- (1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of the Additional Commissioner, Jagir, Jaipur dated 1. 4. 60.
(2.) THE case relates to the personal property of the appellant. THE only item being pressed in this appeal is relating to the property named 'rhagagarh-ka Jungal. ' This property has been disallowed to be included in the personal property of the jagirdar appellant on the ground that neither it was a' jungle' nor had it been entered into the khata of the jagirdar. THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that his claim to this property was not in its capacity as a "jungal" but in its capacity as a "bir" or "grove. " THE argument is that it contained a number of trees which had been continuing in the possession of the Jagirdar himself and that, therefore, vide sec. 23 (1) (iv) of the Act. He based this argument on the contention that the meaning of the word "grove" in the dictionary compiled by Nalanda is also "chhota Jungle. " THE words used in the Acts are not generally interpreted in accordance with their dictionary meaning, when the term happens to be defined in any of the relevant enactments of the State. Definition of the term "grove" would be found in sec. 5 (15) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. A perusal thereof would go to show that by "grove land" is meant only the agricultural land but which cannot be so used because of the number of trees growing thereon. This cannot, therefore, be taken to mean a "chhota Jungle" also. Another argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that he had not been given enough opportunity of proving his case. In the first place, this argument is not borne out by the record. The appellant was given opportunity twice, on 2. 2. 60 as well as on 7. 3. 60, to appear and prove his case, which he did not avail of. This is borne out even by his own application dated 8. 3. 60, in the second paragraph whereof he has very clearly stated that he should be given one more opportunity to prove his case. That the learned Additional Jagir Commissioner did not accede to this request cannot be a ground for letting him have another opportunity of proving his case. Besides, the question of considering this request could arise only when the claim itself could be found sustainable under law. As has been held above, neither a grove nor a "beer" unless it was entered into khud-kasht of the Jagirdar, could he declared as his personal property. It is an admitted position in this case that the disputed land is not entered into the khud-kasht of the appellant. There is thus no force in this appeal which is hereby rejected. .;