- (1.) IN this appeal under S. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act 1952, preferred on behalf of the State of Rajasthan a preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent that the copy of the judgment filed alongwith the memorandum of appeal is not a copy requisite to be filed under O 41, r. 1. CPC. and Rule 17 of the Rajas-than Revenue Courts Manual. The contention is that the copy filed by the learned Government Advocate is not a copy obtained by him under sec. 76 of the INdian Evidence Act, nor is it a "certified copy" containing an endorsement that it has been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the said sec. 76 and the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual and therefore a true copy of the impugned judgment. IN support, has been cited a judgment of the Board, to which both of us were a party, in appeal No. 70/ Jaipur 1959 Isar Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties in this matter and examined the copy also. At the very outset it may be made clear that the facts of the Appeal No. 70/ Appeal/ Jaipur/1959 were entirely different from the facts in the present appeal. In that appeal the copy filed by the appellant was not a copy certified anywhere to be a "true copy" of the impugned order, but only a copy thereof endorsed by the Officer passing that order to the appellant in accordance with sec. 33 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act. And it was in that context that it was examined in the appeal as to whether a copy of that type, without bearing any certificate of its being a "true copy" could be treated to be a "copy" requisite to be filed under O. 41, r. 1. C. P. C. alongwith the memo of appeal. In the present appeal, on the other hand, the copy filed alongwith the memorandum of appeal bears an endorsement under the signatures and seal of the Dy. Collector Jagir Bhilwara passing the impugned order himself alongwith the date on which those signatures were put with a certificate that it was the "true copy" of the judgment. Notwithstanding this certificate of the Dy. Collector Jagir Bhilwara of the copy being a "true copy" present on the copy submitted in this appeal alongwith memorandum, the learned counsel for the respondent characterises it as being not a "certified" copy because of the absence of an endorsement on it to show as to on what date the Govt. Advocate had applied to obtain it, when it was prepared, when it was issued, what fees were charged and who had prepared it and whether it had been compared with the original and found to be correct or not. The question for determination, therefore, in this case is not what has been already determined in appeal No. 70/jaipur 1959 cited on behalf of the respondent, but entirely a different one; whether a copy bearing a certificate under the signatures (duly dated) and seal of the officer passing the judgment under appeal to be the "true copy" of the impugned judgment would be sufficient to meet the requirements of O. 41, R. I CPC and the Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Court Manual or not. Section 75 of the Indian Evidence Act is not only a section to define what would be a "certified copy" of a public document but also a section enabling a public officer having custody of a public document to give any person, who has a right to inspect that document, on demand, a copy of it on payment of the required fees therefor together with a certificate written at the foot of such a copy that it is a "true copy" of such document, such certificate being dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title and seal whenever such-officer is authorised by law to make use of a seal. It is the copy so certified and sealed that may be called, according to this section a 'certified copy'. The relevant provision of Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manwal also lays down a similar procedure for the granting of the copy as well as what would be the endorsements made by the officer granting such a copy on the copy prepared by him. It is the head copyist who has been made responsible for the grant of such a copy in the Rajasthan Revenue Court Manual. But according to the Explanation of section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act any officer, who, by the ordinary court of official duty, is authorised to deliver such copies shall be deemed to have custody of such documents within the meaning of this section, this is it to say for the purpose of granting copies. The first point, therefore, to see is whether the officer passing the judgment under appeal itself is an officer who has got the custody of the judgment or not and who can grant the copies; if applied to, or not. There is no law, quoted at the Bar or in our knowledge, which can declare the officer passing the judgment himself not to be having a custody of the judgment and not authorised to grant a copy thereof. Even the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual does not contemplate that the officer passing the judgment would not grant a copy thereof. The provision relating to the granting of a copy by the head copyist are only enabling provisions and so are the provisions of sec. 76 Indian, Evidence Act. This view finds support in AIR 1943 Mad. 331 wherein, on a question arising whether the copy of an assessment order by an Income-Tax officer could be granted or not under that section, it was held that the section was "only an enabling sect on as regards the issue of certified copies. We are not, as at present advised, prepared to read it as an exhaustive provision, much less as a provision declaring the grant of copies illegal in any particular case". True, in the case the question was whether the grant of a copy of an assessment order recorded by an Income-Tax officer was legal or not, and it was in that context that the above observations were made by the Madras High Court. But still they can be very well read at least to convey that section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act is only an "enabling section" as regards the issuing of certified copies and that copies can be issued even otherwise than under it, and it cannot be regarded as an "exhaustive provision in this behalf. The same can be said of the provision regarding the issuing of the copies in the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual. With the above position of law, therefore, a copy obtained otherwise than under section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, or in any manner other than provided under the relevant provision of the Rajasthan Revenue Court Manual can also be treated to be "true copy" of the judgment under appeal, if it is certified to be so under signatures (duly dated) and seal of the officer passing the judgment himself. Such a copy would very clearly serve the purpose of conveying to the appellate court the order appealed against correctly, as was observed by us in appeal No. 73/jaipur/1959 to be the main purpose of the memo of appeal being accompanied by a "certified copy". If the copy as has been produced in the present appeal bears a certificate of the Dy. Collector Jagir Bhilwara passing the judgment, under appeal that it was a "true copy" of this judgment, we can be sure while looking into it that it was the "true copy" of the impugned judgment and the purpose for which it is required to be filed is served. I Before parting with the case it would also be significant to observe that the learned counsel for the respondent has refrained from making a definite allegation that the impugned copy has not been obtained by the Government in any lawful manner. What he has contended, even when addressed specifically on this point, is that as the record of the lower court present before us with this appeal does not contain any application made by the Government for obtaining the copy of this judgment, this copy cannot unless it was made sure that it was so obtained, be taken to be a "certified copy" obtained in the manner required by sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is a common knowledge that generally the applications for obtaining copies of the judgments are not kept alongwith the record of the case prepared in the trial court, but separately in a separate branch where there is a separate copying branch, or with a separate clerk preparing the copies and not always put on the original record of the case itself. When the learned counsel for the respondent is not prepared to make a definite allegation that no such application was available with the trial court even separately from the record received here, there does not arise any necessity of verifying tins fact from the lower court and doubting the veracity of the copy of the judgment produced on behalf of the appellant only on this ground there being a very clear certificate by the Dy. Collector Jagir himself that it was a "true copy" of the judgment given by him. It would be a also significant to observe in this connection that the provisions of sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act as well as the relevant provisions of Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual for the issuing of the copies only lay down what was to be endorsed on the copies were to be issued. What is most important and most necessary for the purpose of assuring the appellate court that it could without any doubt and with certainty take the copy produced before it alongwith the memorandum of appeal to be the correct copy of the judgment under appeal was that it should bear a certificate of the officer that it was a "true copy", and no other endorsements requited to be made thereon. They are endorsements that the officer granting copies should generally make. And if they do not care to make them, they can be taken to task for the default. But an appellant cannot certainly be penalised for the absence of such endorsements due to the default of the officers issuing the copy. If the copy produced docs bear a certificate that it is a "true copy", the requisites of the law in this behalf should be taken to have been fulfilled and the absence of other endorsements alone should not in any way be taken to take away the value of such copy being a "certified true copy". AIR 1944 Allahabad 114 may also be referred to with advantage in this connection wherein the learned Judges have held that sec. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act prescribed a particular form of certificate in respect of certified copies but that form alone was not necessary in every case. What law required was only a certificate that the copy was a correct copy. The form of the certificate was doubtless, of no importance. What was required was only a certificate that it was a true copy purporting to be signed by some responsible officer. Under the circumstances, we find no substance in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent, and hold that a "certified copy" has been filed alongwith memorandum of appeal by the learned Government Advocate, and that the appeal would now be fixed up for hearing on merits. . ;