Ranawat J. - (1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India of one Nandsingh whose application for restoration of possession was rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer Kotah, on the 27th of July, 1950 and whose revision application was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan on the 19th of January, 1951. It is alleged by the petitioner that two plots of land, one measuring 103 bighas and the other 25 bighas were leased to him by Thikana Kherli Tanwran for a period of three years and on the termination of the period of lease the Jagirdar of Thikana Kherli dispossessed the petitioner from a portion of his land and gave possession thereof to other tenants. The petitioner claimed protection under the Tenants' Protection Ordinance and applied to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kotah, for reinstatement. It was held by the Sub-Divisional Officer and also by the Board of Revenue that as the petitioner was not in cultivatory possession of a portion of the disputed lands in Smt. year 2006, when he is said to have been dispossessed, he was not entitled to claim any protection under the provisions of sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Tenants Protection Ordinance.
(2.) IN this application it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner, that both the Sub-Divisional Officer Kotah, and the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them under the Tenants Protection Ordinance in disallowing the petition of the petitioner for reinstatement. It is claimed that it was the duty of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Rajasthan Revenue Board to have reinstated the petitioner on the land from which he was dispossessed by his landlord, when the petitioner fulfilled the requirements of section 7 of the Tenants Protection Ordinance. Section 7 (1) of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, 1948, is as follows: - "7 (1) Any tenant who was in occupation of his holding on the first day of April 1948 and has thereafter been ejected therefrom, or dispossessed thereof or from or any part thereof; (a) before the commencement of this Ordinance, otherwise than by process of law, or (b) after the commencement of this Ordinance in contravention of the provisions thereof, may, within three months from the date of such ejectment or dispossession or the commencement of this Ordinance, whichever happens to be later, apply to the Sub-Divisional Officer or other officer of equal status for his reinstatement in such holding or part as the case may be. " Two conditions have to be satisfied before an application of a tenant under sec. 7 can succeed for reinstatement: - (1) that the tenant must have been in occupation of his holding on the 1st day of April 1948, and (2) that thereafter he has been ejected therefrom or dispossessed thereof or from or any part thereof. In case, the two conditions under sec. 7 are satisfied and a tenant or sub-tenant applies for reinstatement within three months from the date of his ejectment or dispossession he is entitled to protection under the Tenants Protection Ordinance and it is the duty of the Sub-Divisional Officer to reinstate such tenant or sub-tenant. From a perusal of the judgment of the Rajasthan Revenue Board and that of the Sub-Divisional Officer, it appears that no definite finding has been given on the point whether the petitioner Nandsingh was in occupation of the holding on the 1st day of April, 1948. As regards the fact of ejectment or dispossession of the petitioner from a part of his holding, also no definite finding appears to have been given by the Board of Revenue. The grounds of decision of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan are stated in its judgment as follows: "as a matter of fact, Nandsingh applicant sub-let a number of fields out of the fields taken on lease by him from the Jagirdar Chhagansingh. Thus he was actually a cultivator of a few fields on which his possession has not been disturbed by the Jagirdar and the Sub-Divisional Officer also maintained his possession over those fields in his order. Now the question is about those fields which Nandsingh sublet to other persons. On these fields Nandsingh cannot be said to be in actual occupation and as such he cannot get reinstatement under the provisions of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance. Besides, the period for which the fields in question were taken on lease had also expired and after the expiry of that period particularly when he had given them to other persons, he cannot claim possession over them. It is the sub-tenants who were in actual possession and if they were actually dispossessed they could have applied. By subletting the land for cultivation, Nandsingh became landholder instead of a tenant. " The petitioner was held not entitled to any relief on the basis of the following facts: - (1) that Nandsingh sublet a number of fields from which he complains to have been dispossessed; (2) that the period for which the fields in question were leased to Nandsingh had expired and 3. that by subletting the land for cultivation Nandsingh lost the cultivatory occupation of the land and he thus became a land-holder instead of a tenant. It is not clear from the judgment of the Revenue Board or that of the Sub-Divisional Officer whether Chha-gansingh, on account of sub-letting was entitled to any rent from his subtenants but even if it be supposed that he was so entitled it would not change his position vis-a-vis the landlord and make him a land-holder instead of a tenant. All tenants, or sub-tenants who were in occupatipn of their holdings on the 1st day of April 1948 and who are ejected or dispossessed thereof subsequently are entitled to protection under the Tenants Protection Ordinance and a tenant because he has sublet a part of his holding cannot be regarded as a person not entitled to the protection under sec. 7 of the Act. The expiry of the term of lease has no bearing as regards a,n application under sec. 7 of the Act. A tenant even if he has sublet his holding who was in occupation of his holding on the 1st of April 1948 and who has been dispossessed therefrom Subsequently can claim protection Under sec. 7 of the Ordinance. The grounds on which the Rajasthan Revenue Board has based its decision are beyond the scope of sec. 7. . The learned counsel of the opposite side has vehemently argued that the Board of Revenue did not hold that Nandsingh was in occupation of the land on the 1st April 1948 when it was said that he was not in culti-vatory possession of the land. It may, be pointed out at once that, as has. already been mentioned above, there is. , no such finding contained either in the judgment of the Revenue Board or. of the Sub-Divisional Officer that the petitioner was not in cultivatory possession on the 1st April 1948. The Revenue Board has therefore not exercised its jurisdiction which was vested in it under sec. 7 of the Ordinance. It has been next contended by the learned counsel of the opposite side that the decision of the Revenue Board,' whether right or wrong, cannot be called into question by this court. It may be pointed out that it has not been disputed, that the decision of the Revenue Board was a judicial or a quasi-judicial act. In Mohsin Ali Mohd. Ali and others vs. The State of Bombay (A. I. R. 1951 Bombay 303) Chagla C. J. has laid down the scope of the jurisdiction of a High Court in the matter of issuing high 'prerogative writs of certiorari in the following terms : - "now, it is unnecessary to repeat that the jurisdiction that the High Court exercises when it issues the high prerogative writ of certiorari is limited jurisdiction. The Court is not a court of appeal nor it is a court of revision. It has no power to correct either findings of fact or even errors of law. Its sole function is to, correct persons or tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when they assume jurisdiction which they do not possess, or when they refuse to exercise jurisdiction which is vested in them by law, or when in the exercise of their jurisdiction they violate principles of natural justice. " At page 881 Vol. 9 of the Halsbury's Laws of England, Halisham Edn. , it has been stated as follows: - "the case is more difficult where the jurisdiction of the court below depends, not upon some preliminary, proceeding, but upon the existence of some particular fact. If the fact be collateral to the actual matter which the lower court has to try, that court cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to it, give itself jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess. The lower court must indeed decide as to the collateral fact in the first instance; but the superior court may upon certiorari inquire into the correctness of the decision, and may quash the proceedings in the lower court, if such decision is erroneous or at any rate if there is no evidence to support it. On the other hand, if the fact in question be not collateral, but a part of the very issue which the lower court has to inquire into, certiorari will not be granted, although the lower court may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it. " It was the duty of the Sub-Divisional Officer or the Revenue Board to afford protection to a tenant if his case came within the scope of sec. 7 and when the Revenue Board and the Sub-Divisional Officer have refused to exercise their jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of certain facts which were not relevant for the purposes of sec. 7 of the Tenants Protection Ordinance, it becomes necessary for this court to interfere and to issue a writ of certiorari to direct the subordinate court to exercise its jurisdiction according to law. Had the Revenue courts determined the material question regarding occupation of the petitioner of the disputed land on the 1st of April, 1948 and the fact of his dispossession therefrom within three months from the date of the filing of the petition, whether their decisions were right or wrong, this court would not have interfered in this matter, but as the decision of the Revenue Board is not based on material points but is arrived at on the strength of irrelevant considerations, it becomes apparent that the Rajasthan Revenue Board has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law.
(3.) THIS application is, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the Rajasthan Revenue Board is set aside and the Rajasthan Revenue Board is directed to decide the case according to law and to give protection to the petitioner under sec. 7 of the Tenants Protection Ordinance, in case, its findings are in favour of the petitioner on the two points which are the essential ingredients of sec. 7 of the Tenants Protection Ordinance viz. , the occupation of land by the tenant on the 1st day of April 1948 and his subsequent ejectment or dispossession within three months of the date of the petition. .;