SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. - (1.) THIS application by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23-12-58 passed by Shri R. L. Shah, Additional Civil judge, Udaipur. It arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff, Rawat Mansingh, who is the Jagir-dar of Thikana Kothariya, against the defendant petitioner Tejsingh, who is a 'sikmi' Jagirdar under the plaintiff. The amount was alleged to be due on the basis of a bond dated samvat 2007 Phalgun Vadi 8 corresponding to 1. 3. 1951.
(2.) THE case of the plaintiff was that a sum of Rs. 1,001/- was payable by the defendant under the document in question in various instalments. THE plaintiff laid claim in respect of the last six instalments of Rs. 33o/-for samvat 2010, 2011 and 2013, which appear to have remained due. THEre is also a claim for interest on the amount. THE defendant resisted the claim. He admitted execution of the document in question but the main plea taken by the defendant is that since it was executed for payment of 'nazrana' in lieu of the plaintiff's granting permission to the defendant to make an adoption of Samrathsingh as his son, the consideration was illegal and, as such, was not recoverable. THE trial court found that the alleged debt claimed by the plaintiff related to 'nazrana for recognising the adoption of a boy by the defendant and, therefore, the agreement to pay such a debt being against public policy was void and could not be enforced in law. On the above ground, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge in a very elaborate judgment has disagreed with the view of the trial Court and decreed the claim. ' It is not disputed that the defendant was a 'sikmi' Jagirdar under the plaintiff the Jagirdar of Thikana Kothariya. It is also not disputed that originally according to the practice and tradition of the estate, the defendant was required to seek the permission of the plaintiff to take a boy in adoption or to have the successor to his estate recognised by the superior jagirdar. This sanction or recognition was obtained on payment of a nazrana to the superior Jagirdar. The defendant accordingly asked for permission which was granted by the plaintiff in consideration of the nazrana payable. It was argued that this nazrana is a valid payment which the defendant was under an obligation to pay and the court below was in error in holding that it did not constitute a valid consideration for the execution of the document. It is thus clear that the document was executed for the payment of a nazrana of RS. 500/- for taking a boy in adoption by the defendant and the whole point which the court below had to consider was whether the payment of such a nazrana was against public policy and whether it could be enforced in law. It seems to me that much of the discussion in the judgment of the court below is misconceived and erroneous and the court appears to have misdirected itself in holding that such a payment even if it may have a valid levy earlier, would be enforced any longer after the Constitution of India came into effect. The Full Bench case of this Court in Thakur Jai singh Vs. Thakur Sobhag Singh and others (1) furnishes a conclusive answer to the contention of the plaintiff. Whatever the position may have been prior to the Constitution and whatever rights the Superior thikanedars may have possessed earlier to enforce such a claim for recognising adoption by their subordinate tenure holders, after the Constitution all such rights of either the Rajpramukh or the superior Thikanedars could not be sustained on any ground of public policy. In the decision in question we pointed out that on the coming into force of the Constitution any power that the Rajpramukh enjoyed under Art. 7 (3) of the Covenant lapsed, that is, power to resume jagirs or recognise succession to the jagirs. As a mere executive head such a power could no longer be exercised either by the Rajpramukh or by the State of Rajasthan or by any one else and the succession of jagirs became purely a civil matter governed by the personal laws of the parties concerned and justiciable by the ordinary courts of the land. The adoption in this case appears to have taken place long after the Constitution came into force. The defendant sought permission to adopt on 28th January, 1949 and permission was granted on the 1st of March, 1951 on the defendant being asked to pay Rs. 501/- nazrana. In the eye of law, there was, therefore, no consideration for the document, because the claim for nazrana for the purpose of recognising adoption could not be enforced in law. The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, in error in upholding such a claim. The judgment, is, on the face of it, vitiated by this material illegality and must be set aside. The result is that the application is allowed, the decision of the trial court is restored and that of the lower appellate court is set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs. Since there is no opposition in this Court, there will be no order as to costs here ; but the defendant will get his cost of the courts below. .;