- (1.) THIS is a revision application filed by Shri Balkishan Pareek, Government Advocate on behalf of the Executive Engineer, Electrical & Mechanical Department, Jodhpur against the appellate decision of the Commissioner, Jodhpur which set aside an order passed by the Additional Collector Jodhpur on 6. 1. 1958.
(2.) THE facts in brief are that the Executive Engineer, Elec. & Mech. Department Jodhpur sent a requisition under Sec. 3 of the Public Demand Recovery Act on 12. 1. 56 to the Collector, Jodhpur against the non-applicant Shri Girdhari Lal for recovery of Rs. 15,296/11/ due from him for electric charges. A certificate under sec. 4 was filed by the Additional Collector, Jodhpur and a notice under sec. 6 was served on the non-applicant. THE non-applicant filed petition denying liability under sec. 8 of the Act urging that a certificate for the same amount, and on account of the same dues had already been filed in 1953 in the court of the then Collector Shri C. S. Gupta who having held on 12. 2. 54 that the electric charges were not covered under the public demand, ordered that the recovery under the Public Demand Recovery Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') could not be made. It was further urged that the Addl. Collector was not competent to review his own order and could not issue any second certificate for the recovery of the same amount, which had been already held as not recoverable under the Act. The learned Additional Collector repelled this contention and held that the proceedings under the Act could be entertained every time a fresh requisition was made because the jurisdiction of the court arose only when a certificate was presented, and ended when it was dropped. He further held that dues of the Electrical Department were realisable as a public demand and a certificate should be issued. The non-applicant went in appeal under Section 23 (A) of the Public Demands Recovery Act to the court of the Commissioner Jodhpur, who held that the Collector could have reviewed his own order only when he found some new or important matter, or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the appellant, or could not be produced, or there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or other sufficient cause. As none of the conditions were fulfilled, the Addl. Collector could not review his order. Furthermore, he set aside the argument of the Addl. Collector that a fresh jurisdiction was created when a fresh requisition was received with the observation that it would militate against the principles of natural justice if the question once decided on merits is again allowed to be re-agitated. On. these grounds the learned Commissioner accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the Addl. Collector. It is against this order that this revision has been filed. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. The learned Government Advocate has contended that the observation of the learned Commissioner that there were no grounds for reviewing the case were wrong; as the dues fell under Clause VI of the Schedule of the Act, and ignoring of this provision of law was certainly a good ground for the readmitting of the case by the learned Addl. Collector. It was further contended that the learned Commissioner had erred in applying the principles of resjudicata to this case. The Collector cannot be called be court and therefore principle of resjudicata could not be applicable. A preliminary objection has been raised by the counsel for the non-applicant to the entertainment of this revision. He contended that memo of revision had been signed by Shri Bal Kishan Pareek for Executive Engineer, Electrical & Mechanical Department, when under Sec. 60 of the Elcetricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the State Electricity Board had assumed all the powers and functions of the State Government in respect of the running of electrical undertakings. The revision, therefore, should have been filed on behalf of the State Electricity Board. We have considered this argument and we are not impressed with it. In our opinion the Executive Engineer Electrical and Mechanical Department Jodhpur continued to exercise the same powers as before even after the responsibility for running the undertaking was transferred from the Government to the State Electricity Board, unless these powers were specifically withdrawn. No such order withdrawing these powers has been shown to us. We, therefore, hold that the Executive Engineer Electrical & Mechanical Department Jodhpur was competent to file this revision. The first contention of the learned Government Advocate was that the learned Commissioner went wrong in observing that the Addl. Collector could not review his own order. The Public Demand Recovery Act did not provide for any review. The powers of reviewing, therefore;, are governed by sec. 114 and O. 47, R. 1 C. P. C. It is evident from the perusal of O. 47 R. 11 that the power of reviewing its order by a court is limited to the following contingencies : - 1. When ja new and important matter of evidence is discovered which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of, or could be produced by the person aggrieved by a decree or an order at the time when the decree was passed or order made ; 2. there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record ; 3. there was other sufficient reason. It is obvious that the applicant has not invoked the powers of review on the ground that any new and important matter or evidence had come to his knowledge since the order of the Collector dated 12. 2. 54 was passed, nor on the ground that there was any mistake or error apparent on the face! of the record. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the Collector Jodhpur should have considered that these dues fell under clause VI of the Schedule of the Act cannot be said to be a sufficient cause within the meaning of O. 47 R. 1 CPC. It was a question of interpretation of law. It is practically a well settled principle that wrong exposition of law or a wrong decision on a question of law would not be allowed to be a ground of review. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the learned Commissioner rightly held that the Additional Collector could not review he order passed by the Collector dated 12. 12. 1954.
(3.) THE next point urged was that for the application of sec. 11 or the principle of res judicata, the former decision must be that of a court. THE Collector was an administrative Officer and the Administrative Officers were not courts, though they may conduct certain proceedings in conformity with the principle of natural justice. The first point for determination in this context would, therefore, be whether the Collector would be 'the court' while acting under the Public Demands Recovery Act. This point has been recently decided in Kapur Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan (1960 RLW, 236) by the Rajasthan High Court wherein the learned Chef Justice has been pleased to observe "that the Collector acting under the Rajasthan Publ:c Demands Recovery Act is a revenue court cannot be doubted as under the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Designation) Ordinance 1949, in sec. 2, the Presiding Officer of a District Revenue Court is designated as the Collector". The present case was decided by the Collector on 12. 2. 1951, when the Land Revenue Act too came into force. He would, therefore be deemed to have acted as court. The next question for decision is whether a fresh certificate could be filed when a similar certificate involving the same amount and relating to the same demand has been held by the Collector to be not included in Schedule of the Act and therefore the amount not recoverable under the provisions of the Act, or not, Sec. 11 of the C. P. C. has not been made applicable to proceedings under the Public Demand Recovery Act. We have been led through a member of cases where the principle of resjudicata was applied even though Sec. 11 C. P. C. was not made applicable; this principle was applied in AIR 1953 Supreme Court at page 33 to a case under the Land Acquisition Act, to a case under U. P. Agricultural Relief Act in A. I. R. 1956 page 237, to a case under the Bengal Money Lenders Act in A. I. R. 1956, Cal. 613, to a case under the Arbitration Act in A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 251 and to a case under the U. P. Agricultural Relief Act in A. I. R. 1959 All. 764. The learned counsel for the applicant has, however, referred us to a number of authorities such as AIR 1954 Ajmer 39, AIR 1956 Bom. 375, AIR 1946 All. 719 and 1952 All. 48. We have examined these authorities and find that the principle of res judicata was not made applicable in those cases either because the decisions were not made by courts but by tribunals or administrative Officers, or substantial issues for adjudication between the parties were held to be different (as in Bombay case ). ;