LODHA, J. - (1.) THE only point for decision in this appeal by the defendant-tenant is whether the words "for the period for which the tenant may have made default" occurring in Sec. 13 (4) of the Rajasthan premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 refer to the period for which the arrears of rent are within limitation or they refer to the full arrears of rent be they within limitation or barred by limitation?
(2.) THE contention of the learned consel for the appeallant is that these words should be taken to refer only to such arrears of rent as are within limitation, and can be legally recovered through the process of the court. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon D. S. R. Sarma vs. Nagendra Bala Debi (F. B.) (1), and Krishna Chandra Bose vs. Radharani (2 ). I have gone through both the rulings and in my opinion they are distinguishable inasmuch as the view taken there is based on the language of sec. 14 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 17 of 1950. The words used in Sec. 14 (1) of the West Bengal Act are, "arrears of rent legally recoverable". Under Sec. 14 (4) the tenant is required to make deposit of the arrears of rent which would in the context mean arrears of rent legally payable. Therefore, in view of the language of S. 14, it was held in Krishna Chandra Bose vs. Radharani (2) that the Court cannot make an order for deposit of any portion of rent which is barred by limitation. The relevant words in S. 13 (4' of the Rajasthan Act are "an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made defaults. The intention of the Rajasthan Act appears to be that a tenant who is sought to be ejected because he is in arrears of rent, can avoid ejectment under S. 13 (4) by depositing in Court or paying to the landlord the arrears of rent (whether they are whithin or outside the period of limitation) in respect of which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of 6 per annum from the date when such amount was payable upto the date of deposit. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that by virtue of Secs. 3 and 27 of the Limitation Act. 1963 the plaintiff's claim for recovery of arrears of rent barred by limitation is liable to be dismissed. That may be so, as the remedy of the landlord to recover the arrears of rent through the machinery of law is barred. But the rent due is not completely wiped out. In other words, it is only the remedy for its recovery that is knocked out but the rent still remains due. It is well settled that a debt does not cease to be debt because its recovery is barred by the statute of Limitation. Limitation no doubt extinguishes the remedy but except in the case covered by sec. 27 does not destroy the right. Sec. 27 applies only to suits for possession of property and has no application to the case of a debt. I am supported in this view by Rallia Ram vs. Fateh Singh (3), Mahipal Singh vs. Mam Ghand (4), and Ram Raoji vs. Amirkasam (5 ). As already stated above the Calcutta cases are based on the language of sec. 14 of that Act which is different from the language used in sec. 13 (4) of the Rajasthan Act. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that if a tenant want9 to take benefit of sec. 13 (4) of the Rajasthan Act he is bound to deposit in Court or pay even those arrears of rent recovery of which has become barred by time. It is conceded on behalf of the appellant that in the present case, full arrears of rent along with interest were not deposited in the trial court on the first date of hearing of the suit. The lower court was therefore right in holding that the defendant's defence was liable to be struck out. It has been further found by the courts below that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for more than six months. Consequently, the courts below had no option but to decree the plaintiff's suit for ejectment. At the fag and of the arguments learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant may have miscalculated the amount to be deposited. This submission, in my opinion, is devoid of substance. No such ground was raised much less substantiated at any stage in the courts below. Even no such ground has been taken in the memo of appeal filed in this Court. Consequently, I summarily reject this contention also. No other point was argued. This appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby rejected without any order as to costs. Learned counsel for the appellant prays that the appellant may be granted some time to hand over vacant possession of the house. In the circumstances of the case, I grant six months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises in question. .;