MODI, J. - (1.) THESE are six writ applications under art. 226 of the Constitution which raise an identical question of law relating to the interpretation of sec. 180 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (No. 111 of 1955) (hereinafter called the Act of 1955 ).
(2.) THE broad facts leading upto these applications are common and lie within a narrow compass. THE petitioners are khatedar tenants, being the heirs of the deceased Harhet, who was admittedly a khatedar tenant of certain lands, the khasra numbers whereof are mentioned in their respective applications, and it is unnecessary to mention these in detail for the purposes of our decision. It is also admitted that the several respondents in these applications are sub-tenants. THE case of petitioners in all these cases is a common one namely that some time in 1947, 48 their father Harhet, being old and blind, had admitted for only one year the several respondents as subtenants with respect to the respective khasra number, of which they are in possession, and from which they are sought to be ejected. At the expiry of the term of the tenancy the latter were asked to return possession of their respective lands, but they declined to do so as the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance 1949, (Ordinance No. IX of 1949) had in the meantime come into force and thereby they were protected from eviction. Consequently it was impossible for the petitioners or their father to take any legal proceedings to evict the various sub-tenants until that Ordinance was repealed and the Act of 1955 came into force on the 15th October, 1955. THEreafter Harhet filed an application in each of these cases under sec. 189 of the said Act for ejectment of the respondents sub-tenants. THEse applications were opposed by the respondents. THE Assistant Collector concerned, in whose court these applications were filed in the first instance, allowed them and ordered the ejectment of the respondents. THE latter went in appeal to the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur, from the orders of the Assistant Collector but without any success. THEn they appealed to the Board of Revenue. THE learned members of the Board allowed these applications. THEir main judgment was delivered in case No. 7/bharatpur of 1958 on the 13th June, 1958, against which writ application No. 152 of 1958 has been filed before us while the judgments in the other cases were delivered relying on the view taken in the last mentioned case and thus all the appeals were allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below were set aside and the various applications for ejectment were dismissed. THE present writ applications have been filed before us against the aforesaid orders. We may point out at the very outset that the case of the petitioners was that they were entitled to evict the respondents as the latter were their subtenants bidding from year to year within the meaning of clause (1) (b) of sec. 180 of the Act of 1 056. The learned members of the Revenue Board repelled this contention holding that the said clause would be attracted into application only where such tenancy had come into existence alter the commencement of the Act and not before. We cannot do better than to reproduce their reasoning in their own words: - "we would take up clauses (b) and (c) first. These provisions would govern those tenants or sub-tenants only who were admitted after the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act under sec. 45 for a fixed period of holding over from year to year or where the lease granted after the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has expired and the land holder requires land for his personal cultivation. Thus where the subtenancy was created prior to the enforcement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the sub-tenant had been in possession prior to this enforcement sub-sec. (b) and (c) would not be applicable. Such sub-tenants can be ejected only if they come within sub clauses (a) and (d) of the act". Proceeding further they went on to observe as follows: - "thus sub-clauses (a) and (d) provide for those cases where the sub-tenant was in existence at the time of the enforcement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Such sub-tenants have been conferred the right of acquisition of khatedari rights under sec. 19 of the Act. Any land held by a sub-tenant from the person mentioned in sec. 46 is exempt from the operation of 19 of the Act. But for purposes of this present appeal a reference to this provision is irrelevant. " The learned members, it seems, were perfectly conscious that a tenant or a subtenant from year to year in a case like the present would not be eligible to acquire khatedari right by virtue of the exemption given under sec. 46 read with sec. 19 of the Act. (This latter section has since been amended, but this is immaterial for our present purpose), but all the same they entertained the opinion that this should not and could not lead to the result that he could be ejected as in their opinion such ejectment was not permitted by law. Now before we examine the reasoning of the Board, we should like to quote sec 180 at this place: - "180 - Additional provisions for ejectment of khudkasht or Gair khatedar tenants or sub-tenants. (1) A tenant of khudkasht or a Gair khatedar tenant or a sub-tenant shall also be liable, on application, to ejectment on any of the following grounds namely: - (a) that the land held by such tenant or sub-tenant is in excess of the minimum area prescribed by the State Government for the district in which such land is situated and ejectment from the excess area is sought by the land holder for the purpose of his personal cultivation. " ' Provided that different limits may be prescribed for different districts or parts of a district, so, however, as to ensure a net annual income of twelve hundred rupees for such tenant or sub-tenant, exclusive of the cost of his labour and the labour, of his family. " (b) that he is a tenant or sub-tenant holding from year to year of under a lease or sub-lease granted after the commencement of this Act under sec. 45 of which the period has expired or will expire before the end of the current agricultural year, (c) that the lease or sub-lease granted after the commencement of this Act under sec. 4. 5 had expired and the land holder requires land for his personal cultivation: - (d) that the land had been under the personal cultivation of the land holder for a continuous period of five years immediately preceding the agricultural year 1948-49 and was during or after that year, given on lease or sub-lease for a fixed term and such lease or sub-lease would have been Terminated and the tenant or sub-tenant would have been liable to return possession of the land to his land holder but for the provision of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1 949 'rajasthan Ord. IX of 1949) unless in the meanwhile khatedari rights have accrued to such tenant or subtenant under any law during the term of such lease or sub-lease. Provided that land holder shall not be entitled to an order for ejectment under clause (d) unless the requires the land from 'which ejectment is sought for his personal cultivation, and unless such land is in excess of the minimum area prescribed for the purposes of clause (a); Provided further that a land holder holding thirty acres of irrigated or ninety acres of un-irrigated land under his personal cultivation shall not also be entitled to an order for the ejectment of a tenant under clause (d), and land holder, holding a less area shall be entitled to an order for such ejectment only from such area, as, together with the area already held by him, shall not exceed thirty acre of unirrigated land. Explanation.- one acre of irrigated land shall be deemed, for the purpose of this sub-section to be equivalent to three acres of unirrigated land. (2) The State Government shall prescribe the procedure to be adopted in cases where there are more tenants or sub-tenants than one, or where the area held by the tenant or sub-tenant is in excess of the area from which ejectment can be sought under clause (d) of sub-sec. (1 ). " This section occurs in Chapter XI of the Act of 1955 which deals with ejectment. Sec. 161 enacts that no tenant shall be ejected from his holding otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Sec. 169 then provides that a tenant could be ejected for arrears of rent, and the relevant procedure is provided in this connection in sec. 169 to 171. Sec. 174 deals with the ejectment of a tenant in execution of a decree for arrears of rent ; and sec. 175 governs ejectment for illegal transfer or sub-letting, while sec. 177 provides for same consequence owing to a detrimental act or breach of a condition of a tenancy by the tenant. This brings us to sec. 180. Obviously it enacts some additional provisions for ejectment in the case of khudkasht or Ghair khatedar tenants or sub-tenants. The introductory part of the section lays down that tenants of the kinds mentioned above shall also be liable (on an application) to ejectment on any of the grounds which are then mentioned in four cls. (a) (b) (c) and (d) thereof which we have already set out above. It is clear that these clauses are disjunctive and not cumulative or conjunctive. In other words, if a khatedar is able to bring his case within one or the other of these clauses, he would be entiled to evict, and it is not contemplated that he should necessarily bring his case within all of these clauses. Thus, broadly speaking, a landholder under cl. (i) (a) would be entitled to evict a sub-tenant or a Ghair Khatedari tenant or a tenant of khudkasht where the latter holds land in excess of the minimum area prescribed by the State Government for the district or part of the district in which such land is situate and the land holder, stands in need of the excess area for his personal cultivation. Similarly the land holder will also be entitled to eviction under clause (b), of a tenant or a sub-tenant (1) who may be holding from year to year or (2) who is holding under a lease or sub-lease granted after the commencement of this Act under sec. 45 when the period of such lease or sub-lease has expired or is about to expire before the end of the then current agricultural year. Then comes clause (c) and, with all respect, we may mention at once that it almost covers the same ground as that of clause (b) and yet lays down an additional condition for the landholder to fulfil, namely, that not only the lease or sub-lease granted after the commencement of this Act under sec. 45 should have expired, but the land holder further requires the land for his personal cultivation. Having given our most anxious consideration to the language of this clause and contrasting it with that part of clause (b), which largely covers the same ground, we are confronted with not a little difficulty in understanding the true import and effect of and harmonising these, two provisions inasmuch as there would hardly be a case which should be covered by clause (c) and which would not be covered by the latter part of clause (b ). The last clause (d) then provides that the land holder would also be entitled to the relief of eviction where the land with respect to which such relief is sought had been under his personal cultivation for a period of five years preceding the agricultural year 1948-49 (it will be remembered in this connection that the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 gave protection to any tenant who was in occupation of his holding on or after the 1st April 1948) and he gave it on lease or sub lease during or after the year for a fixed term, and the tenant or the sub-tenant would have been liable to return possession of the land to the land holder but for the provisions of the said Ordinance unless such tenant or sub-tenant should have acquired khatedari rights according to law in the meantime. Then there are two provisions to this clause, the first of which provides that before it could be taken advantage of, the land holder must show that he requires the land in question for his personal cultivation, and, further, that such land is in excess of the minimum area prescribed under clause (a), and the second is that a landholder holding the prescribed quantity of irrigated or unirrigated land under his personal cultivation shall not be entitled to obtain an order of ejectment under this clause. From what we have said above, two things stand out. In the first place, it is enough for a land holder to be entitled to relief under this section that he should bring his case within any one of the various clauses read with their relevant provisions, and it is not necessary that he should satisfy the conditions of each of the clauses read together. In the second place, it seems to us that the various clauses have not been designed so as to be mutually exclusive. At least two of them are partly over-lapping namely (b) and (c) and they appear to us to be also self contradictory inasmuch as while the second part of clause (b) does not require the element of personal cultivation of the land holder to entitle him to relief under that clauses, cl. (c) definitely prescribes it although both these provisions seem equally to come into play where lease or sub-lease has been granted after the commencement of the Act under sec. 45 and such lease or sub-lease has expired. In these circumstances we feel bound to point out that the language of this section is far from happy and the section seems to call for a suitable legislative amendment. But that apart, the principal point that falls for determination before us is, what is the precise meaning of clause (b) the relevant portion of which we wish to reproduce over again so that we are better able to concentrate on its language: - (b) that he is a tenant or sub-tenant holding from year to year or under a lease or sublease granted after the commencement of this Act under Sec. 45 of which the period has expired or will expire before the end of the current agricultural year. "
(3.) THE question is whether the phrase "granted after the commencement of this Act under Sec. 45," governs the words immediately preceding namely "a lease or sublease or it also governs the words "holding from year to year". THE learned members of the Board obviously thought that it governs both. THErefore it is that they felt persuaded to hold that a tenant or a sub-tenant holding from year to year must be a tenant who acquired that status after the commencement of the Act. We have thought deeply over the matter and have not been able to see our way to concur in this view. In order to be able to put a proper interpretation on this clause, we think that it will be desirable to rewrite this clause in its expanded form. (b) that he is tenant or sub-tenant holding from year to year or he is tenant or sub-tenant holding under a lease or sub-lease granted after the commencement of the Act under Sec. 45 of which the period has expired before the end of the current agricultural year. " It will thus become immediately clear that this clause provides for two contingencies. THE first being that the person sought to be evicted is a tenant or sub-tenant holding from year to year and the second being that he is a tenant or sub-tenant holding under a lease or sublease granted after the commencement of the Act under section 45 which has expired or about to expire during the current agricultural year. We have no doubt that words "granted after the commencement of the Act" are properly relatable to the words immediately preceding them namely "under a lease; or sub-lease and cannot possibly govern the phrase "holding from year to year. THE rules of grammar, to our mind, clearly forbid the latter meaning. Besides, sec. 45 appears to us to provide for fixed term tenancies and not for year to year ones, and therefore could not have been used in relation to year to year tenants. Again, it was conceded before us and, the learned members of the Board also appear to have been of the same opinion, that year to year tenants coming into existence after the commencement of the Act would be liable to be evicted under this clause. If so, we confess to our being entirely unable to discover any sound or rational principle why such a tenant or sub-tenant should be treated as being in a more advantageous position simply because he happened to become such a tenant from before the commencement of the Act. THE only submission of learned counsel for the respondents was that the policy of the legislature was to protect these from eviction. And as to this consideration of alleged policy, we are not at all assured. Sec. 14 of the Act lays down that there shall be three classes of tenants namely (a) khatedar tenants (b) tenants of khud-kash and (c) ghair khatedar tenants. THE last category would cover, "sub-tenants" according to this classification. : THEn sec. 15 lays down the definition of khatedar tenants. This Section, broadly speaking lays down that subject to the provisions of sec. 16, which specifies the lands in which khatedari rights cannot accrue every person who at the commencement of the Act was a tenant of land otherwise than a sub-tenant (the underlinig is ours) or a tenant of khudkasht or who after the commencement of this Act is admitted as a tenant otherwise than as a sub-tenant or a tenant of Khudkasht or is an allottee of land under sec. 101 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 1956, or who acquires khatedari rights under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, or who has acquired khatedari rights in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1955 or of any other law for the time being in force shall be a khatedar tenant and shall be entitled to all the rights conferred, and be subject to all the liabilities imposed on khatedar tenants by this Act. THEn some special provisions are made in this very section and in sec. 16 according to which khatedari rights cannot accrue in certain cases. THE only other section which seems to us to be relevant in this connection is sec. 19 which prescribes the condition for conferment of khatedari rights on tenants of khudkasht and sub-tenants under certain conditions. THE proviso to this section, however, clearly lays down that no such right would accrue where the land is held from any of the persons mantioned in sec. 46 of the Act. THE effect of this provision is that no khatedari rights can accrue on a sub-tenant where inter alia a tenant is a minor or a lunatic or an idiot, or what is relevant for our present purposes, is a person incapable of cultivating his holding by reason of blindness or other physical disability or infirmity. In these circumstances it is impossible for us to accept the position that the policy of the legislature is to afford protection to a tenant or a sub-tenant who is merely holding from year to year as such. It is true that a sub-tenant under certain conditions may acquire the status of a khatedar. But if he so acquires it his case will be taken out of the purview of clause (b ). Per contra, however, if a sub-tenant does not acquire the status of a khatedar then the law does not appear to us to give him any special protection. Sub-tenants at the time of the commencement of the Act were not treated or contemplated to be treated as entitled to any special protection. For, if that was so, sec. 15 of the Act would have been worded very differently and indeed would not mention them as not entitled to the status of khatedars in so many words. We, therefore, see no force in the so called consideration of policy, for they seem to operate, if at all the other way about. The correct legal position in our opinion is that the various clauses of sec. 180 have to be read separately, each in its full meaning, and due effect given to each of them, and that it would be hardly correct to import the language of one clause into that of the other and then assign a meaning to either or both of them, and that read in this way, clause (b) is divisible on its natural construction into two parts and that the second part of this clause which deals with "leases" or sub-leases has to be construed with reference to such of them as have been granted after the commencement of the Act, but the same qualification cannot properly be imported into the construction of the first part of this clause which deals with the case of a tenant or a sub-tenant holding from year to year and that this last mentioned clause is general in its language and would cover the case of a tenant or a sub-tenant holding from year to year whether after the commencement of the Act or from before its commencement. We should also like to point out in this connection, even at the cost of some repetition that we cannot import the content of cl. (c) into cl. (b) as the learned members of the Board of Revenue seem to have done. It is well settled rule of construction of statutes that while interpreting a provision, one must put a natural meaning on its words and give effect to the same except perhaps in rare cases where such a course would reduce the law to an absurdity. We have, however, no hesitation in saying that such an exceptional case hardly arises here, while we are called upto to interpret the first part of cl. (b) under which the petitioners have sought to frame their case for ejectment of the respondents. In fact it seems to us that putting any other meaning on this clause would be to put a strained construction on the words used therein, or it may even amount to ignoring certain words which have been used by the legislature, and that we have no warrant so to do. We should like to add that if the real intention of the legislature is different from what we have been able to find out from the language used by it, it is for that body to make its meaning clear beyond all doubt or dispute and we would leave this matter at that. So far as the language of this clause therefore is concerned, we have no hesitation in holding that the meaning put upon this clause by the learned members of the Revenue Board involves a palpable and manifest error of law, which we feel it is our duty to set right. We may add, in passing that in coming to the conclusion to which have, we have looked at the corresponding sec. 175 of the U. P. Act, secs. 87 and 88 of the Jaipur Land Revenue Code and secs. 92 and 93 of the Marwar. Tenancy Act, and that a comparison of the wording of these sections with clause 1 (b) of sec. 180 of the Act of 1955 greatly fortifies us in coming to the conclusion at which we have arrived above. We hold accordingly. If it may be permissible for us to say so we should like to point out, with all respect, that while an effort has been made to make this section more comprehensive than the corresponding sections of the other Acts to which we have referred above, perhaps as much care has not been taken as was required to ensure consistency and harmony between the various provisions contained in the section. The only other question which remains for us to consider is whether the respondents are sub-tenants from year to year within the meaning of clause 1 (b) of sec. 180. Our answer to this question is in the affirmative. There is a concurrent finding of the first two courts that the respondents had been admitted by the original khatedar Harnet as sub-tenants for a period of one year, as he was old and blind, some time in 1947-48 and thereafter the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 having come into force, the farmers declined to return possession to the land holder. It seems to us that, in these circumstances, the fixed tenancy of one year stood terminated and that thereafter it was converted into a year to year tenancy, the reason being that the original tenancy had come to an end and the tenancy that followed was by force of law and could not but have been a year to year tenancy. We should like in this connection to draw attention to the provisions of sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act which cannot in terms apply to agricultural tenancies, but all the same, the principle thereof may well be taken into consideration as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience to determine whether this was a tenancy from year to year, and viewed in this perspective we think that it was. The correct position in law in these circumstances is that the petitioners' case squarely falls within the ambit of sec. 180 (1) (b) and in holding to the contrary, the Revenue Board fell into a plain and serious error of law which is sufficient to attract our certiorari jurisdiction. See Deo Dutt Sharma Vs. Zahoor Ahmed Zaid (1 ). In the result, we allow these writ applications quash these orders of the Revenue Board and restore those of the Additional Commissioner in all the cases before us. Under the circumstances, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs. ;