TYAGI, J. - (1.) M/s.Duduwala & Co., which owns mica mines in the District of Bhilwara (Rajasthan), has filed this writ petition under Art 226 of the Constitution praying that The Minimum Wages (Rajasthan Amendment and Validation) Act, 1969, may be (declared void, as it has been enacted by the State Legislature, which had no authority under the Constitution to enact laws relating to the mines.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition are in a nut-shell as follows : THE State Government by a notification dated 31-7-1965, prescribed certain minimum rates of wages for the work-men working in the mica mines in the State of Rajasthan. THE petitioner and some 16 other owners of the mines challenged the validity of that notification inter alia on the ground that it was issued on the advice of the Advisory Board which was not properly constituted u/s. 9 of the Minimum Wages Act (Act No. 11 1948). This Court accepted the plea of the petitioner and declared that the minimum wages prescribed by the State Govt. on the advice of an illegally constituted Advisory Board were vitiated and, therefore, struck down the impugned notification. This judgment was delivered in Hariram vs. State of Raj.(1). The State by issuing Ordinance No. 4 of 1968 validated the minimum wages prescribed by the State Government under notification dated 31st July, 1965. This Ordinance was later on replaced by the Minimum Wages (Rajasthan Amendment and Validation) Act, 1969 hereinafter called the Amending Act). This Act was made by the State Legislature and the President of India accorded bis consent to it on 3rd April, 1969. By means of this enactment the Legislature added explanation to sec. of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which reads as follows - "Explanation - for the purpose of this section, an officer of the State Government shall be deemed to be 'independent' notwith-standing that the State Govt. is an employer in any Scheduled employment.*' The effect of this addition to sec. 9 was to nullify the pronouncement of this court in Hariram's case(l) that had laid down that the Government Officer in the Advisory Board cannot be treated as "independent persons" within the meaning of the term as used in sec. 9. A new sec. 31-A was also added to the Minimum Wages Act to validate certain minimum rates and wages prescribed by the State Government notwithstanding any judicial pronouncement to the contrary, or any defect or irregularity in the composition of the Committee or the Sub Committee, or the Advisory Board under sec. 5 or sec. 7 of the Minimum Wages Act. This Amending Act and the Ordinance have been challenged by the petitioner on various grounds, but I need not mention all those grounds, as this petition can be disposed of by deciding the main ground of the petitioner that the State Legislature was not competent to enact laws concerning the mines in the State of Rajasthan. According to the petitioner entry 55 in List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction to Parliament to enact laws regulating labour and safety in mines and oilfields, and this power of Parliament is not, in any manner, curtailed by entry 24 of List III (Concurrent List), which empowers Parliament as well as the State Legislature to enact laws regarding the welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. It may be mentioned here that entry No. 24 in List III of the Seventh Schedule was later on amended for the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the words "but only with respect to labour employed in the coal mining industries" were added after the words "maternity benefits". A reply has been filed on behalf of the State Government wherein the facts as mentioned by the petitioner giving the history of the impugned enactment have not been controverted, but this allegation of the petitioner that the State Legis-ture was not competent to enact the impugned Act, is vehemently opposed by the respondents. This issue raised by the petitioner relates mainly to the interpretation of the Constitution and, therefore, it will be relevant to mention the two entries around which the arguments of learned counsel representing the parties revolved. Entry No. 55 in List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution reads as follows : "Entry No. 55 - Regulation of labour and safety in mines and oilfields." Entry No. 24 in List III of the same Schedule reads like this : "Entry No. 24 Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits." Art. 246 clearly lays the field in which the Parliament and the State Legislature shall function and according to it Parliament has the exclusive power to enact laws in respect of any matter enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule. This list has been described by this Article of the Constitution as the "Union List". As regards the matters enumerated in List III which is termed as "Concurrent List" both Parliament and the State Legislatures have the power to enact laws, but in respect of the matters enumerated in List II (State List) it is only the State Legislatures that have the exclusive power to make laws. The scheme of this Article, therefore, makes it clear that in respect of the matters enumerated in List I Parliament has the exclusive jurisdiction to enact laws. It is in the background of the scheme of Art. 245 of the Constitution that I have to examine the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Hastimal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the Stage Legislature cannot enact laws in respect of the matter covered by entry No. 55 of List I even though entry No. 24 in List III may partially or wholly cover the came subject. In support of this contention he placed reliance on Indu Bhushan Bose vs. Rama Sundari(2) wherein their lordships have laid down that if the exclusive power to enact laws in respect of certain subjects has been given to Parliament that exclusive power cannot be circumscribed even if the power of State Legislature to enact laws in respect of that matter is spelt out in some other entry in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule. The facts of that case were that a suit was filed for eviction against the person who filed the appeal before the Supreme Court, in the Court of Munsif on the ground that regulation of house accommodation including control of rents in cantonment area being a subject in Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature was not competent to legislate on that subject and that the appellant was not entitled to protection under the Act which was extended to the cantonment area by the State Government. The High Court on a reference being made by the Munsif under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code declared the notification by which the State Act was extended to the cantonment area as ultra vires and void. The appeal was filed against that judgment of the High Court in the Supreme Court. An argument was advanced before the Supreme Court that the expression "regulation of house accommodation (including the control of rents) in such areas (cantonment areas)" as used in Entry No. 3 of List I of the (Seventh Schedule should be confined to the houses which are required or are actually in prosession of military authorities or military officers, and, therefore, the Parliament cannot be said to have possessed a power to regulate house accommodation by law which is owned and possessed by the civilians. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that connection discussed the meaning of the word "regulation" as used in Entry No. 3 and laid down that this expression cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to be confined to allotment only and not to other incidents, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of the house accommodation. The dictionary meaning of the word "regulation" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is "the act of regulating" and the word "regulate" is given the meaning "to control, govern or direct by rule or regulation". This entry, thus, according to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, gives the power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. While dealing with the arguments that the regulation of house accommodation does not control the eviction of private tenants, their lordships observed as follows : "This argument is based on the premise that the words "including control of rents" was introduced in Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the legislative authority of Parliament and making it wider that that of the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act. Such an assumption is not necessarily justified. It may be that the words"including the control of rents"were introduced by way of abundant caution or to clarify that the regulation of house accommodation is wide enough to include control of rents. The addition may have been made so as to concentrate attention on the fact that legislation was needed for the control of rent in the situation that existed at the time when the Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly." It is in this back ground that the Supreme Court observed that : "The submission made that this interpretation will lead to a conflict between the powers conferred on the various Legislatures in Lists I, II and III has also no force, because the reservation of power for Parliament for the limited purpose of legislating in respect of cantonment areas only amounts to exclusion of this part of the legislative power from the general powers conferred on State Legislatures in the other two lists." These observations of the Supreme Court lead me to infer that if the powers are reserved to Parliament to enact laws in respect of a subject enumerated in List I (Union List) even though the power is for limited purpose, then that power shall be used by Parliament in exclusion of the legislative power of the State Legislature even though such power is derived by the State Legislature under some entry in the other two lists of general nature. Relying on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Waverly Jute Mills vs. Raymon & Co.(3) learned Deputy Government Advocate argued that the entries enumerated in Lists I, II and III should be so construed that it may not result in any of these entries being rendered futile and otiose and such a construction which renders any one of the entries in the 3 lists futile must be avoided. He also urged that a liberal interpretation must always be given to the entries in List III (Concurrent List), which may go in favour of the Legislature. The authority cited by Mr. Tewari, in my opinion, does not help him to persuade this Court to interpret entry No. 24 of List III in such a manner that the State Legislature may enact laws in relation to the labours employed in the mines. If the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Waverly Jute Mills case(3) that the interpretation of one entry in these 3 Lists should not render any entry futile or otiose is applied for interpreting entry No. 24 of list 3 and if it is liberally construed so as to include therein the power for the State Legislature to enact laws relating the welfare of labour in the mines, then in my opinion Entry No. 55 in Union List so far as it relates to the "labour in mines" would become absolutely futile. If such laws be enacted by the Parliament under Entry No. 24 in the Concu-rent list then there was no necessity for the founding fathers to include the regulations of labour in mines in Entry No. 55 of the Union List. It is not disputed by Mr. Tewari that Parliament can enact law relating to the welfare of labour in mines under entry No. 55 of the Union List. If the Constitution has given this power to Parliament under entry 55 of the Union List then this power is to be used by Parliament to the exclusion of the State Legislatures as has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Indu Bhushan Bose(2) and such a power of Parliament cannot be circumscribed by giving wider meaning to entry No. 24 of List III. If the exclusive power of Parliament is admitted under entry No 55 of Union List then it ousts the State Legislature to enact laws on the subject, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. If any subject is included in the Union List then Parliament acquires exclusive jurisdiction to enact law in respect of that subject even though that subject may be covered by an entry in the concurrent list. Entry in the concurrent list shall, therefore, be interpreted subject to the entries in the Union list. There is no doubt that the language of entry 24 in the concurrent list is capable of being construed in favour of the State Legislatures to enact laws in respect of labour in mines, but even if we give a wider interpretation to entry No. 24 in the concurrent list we can not forget that the exclusive power of Parliament under entry 55 of the Union list would oust the jurisdiction of the State Legislature to enact laws regarding labour in mines. This view of mine finds support from the subsequent amendment of entry No. 24 in the concurrent list which was amended for the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the President by issuing Constitution (Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954. By this the words "but only with respect to labour employed in coal mining industries" were added to this entry after the words "the maternity benefits" which clearly mean that the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been specifically empowered inspite of entry 55 of the Union List to enact law in respect of labour working coal mining industries only. Mr. Tewari relying on this amendment urged that its effect is to curtail the powers of State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir to enact laws only in respect of labour employed in the coal mining industries. According to him if these words were not added in entry No. 24 then the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature could enact laws in respect of the labour working in all the mines and not in the coal mines only. Mr. Hastimal on the other hand argued that the word "only" indicates that the Constitution wanted to confer power under Art. 246 of the Constitution to enact laws only in respect of labour employed in coal mining industries and in no other mines. If we read this amendment in Entry No. 24 of the Concurrent List in the background of the language of Art. 246 then it becomes clear that these entries have been made in these three Lists to confer power on the respective legislatures to enact laws in respect of the subjects mentioned therein. The purpose of these Lists is to enumerate matters on which the Parliament or the State Legislatures can enact laws. These lists have not been made to curtail the power of the legislature but their purpose is to specify the subject on which the Parliament and State Legislatures can enact law in their respective domain. By using the word "only" with respect to labour employed in the coal mining industries "it is difficult to interpret that by the use of the word "only" the President wanted to curtail the jurisdiction of the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir to enact laws which it enjoyed under the unamended entry. If this amendment is properly read in the light of the language of Art. 246 of the Constitution then it becomes clear that by amending entry No. 24 in list III the President wanted to confer further power on the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir to enact laws for the welfare of labour employed in coal mining industries also which the legislatures of the States did not possess under the entry No. 24. In this view of the matter I agree with the arguments advanced by Mr. Hastimal that the State Legislature had no power to enact the impugned Amending Apt in respect of the labour employed in the mines. This matter is covered by Entry 55 of List I which exclusively confers jurisdiction on Parliament to enact laws in respect of labour in mines, which expression undoubtedly includes the welfare of labour. The Minimum Wages Act which was enacted for the welfare of labour and, therefore, this Act can be amended in respect of the labour working in the mines only by Parliament and not by the State Legislature. The impugned Act cannot, therefore, be sustained as it has been enacted by the State Legislature which was not competent to enact law regulating labour in mines which subject is covered by entry 55 of the Union List.
(3.) THE writ petition is, therefore, allowed, the Minimum Wages (Rajasthan Amendment and Validation) Act, 1969, is declared ultra vires the powers of State Legislature. No order as to costs.;