RANAWAT, J. - (1.) THIS is a reference by the Additional Sessions Judge of Sikar dated 24. 8. 1959. It came up for hearing before Hon'ble the Chief Justice but as a point of law was involved in it, it has been referred to a Division Bench.
(2.) THE facts of the case are very simple. THE accused Surya Narain is alleged to have driven motor bus No. R. J. V. 331 and while doing so, he dashed the bus against Onkarlal who was thrown aside and a baby two years old whom he was carrying in his lap was thrown in front of the vehicle and consequently was over-run and died. THE police challaned Surya Narain under sec. 304-A read with sec. 279 Indian Penal Code. As Surya Narain had no license for driving a bus, he was also challaned separately under sec. 3 read with sec. 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act. THE complainant Prabhudayal also lodged a complaint under sec. 304-A read with sec. 279 Indian Penal Code. THE Magistrate consolidated the two cases instituted on the complaint together with the challan and he tried the accused for both the cases jointly. THE case under sec. 304-A and sec. 279 Indian Penal Code took some time and the other case under the Moor Vehicles Act concluded on the 19th of May, 1958. THE Magistrate held that it was not proved that the accused Surya Narain. was driving the bus R. J. V. 331 at the time of the accident and he, therefore, acquitted him of an offence under sec. 3 read with sec. 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act. THEreupon the accused contended in the two cases that were still pending in the Court of the Magistrate that the said finding in the case under the Motor Vehicles Act was binding on the prosecution, and that the cases under sec. 304-A and sec. 279 Indian Penal Code could not proceed thereafter against the accused. THE Magistrate accepted the contention of the accused following the decision of the Supreme Court in Pritam Singh and another Vs. THE State of Punjab (1), dropped those proceedings and acquitted Surya Narain on the 31st of March, 1959. THE complainant then made an application in the Court of the Magistrate that the proceedings under sec, 304-A and 279 Indian Penal Code on his complaint should continue even though the case of the State failed in view of the aforesaid authority of the Supreme Court. THE Magistrate dismissed that application on the 9th of May, 1959. THE complainant then went in revision to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Sikar which has resulted in this reference. In the opinion of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the decision of the Supreme Court in Pritam Singh's case (1) is applicable to the parties to the earlier case only and it is not applicable to the case of the complainant who was not a party to the previous decision. THE learned Judge has recommended that the proceedings under sec. 304-A read with sec. 279 Indian Penal Code should be allowed to continue on the complaint of Prabhudayal. THE learned Judge has also pointed out that the Magistrate was wrong in consolidating the two cases and in holding a single trial. He has considered this circumstance to be one of the reasons for the reference. The point at issue in this case lies in a narrow compass. The accused Surya Narain was acquitted in the case under sec. 3 read with sec. 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act on the finding that it was not proved that he was driving the vehicle R. J. V. 331 at the time the incident took place in which the son of Prabhudayal suffered death. That finding is binding on the prosecution in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Count in Pritamsingh's case (1 ). In that case, the accused was acquitted under sec. 19-F, Arms Act, and it was held that it was not proved that two revolvers were in the possession of the accused. In a subsequent case under sec. 302 Indian Penal Code in which it was alleged that the accused committed murder with the revolvers for the possession of which he was challaned under sec. 19-F of the Arms Act, it was held that the finding in the previous decision under sec. 19-F was binding on the prosecution and the prosecution could not be permitted to lead evidence and claim a different finding on that particular fact. The rule laid down in Pritamsingh's case (1) was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Banwari Vs. State of Rajasthan decided on 7th February, 1961. In Banwari's case, the accused was acquitted under sec. 20 of the Arms Act and he was prosecuted for offence under sec. 392 read with sec. 397 Indian Penal Code, and the only evidence against him consisted of the statement of the approver and the evidence of the recovery of a gun. The High Court convicted the accused on the basis of the evidence of the approver as corroborated by the testimony of the recovery of a gun. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that as the accused was acquitted under sec. 20 of the Arms Act and as it was held that the recovery of the gun from his possession was not proved, it could not be accepted in the subsequent trial under sec. 392 and 397 Indian Penal Code that the fact of recovery of the gun from the possession of the accused was established and that circumstance would not be taken into account for corroboration of the evidence of the approver. The accused was, in these circumstances, acquitted. The decisions in Pritam singh's case (1) and in Banwari's case lay down the rule that a decision in a previous trial in favour of the accused is binding on the prosecution in a subsequent trial. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has tried to distinguish the Pritamsingh's case (l) on the ground that though a finding in a previous case may be binding as against the State yet it is not so binding against the complainant. We do not think this distinction is well founded. A private complaint may be made by any person and there may be a multiplicity of complaints. Under sec. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no notice is taken of the complainant being a party to the proceedings. If a decision is binding on the State it would as a matter of fact be binding on all those persons who may take upon themselves the role of complainants. The State and the complainants occupy the same position in criminal cases and so far as the rule of "autrefois" is concerned, it is equally applicable to the State and to the complainants, no matter whether the name of a particular complainant is or is not on the record. We need not, in this view of the matter, go into the other ground referred to by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in his order of reference regarding consolidating the complaint case with the police challan case. The prosecution can not succeed in the challan case on account of the fact that the finding in the case under sec. 3 read with sec. 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act is that the accused Surya Narain was not driving the vehicle R. J. V. 331 at the time the occurrence took place. The case against him under sec. 304-A and 279 Indian Penal Code can not proceed because it is held in the other case that the accused was not driving the vehicle. The reference fails and is dismissed. .;