SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. - (1.) WE have heard Mr. Hastimal, learned counsel for the petitioner, at great length in support of this application. Learned counsel has presented bis case with his usual vigour and ability but we regret we do not feel persuaded to grant him the relief claimed in this application. The application is directed against the order of the Board of Revenue dated 18th November, 1960, and the petitioner prays that the said order should be quashed by a writ of certiorari.
(2.) THE relevant facts may be briefly set out: THE Jagir of Thikana Kotari was resumed on 1st August, 1954 in the life time of the Jagirdar Kaviraj Durgadan who filed a list of his properties on 5th October, 1954 in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (Act 6 of 1952 ). THE Jagirdar, however, died before any decision could be arrived at. For purposes of compensation and rehabilitation Shri Mahipat Singh, the petitioner was subsequently recognized to be the lawful heir of the deceased Jagirdar. Certain other claimants raised objections to the proceedings, relating to the private properties, and the Jagir Commissioner decided the case on 12th January, 1959. THE claimants as well as the petitioner Mahipat Singh presented appeals against the order of the Jagir Commissioner to the Board of Revenue, and the Board by its decision dated 18th July, 1959 remanded the case to the Jagir Commissioner for deciding the question of private properties under sec. 23 (2) of the Act, afresh. When the case went back to the Jagir Commissioner, on 17th September, 1959, he directed the issue of notices to the Revenue Secretary and the Deputy Collector Jagir and certain other persons fixing 23rd November, 1959 for hearing. On receipt of this notice objections were sought to be presented on behalf of the State Government but the Jagir Commissioner, by his order dated 15th July, 1960, held that the objections could not be entertained as prior to that stage no objections had been presented by the State Government as to the nature of the properties. Against that order an appeal was presented under sec. 39 by the State Government to the Board of Revenue and the Board by its order, which is now impugned before us, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Jagir Commissioner and directed that the State Government should be given an opportunity to raise objections and thereafter the question as to the nature of the properties should be decided in the presence of the parties in accordance with law. It is against this order that the writ petition has been filed. Mr. Hastimal contends that the entire order of the Board of Revenue is without jurisdiction and mis-conceived. He submits that the Government at no stage had claimed the disputed properties as resumable properties and not the private properties of the jagirdar and the question [which was presented to the Board was merely confined to the respective claims of persons who represented that they were entitled to the properties in question. As such, according to learned counsel, the Jagir Commissioner was justified in not re-opening the question as to the nature of the properties, which must be held to be private properties; and the Board of Revenue was in error in mis-conceiving the scope of the proceedings and directing the Jagir Commissioner to determine the question afresh under sec. 23 (2) of the Act. He contends that even the order dated 18th of July, 1959 passed by the Board of Revenue was an order without jurisdiction as it was not open to the Jagir Commissioner to deal with the question of the nature of the disputed properties when the only matter which fell to be considered was whether the one or the other of the claimants was entitled to the same and the Government had not put up any claim to the properties at the earlier stage. Mr. Hastimal further points out that under rule 22 of the relevant Rules there was no reference made to the Jagir Commissioner by the officer who took charge of the properties of the late jagirdar, that these properties, though included in the list submitted by him, were not his personal properties. Therefore, no further enquiry as to the nature of the properties was called for and the subsequent rules framed for the purpose were not attracted. These arguments, though quite plausible, do not bear scrutiny. As the findings show, it has to be remembered that a list was of course submitted by the late Jagirdar in which he included the disputed properties as his private properties. The Board has pointed out that no decision had been arrived at on the point by the Jagir Commissioner himself. It is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that even in the absence of any reference made by the officer who took charge of the properties there was a statutory obligation on the part of the Jagir Commissioner to come to a decision whether the properties so included in the list were, or were not, the private properties of the Jagirdar, or were properties which were liable to be resumed, in which case compensation would be payable to the heirs of the Jagirdar. In this case it appears that the claimants to the jagir were fighting between themselves with regard to these properties or the compensation payble therefor, and against the decision of the Jagir Commissioner given under sec. 23 (2) of the Act or purporting to have been given under that section the petitioner himself, as also the other claimants, preferred appeals to the Board of Revenue. As such the Board of Revenue, as an appellate court, was in seizin of the matter; and one of the incidental questions which arose for decision in the case was whether or not these properties were the private properties of the jagirdar. It is true that at that earlier stage the Government had not put forward any claim to these properties as resumble properties; but that would make no difference so far as the statutory obligation of the Jagir Commissioner was concerned. The Board, therefore, being of the opinion that the question of the properties had not been properly decided, remanded the case to the Jagir Commissioner for an appropriate decision on the point in the presence of parties concerned. It cannot be, therefore argued that the Board was without jurisdiction. The nature of the properties had to be determined because that alone would lead to a determination of the claim for the compensation as between the contesting claimants, if any; and the petitioner himself had invoked the jurisdiction of the Board as an appellate authority underthe Jagir Act. When the matter went back to the Jagir Commissioner, the officer himself thought that notices should go to the Revenue Secretary to the Government as also to the Deputy Collector Jagir. This was quite in consonance with the spirit of the order which had been passed by the Board of Revenue; yet when the matter came to be heard by the Jagir Commissioner he appears to have shut out the objection raised by the State Government on the ground that the objections had not been raised at an earlier stage. As we have pointed out, the question of the nature of the properties had to be decided by the Jagir Commissioner under the statute, even if no reference to that effect had been made by the person in charge of the properties of the jagirdar; and that not having been done, the State Government could not be shut out merely because the Jagir Commissioner had failed to perform his duty under the statute. It was only fair and convenient that the Jagir Commissioner should have heard the State Government also on the point and then, as directed by the Board of Revenue, determined the matter according to law. We, therefore, see no force in the contention of learned counsel that the order of the Board of Revenue is without jurisdiction in giving the direction which it has given. It is true that it is no part of the duty of the Jagir Commissioner to decide the claim of the parties inter se, specially when there may be no question of compensation involved; but the question of compensation would arise only if the nature of the properties is first determined. If it is held that some of the properties mentioned therein are resumable, then of course the question of compensation becomes necessary. \ We agree that the order of the Board of Revenue need not have been encumbered with the discussion of a number of cases, which do not appear to have any direct bearing on the point. But that is quite apart from saying that the order of the Board is without jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, the order cannot be interfered with and the Jagir Commissioner has to carry out the directions given by the Board under the impugned order. On the whole, therefore, we see no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed. . ;