Wanchoo, C.J. - (1.) THIS is a revision by Prem Das under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and has arisen in the following circumstances.
(2.) PREM Das is the Muddati Mazara (something like an occupancy tenant) of plot No. 826 in village Sherpur. Govind Sahai opposite party is also Muddati Mazara of the contiguous plot No. 827. The dispute relates to a portion of No. 826, which is said to have been amalgamated with No. 827, and is known as 826 Minjumla. In the revenue papers, it seems that Govind Sahai was entered as a subtenant of PREM Das on this 826 Min. Consequently, PREM Das issued notice of ejectment against Govind Sahai under sec. 180 of the Alwar Revenue Code. This notice was contested by Govind Sahai under sec. 181 (3) of the same Code by instituting a suit. That suit was dismissed by the first court, but was decreed by the first appellate court and was eventually dismissed by the second appellate court, namely, the Revenue Minister of the former State of Alwar, on the 25th of July, 1947. Thereafter a decree of ejectment followed under sec. 181 (4) of the Alwar Revenue Code, and possession was given to PREM Das of this plot in execution of the decree. Thereafter, Govind Sahai brought a suit in the civil court against PREM Das, and his prayers were that a declaration be made that 826 Min was included in 827, because it was in the adverse possession of the plaintiff, and the entry in the revenue papers with respect to 826 Min was incorrect, and that the decision of the Revenue Minister dated the 25th of July, I947, was null and void, and that the plaintiff should be given possession of 826 Min. Thereupon, the present applicant objected in his written statement that the suit as framed was not cognizable in the civil court, and should have been filed in the revenue court. A preliminary issue on this point was framed, and the learned Munsiff decided on the 5th of September, 1950 that he had jurisdiction to hear the suit. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. A preliminary objection has been raised that no revision lies to this court because no case has been decided. Reliance in this connection has been placed on two cases, namely, Buddhoo Lal and another vs. Mewa Ram (A.I.R. 1921 Allahabad 1) and Manna Lal and others vs. Earn Gopal and another (A.I.R. 1950 Allahabad 205). The former was a case where a preliminary issue as to whether jurisdiction lay in the civil court at Etawah or the civil court at Cawnpore was raised and decided by the Munsiff. Thereupon, a question arose whether this was a case decided, and a Full Bench of five Judges by three to two came to the conclusion that the decision of this matter was not a case decided. The second case raised the question whether the suit was cognizable by the revenue court or by the civil court, and a preliminary issue was raised and decided. In revision, the learned single Judge followed the decision in the case of Buddhoo Lal vs. Mewa Ram without giving any reasons of his own, and without noticing the distinction between the two cases, namely, that the former case only raised the question whether the jurisdiction lay in one civil court or another, while the latter case raised the question whether the jurisdiction was in the civil court or in the revenue court. There is a difference of opinion between the various High Courts on the question whether an interlocutory order like this is a case decided. The High Courts of Calcutta, Madras, Nagpur, Orissa, Patna and Rangoon have generally held that the court can interfere in a case like the present, if the order is covered by one of the three clauses of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while the Allahabad High Court and the Chief Courts of Sind and Oudh have generally held the other view. The Lahore High Court formerly held the same view as the Allahabad High Court; but in a recent case, Bibi Gurdevi represented by Prithvi Raj Khosla vs. Chaudhari Mohammad Baksh and others (A. I. R. 1943 Lahore 65), that court changed its view, and held that orders like the present could be revised, and amounted to a case decided. We feel that where, as in the present case, the question is whether a suit is cognizable in the civil court or in the revenue court, the decision on a preliminary issue on this point should be treated as a case decided, for it is best that in such cases there should be as early a decision as possible on the question of the correct forum, namely, whether it is civil court or a revenue court, so that the parties may be saved unnecessary expenses in litigation. Therefore, we overrule the preliminary objection, and hold that where the question is whether the civil courts or revenue courts have jurisdiction and a preliminary issue on the point is decided one way or the other, there is a case decided, and sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. The question is obviously one of jurisdiction, and is covered either by clause (a) or (b) of that section, and this Court, therefore, has the right to interfere. We now turn to the merits of the application. The applicant relies on the amended sec. 7 of the Alwar Revenue Code, which begins as follows : - "The following proceedings, applications and suits shall be disposed of by Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts as such and no other officer or Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which any such application, proceeding or suit may be made or instituted." This section further provided for the jurisdiction of the Collector, the Assistant Collector of the First Grade and Assistant Collector of the Second Grade, and certain entries in the three Groups may be mentioned. These are entry No. 8, Group No. II, suits for amendment of entries in Settlement records and Patwari papers, entry No. 8, Group No. II, suits by tenants for recovery of possession forcibly taken by landlord or another person, entry No. 10, Group No. I, suits by a tenant to establish a claim to a right, of occupancy or by a landlord to prove that such a tenant has not such a right, entry No. 12, Group No. II, suits by a tenant to contest liability to ejectment when notice of ejectment has been served, and entry No. 14, Group No. II, any other suit between landlord and tenant arising out of the lease or conditions on which a tenancy is held. The contention on behalf of the applicant is that the present suit is of such a nature that it comes within one or other of these entries, which we have set out above. Learned counsel for the opposite party also admits that so far as the prayers for correction of entries in the Patwari papers and for declaring the decree of the Revenue Minister null and void are concerned, no suit can lie in the civil court. His contention, however, is that that part of the suit which relates to his prayer for possession is cognizable by the civil court, and, therefore, the civil court should be allowed to go on with the trial of this suit so far as that prayer is concerned. He relies particularly on Chela vs. Baija and others (A.I.R. 1927 Lahore 452) in this connection. It appears that the Alwar Revenue Code is based on the Punjab Tenancy Act, and the argument is that the sections in the two laws being more or less similar, this decision of the Lahore High Court lays down that the civil court has jurisdiction to try a suit brought by a person, who has been dispossessed from his tenancy after a notice issued to him under sec. 43 of the Tenancy Act (which corresponds to sec. 180 of the Alwar Revenue Code), and who has been unsuccessful in a suit under sec. 45 (which corresponds to sec. 181(3) of the Alwar Revenue Code) to contest his liability to ejectment, for possession of the land from which he has been ejected on the ground that he had a right of occupancy therein. This case was based on the word "tenant" which was used in sec. 50 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (which corresponds to sec. 184 of the Alwar Revenue Code), and it was held by the Lahore High Court that as the tenant ceases to be a tenant after ejectment, he could bring a suit to the civil court. Immediately this case was decided the Legislature stepped in, and enacted sec. 50 A to make it clear that that decision was wrong and not according to the intention of the Legislature. We are of opinion that the use of the word "tenant" in sec. 184 of the Alwar Revenue Code was really meant to apply also to a person who had been a tenant and had been ejected and wanted to regain possession of his tenancy holding. Therefore, such a person could, in our opinion, bring a suit under sec. 184 for recovery of possession, if he was wrongfully ejected. This matter was made clear in sec. 50 A, which was introduced in the Punjab Tenancy Act, and has been further made clear by the use of the word "person" in entry 12 of Group B of the First Schedule in the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act 1951 (No. 1 of 1951). We are, therefore, of opinion that a tenant, who has been ejected under s. 181(4) of the Alwar Revenue Code cannot file a civil suit to get back possession of the land from which he has been ejected by the revenue courts. Learned counsel for the opposite party then argues that his client is not claiming any tenant right by his plaint, and that what he is claiming is that he has become owner of the land by adverse possession, and, therefore, the suit lies in the civil court. In this connection he relies on Maru vs. Abdul Rahim and others (A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 849). That suit was decided after sec. 50 A had been introduced in the Tenancy Act. It was then held that sec. 50 A did not bar a person, who had been ejected from the tenancy, and whose suit to contest his liability to ejectment on the ground that he was an occupancy tenant had been dismissed, from suing in a civil court for possession of land on the ground that he had acquired ownership of the land by prescription. This position, however, does not arise in the present case. Learned counsel was unable to point out to any portion of the plaint where the opposite party Govind Sahai has claimed that he has become full owner of 826-M in on account of the fact that he was in adverse possession for over 12 years. We may also point out that the owner of the land has not been made a party to the suit, and if the intention of the opposite party was to claim full ownership of this plot, he would not have been so foolish as to bring a suit only against the tenant and leave out the owner. The very fact, therefore, that the owner has not been made a party can lead to no inference but this that whatever right Govind Sahai, opposite party, claims is a kind of tenant right and not the right of full ownership. That is why he has claimed that he was in adverse possession as against the tenant. There is not a word in the plaint to show that he was in adverse possession as against the owner. Under these circumstances, there is no force in the argument that this plaint lies in the civil court because Govind Sahai is claiming to be the full owner of the property by prescription. We are, therefore, of opinion that the reliefs claimed in this plaint cannot be granted in the civil court, and such a plaint should be filed in the revenue court, if anywhere at all. The next question is as to what order we should pass now. Ordinarily we would have passed an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper court, but since the decision of the learned Munsiff, the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No. 1 of 1951) has been put on the Statute Book. Sec. 6 (3) of this Act reads as follows : - "Any suit, application, case or proceeding, pending before a civil court when this Act comes into force, which has been declared by sec. 7 to be exclusively triable by a revenue court, shall be transferred by such civil court to the revenue court competent under sec. 12 to deal with and dispose of the same." There is no doubt that the suit as framed by Govind Sahai is exclusively triable by a revenue court under sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Act, Therefore, the proper order to pass is that the suit shall be transferred by the Munsiff to the revenue court competent under sec. 12 of the Rajasthan Act to deal with and dispose of the same. We, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the learned Munsiff, and direct that he shall take action under sec. 6 (3) of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No. 1 of 1951), and transfer this suit to the revenue court competent under sec. 12 to deal with and dispose of the same. The applicant will get his costs of both the courts from the opposite party. ;