was 3 bighas 5 biswas, of which 1 bigha 5 biswas was in the name of the father of the defendants and later on in their name. There is nothing on record to show how this khasra No. 973 is related to the suit land and in the absence of this the statements of the witnesses called by the defendants do not help very much because it is not established that the possession of which they speak relates to the suit land. Counsel for the appellants says that the suit land has not been properly described in the plaint but this is not correct The land is very clearly stated as being 1 bigha 6 biswas in khasra No. 1112 and recorded as bir. Thus the defendants have not been able to produce any evidence as to when they entered on the suit land. From the side of the plaintiff, there is an admission by him before the trial court that the defendants were in possession for 10-11 years, i. e. about nine years prior to the institution of the suit and in the plaint he has admitted that they took unauthorised possession of the land about 10 years back We thus arrive at the conclusion that the defendants first took possession of the land about 10 years prior to the filing of the suit when the petitioner was still a minor. Since the period of limitation under sec. 183 of the Tenancy Act is 12 years, we hold the suit to be within limitation. Counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the Revenue Appellate Authority's order and says that counsel for the appellants admitted before the lower court that their possession was only for 10 years. A careful reading of the Revenue Appellate Authority's order suggests that perhaps the words 10 years may have been written by mistake because the whole case of the defendants is that they have had possession for 30 years. In any case, this point is not material because we have already held on the basis of the evidence that the initial occupation of the land by the defendants was about 10 years prior to the institution of the suit. Counsel for the appellants has also raised the point that the petitioner was not entitled to bring a suit under sec. 183 because the land in question is recorded as bir and as per sec. 16 (1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act no khatedari rights accrue on such land. We do not find it possible to agree with this view. Sec. 16 (1) of the Act refers to pasture land and although birs are grasslands it does not mean that all of them necessarily fall within the definition of pasture, which in common parlance relates to grazing grounds. The evidence on record shows that the grass grown on the suit land is cut and sold and cattle do no graze thereon. Moreover, the land has been recorded in the khatedari of the respondent and unless the entries can be shown to be wrong they must be presumed to be correct. Thus this plea does not help the appellants. The result is that there is no force in any of the arguments put forward by the appellants and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. .;