TYAGI, J. - (1.) M/s. Khetan Business Corporation (P) Ltd. , Bombay, hereinafter called the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the State of Rajasthan, Director of Mines and Geology, Udaipur, Mining Engineer, Udaipur, and one Shri R. K. Bhatt, proprietor Shreeji Industries, Bapu Bazar, udaipur praying that the order of the Government, dated 6. 04. 1979, directing a fresh survey of the mining area leased out to the petitioner, be quashed and the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 be restrained from making fresh demarcation of the area leased out to the petitioner Company and the pillars showing the boundary lines of the petitioner's area may not be disturbed.
(2.) THE case of the petitioner Company is that a mining lease of an area measuring 47. 37 hectares near village Kalahergarh, Tehsil Nathdwara, District Udaipur, was granted to the petitioner for 20 years on 31. 08. 1962 and the demarcation thereof was made on 17th and 18. 08. 1962. Pillars ABC and D were constructed to mark the demarcation on the spot and a lease deed was executed and got registered. In this deed it was mentioned that an area 47. 37 hectares of thereabout delineated on the plan and shown in red colour, had been handed over to the petitioner and the verification report of the said area was attached thereto. This verification report has been placed on record along with the lease-deed by the petitioner Company as Annexure 2. THE grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 4 Shri R. K. Bhatt, Proprietor Shreeji Industries, was granted prospecting licence for an area of about 698. 940 hectares adjoining the petitioners' area surrounding it from three sides. THE area of the prospecting licence of the respondent No. 4 was also demarcated by one Surveyor Shri Jagjeet Singh of the Mining Department and in that demarcation report it was mentioned that pillars AB and C as fixed by the Department for demarcating the petitioner Company's lease deed would as well be the pillars T. S. & R. respectively of the prospecting licence of Shri R. K. Bhatt. After sometime it so appears that Shri R. K. Bhatt found out that the area actually demarcated for the petitioner did not tally with Annexure 2, viz. , demarcation verification report and of that basis a representation was made by the respondent No. 4 that he was not satisfied with the demarcation of the pillars RS & T of his prospecting licence and, therefore, he sought the redemarcation of his pillars RST in accordance with the demarcation verification report Annex. 2. THE contention of the respondent No. 4 was that point A of the petitioner Company's area must be at a distance of 3 miles nd 380 ft. , from G. T. point 2305 at 289. 30o and since the pillar A was not correctly fixed by the Surveyor of the Department it should be changed and accordingly his pillar T must also be shifted. THE petitioner Company took a stand that 3 miles and 380 ft. from G. T. point 2305 was wrongly mentioned in the demarcation report, it should be correctly stated as 3 miles and 880 ft. in place of 3 miles 380 ft. and further asserted that the pillar A has been rightly fixed by the Department. He also contended that he has been working the area bounded by the pillars ABC and D for the last 8 years, and therefore, now the Department has no jurisdiction to change the area on the basis of the description report wherein by mistake wrong distance from the fixed G. T. point 2305 was erroneously written. THE Government, made certain inquiries and passed an order on 6. 04. 1970 (Annex. 8) of too closely examining the arguments of both the parties and recorded its finding that 3 miles and 380 ft. from G. T. S. point 2305 has been erroneously written in the demarcation report and it should be 880 ft. in place of 380 ft. and on that basis the claim of the respondent No. 4 that the pillar A must be shifted from its original position to a point which is 3 miles 380 ft. away from G. T. S. 2305 was rejected. It so appears from the facts mentioned in the write petition that the respondent No. 4 did not put on end to his claim and he still pursued the matter at the level of the Government. The Government, as is apparent from the reply filed by it, has now taken a different stand and it now thinks it advisable to re- survey the area to rectify the error and shift the location of pillar A of the petitioner's area. The contention of the petitioner Company is that the pit, which is being worked out by it for the last 8 years, contains a rich mineral deposits and the respondent No. 4 has an evil eye on that pit and this device has been thought of by the respondent No. 4 to deprive the petitioner from the actual area of operation by getting the position of pillar A shifted from its original position. If the Govt. is permitted to do so under the plea of rectification of error, which error the Govt. was not prepared to accept while passing order Ex. 8, the effect of it will be that the rich deposits of the petitioner company shall go to the area of the respondent No. 4, and it is from this view above that the respondent No. 4 is trying to pursue the matter at the Government, level and, unfortunately, according to the petitioner Company, the Government is not prepared to stick to its original stand. While accepting the position that the pillar A shall be fixed in accordance with the distance of 3 miles 380 ft. from G. T. S. point 2305 on a bearing of 289. 30o, the Government ordered that the actual demarcation be again made and the parties may be informed of this decision of the Government. The direction for a fresh survey and demarcation of the petitioner's area is issued by the Government in the name of fairness but the contention of the petitioner Company is that this order is without jurisdiction and neither under the provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 nor under any other law, the Government can disturb the position of the leased area granted to the petitioner Company in the year 1962. It may be mentioned here that while verifying the demarcation report, pillar A was determined by the Surveyor of the Mining Department with reference to certain local references, namely, the well and a `pipal' tree, but now it so appears that the said references did not find favour with the Government and the Government wants to have a re-survey of the entire plot for the fixation of pillar A with reference only to the distance of 3 miles 380 ft. from G. T. S. point 2305. The case of the petitioner in this respect is that looking to the terrain where the disputed plot is situate, a resurvey is bound to bring some disturbance in the location of the pillars as is clear from the document Ex. 7 produced by the Government itself, which shows that there are hillocks around this plot of land having slope of 65o to 70o and after every 10 or 15 ft. the surveyor has to take stepping before they could put up their instruments and use their palsmatic compass and the chain to have the correct survey of the place. This difficult terrain, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, bound to create some difference in the exact location of the pillar A and Mr. M. C. Bhandari has gone to this extent that every time the Surveyor cannot reach the exact location which he had reached when he had made the previous survey. However, the petitioner has challenged the order of the Government dated 6. 4. 1970, Annexure 8, and sought the protection of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to preserve his property rights in the land disputed, which was transferred to him by means of a lease created in his favour. It is under these circumstances that this writ petition has been filed with the prayers referred to above. The State Government has filed a detailed reply to this writ petition and it is strange that the stand taken by the State Government while issuing the impugned order Annexure 8 has now been totally charged and according to State's reply the case of the Government now is that the Surveyor ought to have demarcated the area of the petitioner Company from point G. T. S. 2305 instead of taking into consideration the local references made in the demarcation report, which, according to the Government was foundationally wrong as the Pakka pillars were not at the position where they must have been fixed. It has also been contended that the petitioner Company has dug pits on the boundary line, the part of which falls within the petitioner's land and a part of it lies beyond the boundary line. The Government has filed a map showing the correct position of the petitioner's area. This is Ex. 5. In that map it has been shown that the petitioner Company has transgressed the outer limits of the area granted to it as a mining lease. It has also been averred that it was within the competence of the Government to re-survey and re-demarcate the area and rectify the mistake, if any, committed while granting the mining lease. In para 12 of the reply this contention of the petitioner Company that 3 miles 380 ft. was wrongly mentioned in the demarcation report has now been challenged by the Government. The Government is not prepared to take 3 miles 380 ft. In the demarcation report as a typographical mistake. According to the Govt. the petitioner wanted the exact spot of pillar A at a distance from the fixed point as mentioned in various copies of the demarcation report. From the tenor of the Govt. reply, it appeared that the Government how thinks of shifting the plot from its original position to the plot which may how he found out by fixing pillar A at a distance of 3 miles 380 ft. from G. T. S. point 2305. But the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate stated at the Bar that the Government would not rectify that mistake of 3 miles 380 ft. but would re-survey the plot while taking the distance of pillar A at 3 miles 880 ft. from G. T. S. point 2305. The Government asserts very vehemently its right to rectify the error committed in fixing the pillar A even though the petitioner Company has been working on the plot for the last 8 years. The respondent No. 4 has also filed a long reply to the writ petition and the main stand taken by him is that the entire survey was done by the petitioner Company and the petitioner Company was responsible for getting the pillars erected on wrong places which are not in accordance with the description as contained in the survey report. As regards the local points of reframed, the contention of the respondent No. 4 is that they did not tally with the application given by the petitioner Company and, therefore, the pillar A could not have been fixed at the place where it has been fixed and hence, the area, which was marked to be leased out for the petitioner Company could not be leased out in accordance with the application made by the petitioner Company itself. Few other questions were raised by the respondent No. 4 claiming that he was entitled to get the area covering the working pits of the petitioner as his application for licence covers the area wherein the working pits of the petitioner Company's area situate. It is also contended that according to the application for mining lease filed by the petitioner the area bounded by the pillars A,b,c & D could not be leased out to the petitioner Company and their present pits, where the petitioner is working should be handed over to the answering respondent. Lengthy arguments were addressed at the Bar and both the parties pressed their view points with all vehemence at their command. The main question that arises for the determination of this Court is whether it is open to the Government now after 8 years of the grant of the mining lease to shift the position of pillar A and change the position of the leased area by refixing the position of pillar A with reference to the distance mentioned in the mining lease application and demarcation report. Before coming to the main question I would like to refer to the provisions of the law under which the mining leases are granted by the Government under the provisions of Mineral concession Rules, 1960, which have been framed by the Government of India under the provisions of the Mines (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Chapter III of these Rules deals with the grant of prospecting licences. It may be mentioned here that under Chapter III before the mining lease was granted to the petitioner Company, it had in its favour a prospecting licence for this very land along with some other land contiguous to it. Chapter IV of the Rules deals with the grant of the mining lease. Under Rule 22 an application for the grant of the mining lease has got to be filed by a person who is desirous of having a mining lease in his favour. This application must be accompanied under sub-rule (3) by a fee of Rs. 200/- and income-tax clearance certificate in form C from the Income-Tax Officer concerned and a certificate of approval in form A. It is also necessary that every such application for grant of the mining lease shall, in addition to those specified in clause (i), be accompanied by a deposit of five hundred rupees for meeting the preliminary expenses in connection with the grant of the mining lease. On filing such an application, the applicant gets an acknowledgment from the officer concerned of the Mining Department. These rules speak of certain rights of the lessee. Rule 33, however, lays down that when a mining lease is granted by the State Government, arrangements shall be made by the State Government at the expense of the lessee for the survey and demarcation of the area granted under the lease. It is under the provision of this rule that before a land in demised and the possession thereof is transferred to the lessee under the mining lease, it is certified by the Department and a demaraction thereof is made, so that it may be got identified at the spot. There is another rule which is of consequence for the purpose of deciding this petition, and it is Rule 56. This rule deals with the powers of the Government to rectify apparent mistakes and it reads as follows:- "any clerical or arithmetical mistake in any order passed by the Government or any other authority or officer under these rules and any error arising therein from accidental slip or omission, may, within two years from the date of the order, be corrected by the Government, authority or officer, as the case may be: Provided that no order prejudicial to any person shall be passed unless he has given a reasonable opportunity for stating his case. ' Mr. Bhandari appearing on behalf of the petitioner urges that by granting a lease under these rules certain rights are created in the property leased out to a lessee which are property rights. It is not only the interest in the property but the property itself is transferred under the mining lease and, therefore, the petitioner has a fundamental right to retain the property if the deed of the lease empowers him to do so. It is only under the terms of the deed that the rights between the State and the lessee can be determined. Learned counsel further argued that the Government has no better rights than a private person, and, therefore, if a lease has been granted to a lessee and if the Government thinks that my mistake some other plot of land, which was not to be leased out, was leased out to the lessee and the possession thereof has been transferred to him, then the only remedy open to the State Government is to proceed in accordance with the law of the land; simply because the Government is a powerful organization, it cannot disturb the rights of a lessee at its own sweet will as it can act only in accordance either with the rules, under which the lease has been granted, or according to the law of the land. His contention further is that the rules do not confer any such power upon the Government whereunder it can, after the lapse of 8 years, disturb the petitioner's rights in the land leased out to him. His argument is that after a particular plot of land is leased out for being exploited under the terms of the deed, the lessee gets his rights and he, therefore, cannot be always at the mercy of the Government officials who can take any stand in the name of mistake and disturb his working of the leased out area as and when it suits them. In the present case the contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner has been working the area leased out to him since 1962 and upto 1968, when an evil eye of the respondent No. 4 fell on he rich deposits of the petitioner in the area leased out to him, the petitioner was working without any interference from the Government but now as the Government wants to help the respondent No. 4 by disturbing the petitioner's possession, the question of rectification of a mistake has been taken out by the Government which, according to Mr. Bhandari, the Government was not empowered to take under the Rules or under the law of the land. According to Mr. Bhandari the Government has power under Rule 56 to rectify only a clerical or arithmetical mistake in any order passed by the Government and that can only be done within a limited period of two years and not beyond that and in the present case in the name of rectification of an error by having a survey of the plots to be leased out to the petitioner the Government wants to take away the entire deposits of the petitioner, which, according to the petitioner, the Government has no power to do. Mr. C. L. Agrawal, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4, on the other hand, contended that Rule 33 gives powers to the Government to have a survey and demarcation of the land leased out under the rules and this power, when read with Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act confers an unlimited jurisdiction on the Government to rectify the error in survey committed while surveying the plots as and when it is discovered. According to Mr. Agrawal where, by any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act any power is conferred then, unless a different intention appears, that power can be exercised from time to time as against rules. No further contended that the Mineral Concession Rules were undoubtedly enacted by the Central Government after the Central Act of 1887 by the Central Legislature and, therefore, the State Government by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 14 can exercise the power of survey from time to time as occasion requires. Since a dispute has how been raised by the respondent No. 4 that the pillar A has not been properly fixed up with reference to the distances given by the petitioner in his application for the mining lease as well as in his demarcation report, the Government with reference to the power which was required to be utilised by the Government while fixing the area leased out to the petitioner. These arguments pose two questions for my decision: (1) whether the Government can rectify an error of this nature after the lease was granted and the land was demised and the possession thereof was handed over to the lease; and (2) whether by virtue of Sec. 14 of the Central General Clauses Act 1887, the power which is conferred on the Government to demarcate and survey the land under Rule 33 of the Rajasthan Mineral Concession Rules can be exercised by it from time to time, as the occasion arises. I have very carefully gone through the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Except Rule 56, there is no other rule in the body of these rules which empowers the Government to rectify the mistakes committed by it while granting the lease. Rule 56 confers a very limited power on the Government to rectify the mistakes the clerical or arithmetical nature in the order passed by the Government or any other authority or officer under the Rules. It can also, under this power, rectify errors arising from accidental slip or omission, but if the error is such which does not fall within its ambit as mentioned in Rule 56, then the Government have no power to rectify the error. This error, which is now being sought to be rectified by the Government, is neither the clerical or arithmetical error, nor is it an error arising from accidental slip or omission. From the verification report Annexure 4 it is clear that the pillar A was fixed by the verifying authority with reference to certain local references, namely, the well and the `pipal' tree. In para 9 of this document the references are given for the pillars and for pillar A it is mentioned that pillar A is located in the cultivated land of Hirka S/o Vatha; A to a well by 360o, distance 118 ft. , A to the `pipal' three by 293. 30o, distance 160 ft. This reference does not make a mention of the distance from G. T. S. point 2305, though in para 6 the the starting point has been shown as G. T. S. point 2305. From this document it is clear that the authorities fixing the location of the pillar A bad done so deliberately with local reference of a well and `pipal' tree. It was also mentioned therein that the pillar A was located in the cultivated land of Hirka. It shows that the mention of the local references cannot be an error of accidental type, nor can it come within the purview of the term omission. In such circumstances, the application of Rule 56 is totally ruled out. It may be also be mentioned that even if this mistake had fallen within the purview of Rule 56, the Government had the authority to rectify it only for a period of 2 years from the date of the grant of the lease and not beyond that. The lease was granted to the petitioner Company as back as in 1962 and now after the lapse of 8 years the Government, under the plea of rectification of mistake, wants to shift the petitioner's plot of land from the place which is bounded by present ABC pillars to some other place, which may now be located with reference to a mistaken description given by the petitioner Company in its application for mining lease. In my opinion, the Government, under the Mineral Concession Rules, cannot claim any such power so as to shift the petitioner's plot of land to another place under the plea of rectification of mistakes. This brings me to the second ground of argument of Mr. Agrawal that under Rule 33 of the Mineral Concession Rules, the power of survey and re-survey is inherent in the Government by virtue of application of Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act. Rule 33 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, reads as follows:- "survey of the area leased.-When a mining lease is granted by the State Government, arrangements shall be made by the State Government at the expense of the lessee for the survey and demarcation of the area granted under the lease. ' From a perusal of the relevant rules it is clear that this power has been given to the Government for surveying and demarcating the land at the expense of the lessee himself with a view to transfer the land self with a view to transfer the land actually granted to the petitioner and it is only after this survey and demarcation that the land is demised and the description thereof has been entered in the mining lease. The lease deed has been produced by the petitioner Company as Annexure-1. In para 1 of this lease deed it has been mentioned that "all that tract of lands situated at near village Malargarh in Tehsil Nathdwara, the registration District of Udaipur containing an area of 47. 37 hectares or there abouts delineated on the plan hereto annexed and thereon coloured red plan and demarcation verification report are attached herewith' referred as the said land. From this description it becomes clear that there had been demarcation and the survey. It is only thereafter when the land has been surveyed and demarcated that the description of the land is mentioned in the lease-deed and the exact area thereof has been entered therein. The land that was actually demised and handed over to the petitioner Company as a lessee has been shown in a plan annexed with the lease-deed in red colours and it is not disputed by the parties that this very area was handed over to the petitioner company to be worked out under the terms of the lease. The language of Rule 33 further shows that this power of survey and demarcation is given to the Government when the mining leases are granted by the State Government. When once the lease has been finalised this power of demarcation and survey automatically comes to an end because the purpose for which this power is given to the Government in fulfilled. The words in Rule 33 "when a mining lease is granted' are significant to indicate that it is only at the time when the mining lease is granted that survey and demarcation of the area granted under the lease can be done by the State Government and not thereafter.
(3.) NOW let us see what is the effect of Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act on the powers which are now sought to be exercised by the Government for re-surveying and redemarcating the land. Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act reads: "power conferred to be exercisable from time to time.- (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any power is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887. ' The argument of Mr. Agrawal is that unless there is specific bar, a power conferred can be used by the Government any time when the occasion arises. In support of his argument reliance has been placed on an authority of the Assam High Court reported in Sandhiram vs. Deputy Commissioner (1 ). On a very careful perusal of the said authority, it can safely be said that that authority does not in any way carry further the proposition of law as put by Mr. Agrawal on the interpretation of Rule 33 of the Mineral Concession Rules read with sec. 14 of the Central General Clause Act. In the Assam case (supra), the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, granted certain grazing permits in unclassified forests and the permit so granted had a condition that the permit holder shall not change the `khutis' without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner, however, opened the matter of the `khutis' which was resented by the villagers. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed in the Assam High Court by those who were affected by the order of the Deputy Commissioner. In that case the learned Advocate General raised a question that the power to fix the place for grazing implies also the place for re- fixing the sites of `khutis' unless the language of the rules expressly provided to the contrary. This contention was based on the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Assam General Clauses Act, which was analogous to Sec. 14 of the Central General Clauses Act. Their Lordships, while discussing this argument observed 226 follows:- "circumstances which may make refixing of the sites of `khutis' necessary or desirable can be easily conceived. the effect of Section 15, Assam General Clauses Act would be that the competent authority shall have the right to refix them unless a different intention could be read into the rule. We do not think it is possible to read any such intention. The rule was primarily intended to prohibit shifting of sites by the graziers without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. It is not intended to create any limitation on the power of the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer. It cannot be said that the rule itself in express terms of by necessary implication or intendment prohibits refixation or the alteration of sites of `khutis' or Bathans during the currency of the permit. By virtue of Section 15, Assam General Clauses Act, the competent authority will have the power to fix sites for `khutis' from time to time according to the need of the situation. ' The observations of their Lordships of the Assam High Court justify it to lay down that the provisions of law under which a power is sought to be exercised from time to time with the aid of Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act must not have any such prohibition for the re-exercise of the power and if that provision, by implication or otherwise, contains prohibition for the exercise of a power conferred on an authority then the application of Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act cannot in any manner be invoked. While discussing rule 33 I have already observed that the power to survey and demarcate is given to the Government only at the time when the lease is granted and not as and when it suits the Government to shift the plot of the land leased out to the lessee. The purpose for conferring this power is quite obvious because without survey and demarcation the land cannot be demised. If once that purpose is fulfilled, that power cannot be invoked simply because the Government thinks that while exercising that power it had committed certain error. The right once created in the land and leased out to the lessor cannot be disturbed on the pretext of error in exercising the power of demarcation and surveying the plot of land by invoking the rule of interpretation as given in Sec. 14 of the Central General Clauses Act. In Nava Samaj Ltd. vs. Registrar of Companies (2) the provisions of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court and Desai J. after considering the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. D. N. Ganguly (3), observed that the questions to be examined in all cases must be to find out whether the scheme and object of the relevant provision of law whereunder the powers are conferred to an authority are repugnant to the rule of construction as contained in Secs. 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act. This question was also examined by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. D. N. Ganguly (supra ). In that case the Government had referred an industrial dispute to the Tribunal but later on the previous order was revoked by it. In this connection while discussing the scope of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, their Lordships of the Supreme court laid down:- "it is well settled that this section embodies a rule of construction and the question whether or not it applies to the provisions of a particular statute would depend on the subject- matter, context, and the effect, of the relevant provisions of the said statute. In other words it would be necessary to examine carefully the scheme of the Act, its object and all its relevant and all its relevant and material provisions before deciding whether by the application of the rule of construction enunciated by Sec. 21, the appellant's contention is justified that the power to cancel the reference made under Sec. 10 (1) can be said to vest in the appropriate Government by necessary implication. If we come to the conclusion that the context and effect of the relevant provisions is repugnant to the application of the said rule of construction, the appellant would not be entitled to invoke the assistance of the said section. We must, therefore, proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the Act itself. ' Sec. 14 also embodies a rule of construction like the provisions of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act and, therefore, the same principle shall have to be applied, while applying the provisions of Sec. 14 as are obtainable for the application of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. If the Government wants to exercise the power by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act, them I shall have to examine whether the Mineral concession Rules envisage any such contingencies under which the Govt. can survey the plot of land once leased out to a lessee. A lease, according to the Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of property. If the property is once transferred by executing a valid lease-deed the lessor cannot change unilaterally the conditions of the lease, unless he has been specifically authorised to do so. The authority is vested in the Government under Rule 33 to survey and demarcate the property for the purposes of leasing out the area under the Mineral Concession Rules so that authority may determine the exact location of the land which is sought to be leased out. After once it has been determined and the lease is completed by executing the lease-deed and transferring the possession thereof in accordance with the rules that power of survey and demarcation is exhausted. Such a power under these circumstances, cannot be said to have remained with the Govt. to change the location of the leased area as and when it suits the Govt. to do so. In this connection, reference may be made to Sec. 94 of the Evidence Act, which says that when language used in a document is plain in itself, and when it applies accurately to the existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was meant to apply to such facts. There is an illustration under this section and it reads: "a sells to B, by deed, "my estate at Rampur containing 100 bighas. ' A has an estate at Rampur containing 100 bighas. Evidence may not be given of the fact that the estate meant to be sold was one situated at a different place and of a different size. ' This illustration amply clarifies the position. If the description of the leased area generally tallies with the plot of the land actually demised by the Govt. and the possession thereof has been transferred to a lessee than on the principle embodied in this section, it will not be open to the Govt. to prove that it never wanted to lease out an area the description whereof is given in the lease-deed. A false description does not in any manner vitiate a document. The illustration to Sec. 94, Evidence Act would govern the circumstances of the present case. The Govt. while demarcating the land knew it perfectly well that it was leasing/out that plot of land to the petitioner Company, which was bounded by the pillars ABC and D. Even when the prospecting licence was granted to the respondent No. 4 and his land was demarcated by the Mining Department, these very pillars ABC & D were taken to be the pillars which bounded the plot of land leased out to the petitioner but later on when the respondent No. 4 discovered some discrepancy in the distance of pillar A from the G. T. S. point as given in the verification report, a doubt was created by respondent No. 4 about the exact piece of land for which the application for mining lease was given by the petitioner which also contains the same description of the location of pillar A as is given in the verification report. Upto 1966 when the area given to the respondent No. 4 was demarcated the pillars AB and C were treated correct and they were taken as pillars RS & T of the boundary of respondent No. 4. This goes to establish that the Govt. always took it that the piece of land leased out to the petitioner was exactly the same which it wanted to lease out to the petitioner. It is only after the respondent No. 4 entered in this business and he felt that his interests were in conflict with the interests of the petitioner Company that the Govt. was approached. In the beginning the Govt. adopted a just attitude and passed the order Ex. 8 that later on it changed its stand and in its reply to the writ petition the attitude adopted by it became quite unreasonable. The land having given by executing the lease deed and the possession having once been transferred and the mineral was allowed to be exploited for 8 years, the Govt. or the Mining Department, cannot now act in any manner which may prejudice and rights of the petitioner. If the Govt. feels that it had committed any error in leasing out the plot to the petitioner Company, then it can get the error rectified only through the aid of the court if the law of the land so permits. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 urged that this Court should not grant any relief to the petitioner Company under its extraordinary jurisdiction because a remedy by way of revision was available to the petitioner under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concessions Rules. On a careful perusal of Rule 54, I find that an application for revision can lie only when the order of the State Govt. or any other authority sought to be challenged is passed in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act or the rules. Learned counsel for the petitioner Company states that here the impugned order has been passed without any authority under the Act or the Rules and, therefore, the question of challenging this order before the Central Govt. does not arise. Rule 54 reads as follows:- "1) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act or these rules may, within two months of the date of communication of the order to him apply to the Central Government in implicate in Forum N for revision of the order. . . . " The mandate of this rule is very clear. Only such orders can be revised under this rule by the Central Government which have been passed by the State Government or the authorities under the provisions of the Act or the rules. If the impugned order does not come within the power conferred on the Government or the authority empowered by the Act or the rules, then that order cannot be challenged before the Central Government under Rule 54. The only forum for getting such orders set aside is this Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction or a civil court where a regular suit can be filed. In my opinion, this ground has no force and it is, therefore, rejected. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed and a direction is issued to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 not to dislodge the petitioner Company from the plot of the land bounded by the pillars ABC and D originally erected in 1962. If for correcting their own record the Govt. want to carry out any survey, the petitioner Company shall not come in the way of the Government to complete a survey. The petitioner Company shall get their costs from the respondent No. 4. . ;