Wanchoo, C.J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal by Maharaj Hari Singh against the decree of the Additional District Judge Udaipur, dismissing the suit brought by the plaintiff-appellant against the State of Rajasthan.
(2.) THE suit is with respect to a jagir, called the Jagir of Bagor. THE plaintiff's case is that he is a Sisodiya Rajput, descended from the royal family of Mewar, and is an agnate of the present ruler of Mewar. He relied on a pedigree, which was filed along with the plaint and claims that on the basis of that pedigree he is an Umrao of Mewar, and entitled to hold the Jagir of Bagor by right of succession. THE last holder of the Jagir was Maharaj Shakti Singhji, and the plaintiff claims to be the successor as a male lineal heir by the rule of primogeniture. THE Jagir was escheated in 1889 A D. by the late Maharana Fateh Singhji of Mewar on the ground that the line of the rightful claimant was extinct. THE plaintiff alleges that he made investigations into the matter, and came to know about the year 1931 that he was the rightful heir to the Jagir, and was, therefore, an Umrao by right of birth. THE plaintiff thereafter approached His Highness the Maharana of Mewar, and requested him to correct the pedigree. THE plaintiff was allowed to submit the correction for the official publication, known as "List of Ruling Princes, Chiefs and Leading Personages of Rajputana and Ajmer" and the Government of India corrected the genealogical table in the sixth edition of the book published in 1931, which shows that the plaintiff is the nearest heir to the Jagir. THE plaintiff also published another book, called "THE Netawal Family" giving the full history of his family, and the correct genealogical table was included in that book, which was published at the cost of the Government of His Highness the Maharana of Mewar. THEreafter the plaintiff approached. His Highness the Maharana of Mewar a number of times to re-grant| him the Jagir of Bagor; but his request has not been heeded so far. In view of this a cloud has been cast on his title to the Jagir of Bagor and his status as Umrao. THE plaintiff gave notice to the defendant in this connection and the suit was filed after the period of two months had expired. THE plaintiff claims that the cause of action arose in or about 1931, when His Highness the Maharana of Mewar agreed to the correction, and in 1943, when His Highness paid for the publication of the book, known as "THE Netawal Family". THE plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit on the 24th of March, 1949 in the High Court of former Rajasthan for a declaration that he was entitled to the Jagir of Bagor, and also entitled to be called an Umrao of Mewar. THE suit was not valued, as it was said to be incapable of valuation, and a court-fee of Rs. 10/- was paid on a declaratory decree. The suit was opposed by the State on a number of grounds. The pedigree filed with the plaint was not admitted, and was said to be incorrect in a number of places. It was alleged that the suit was not maintainable in the High Court. It was also contended that the court-fee paid was insufficient, and the suit was barred by limitation and under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. A plea of res judicata was also raised. It was also said that on the death of a jagirdar the Jagir is automatically resumed by the State, and thereafter it is re-granted, and this re-grant depends upon the will of the State. Ten issues were framed in the trial court, of which the following require consideration in appeal also : - (1) Is the suit within limitation? (2) Is the suit maintainable in the Civil Court? (3) Can the plaintiff maintain the suit without claiming possession of the Jagir of Bagor? (4) Is the pedigree filed with the plaint correct? (5) Is the court-fee paid insufficient? (7) Can the plaintiff maintain the suit after the application of his father for the grant of the Jagir of Bagor had been dismissed? Certain facts are practically admitted between the parties, and may be set out at once before we turn to the decision of the various issues. The Jagir of Bagor was granted to Nath Singhji, son of Maharana Sangram Singhji II, and continued in possession of the descendants of Nath Singhji till the time of the last holder, Shakti Singhji, who died childless in 1889 A. D. Shakti Singhji's father was Sohan Singhji. He held the Jagir for some time, but was deprived of it in 1875 A. D. by the then Maharana of Mewar for reasons which need not be gone into. Sohan Singhji's son, Shakti Singhji, was granted the Jagir thereafter, and died childless in 1889. At that time Sohan Singhji was alive; but as he had been deprived of the Jagir, and had been ordered to have Mewar, the Jagir was not given back to him. As a matter of fact, some time before the death of Shakti Singhji, Sohan Singhji was allowed to come back, and live in Mewar, on his giving a distinct understanding that he would have no claim to the Jagir of Bagor. Therefore, when Shakti Singhji died in 1889 A. D., the Maharana escheated the Jagir on the ground that there was male lineal heir of the blood of the original grantee, Nath Singhji. In 1902 A. D. Bhopal Singhji, father of the present plaintiff, had applied to the then Maharana for being granted the Jagir of Bagor. His prayer was rejected on the ground that he was not the heir to the Jagir. It further appears that in the previous editions of the book called "List of Ruling Princes, Chiefs and Leading Personages of Raj-putana and Ajmer", the pedigree, was slightly different from the one which has been filed with the plaint and is relied upon by the plaintiff. Nath Singhji had a son Surat Singhji, who adopted a son called Rup Singhji. The previous editions of the book show that this Rup Singhji was not in line of Maharana Sangram Singhji II, but was from another branch, descended from an earlier Maharana of Mewar. The correction, which was made in the sixth edition, is said to be that this Rup Singhji is same person who is shown in the pedigree as the grandson of Zalim Singhji, who was a son of Nath Singhji. If this correction is correct, the descendants of Rup Singhji, who now form the Netawal family, would also be the descendants by blood of Nath Singhji,the original grantee. On the other hand, if the original entry in the genealogical table is correct, the present members of the Netwal family would not have any blood of Nath Singhji in them, as this Rup Singhji would be an outsider adopted into the family. The plaintiff's case, of course, rests on this correction, and he claims to be heir of the Jagir of Bagor on its basis. We shall now take the issues one by one. " Issue No. 2 - We shall begin with the issue of maintainability. The suit, as we have already said, was filed in the High Court of former Rajasthan on the 24th of March, 1949. Thereafter the present state of Rajasthan was formed, and this suit was transferred under sec. 49 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. XV of 1949) to the-District Judge of Udaipur for disposal. From that Court, it was transferred to the Additional District Judge's Court, Udaipur. The trial court has held that in view of these transfers it had jurisdiction. This, in our opinion, is incorrect. The suit was transferred to the District Judge with the direction that that court should dispose it of according to law. That meant that the trial court would have to consider whether under the law in force at the time when the suit was filed, the suit was maintainable in any civil court. In this connection we may point out that the High Court of the State of former Rajasthan had original as well as appellate jurisdiction under sec. 9 of the United State of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. III of 1948); but that jurisdiction was confined to what might be conferred upon it by the law for the time being in force. The jurisdiction of the subordinate civil courts in the former State of Rajasthan is contained in the United State of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. XXXI of 1948). The District Judge had unlimited jurisdiction to hear all original suits for the time being cognizable by civil courts. If, therefore, the civil courts had jurisdiction to hear the suit, it should have been filed in the Court of District Judge, and not in the High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on the Constitution of Mewar, which was promulgated on the 3rd of May, 1947. In that Constitution it was provided in Part VI, Article XVIII, Clause 2, that the High Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all disputes between any two or more Umraos, and in all disputes between the State and an Umrao. The contention of the appellant is that this was a dispute between an Umrao and the State, and as such he could file the suit in the High Court of former Rajasthan, which must be deemed to have inherited the jurisdiction of the High Court of Mewar. We are of opinion that this contention is unfounded. In the first place, when the former State of Mewar came to an end and was merged with other States to form the United State of former Rajasthan, the Constitution of Mewar must be deemed to have come to an find, and, therefore, the High Court of the State of former Rajasthan did not inherit any powers which were in the High Court of Mewar by virtue of this Constitution. In the second place, even if it be held that the High Court of former Rajasthan inherited the powers of the High Court of Mewar, the suit would still not be maintainable in the High Court because it was not a dispute between an Umrao and the State. The appellant is claiming to be an Umrao, but his claim to be an Umrao is not being admitted by the State. The provision in the Constitution of Mewar, in our opinion, referred to suits between an undisputed Umrao and the State. If it was the intention of the Constitution that a person could file a suit in the High Court for claiming the status of an Umrao, the provision would have been specific and in different terms. We are, therefore, of opinion that even under the Constitution of Mewar the appellant could not file this suit in the High Court of Mewar and, therefore he could not file it in the High Court of former Rajasthan. (2) The further . question that arises is whether, even if the suit could not be filed in the High Court, it could be filed in the civil court, where it eventually reached. In this connection our attention was drawn to the fact that in the earlier laws in force in the former State of Mewar, there was specific provision for barring the jurisdiction of the civil courts over cases relating to Jagirs. Reference may be made to sec. 14 of the Mewar Subordinate Civil Courts Regulation of October, 1940, ana to sec. 21 of the Civil Courts Act (No. XXIV of 1942), and the amendment thereof by Act No. XII of 1945.1 These Acts were repealed by implication by the Civil Courts Ordinance (No. XXXI of 1948) of the State of former Rajasthan. In this Ordinance there is no section corresponding to sec. 21 in the Mewar Act. It is, therefore, urged that the civil court had jurisdiction to hear this suit. We may, however, point out that a Revenue Act was in force in Mewar which is No. V of 1947. That Act specifically provides under sec. 123 (2) that the civil courts would not have jurisdiction with respect to Thikanedars, Jagirdars, Mafidars and Bhomias if these want to establish any right of theirs against the provisions of this law. This Act was in force in 1949 as it had not been repealed after the coming into existence of the former State of Rajasthan. Under sec. 107 and III of this Act, information of the death of a Thikanedar or Jagirdar would be given to Mahkma Khas, and succession would be recognised according to the rules framed under this Act and with the sanction of His Highness. We may also refer to sec. 17 of the United States of Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance (No. XXXI of 1948), which clearly saves the provisions of other enactments, and also sec. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code which bars the jurisdiction of courts in suits, the cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. We are, therefore, of opinion that the present suit was not maintainable either in the High Court or in the subordinate civil courts in view of these provisions of the Revenue Act of Mewar. Issue No. 3 and 5 - I, We now turn to the question whether the suit is barred under the proviso to sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act on the ground that the appellant had not sued for possession of the Jagir. The question of court-fee will also depend upon the question whether the appellant should have sued for possession also. If he must sue for possession then the court-fee paid would be insufficient, as the suit would have to be valued according to the value of the Jagir, and court-fee would have to be paid ad valorem. The proviso to sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act provides that "no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so". Admittedly the plaintiff is out of possession of the Jagir. Normally, a person, who claims title to immovable property, and is not in possession of it, has to claim posses-sion as well. He has to value the property and pay ad valorem court-fee as prescribed by the Court Fees Act. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the appellant that he could not sue for possession. The argument is that the grant of a Jagir was entirely within the discretion of His Highness the Maharana of Mewar, and now is entirely within the discretion of the State of Rajasthan. Under these circumstances it is argued that it was useless for the appellant in March, 1949, to have asked for possession of the Jagir, because the civil court could not give him a decree for possession. We are of opinion that if the civil court has jurisdiction in the matter, it could not only give a declaration of title, but also grant possession If it has no jurisdiction in the matter, it can neither give a declaration of title, nor grant possession. We are further of opinion that the middle position, namely, that the civil court has jurisdiction to grant a declaration of title but has no jurisdiction to grant possession, is an impossible position, unless there is some provision in the law relating to Jagirs which says that the State will grant a Jagir after a declaration from the civil court. No such provision applicable to Mewar has been brought to our notice and, therefore, we cannot accept this position. Our conclusion, therefore, is that if the civil court has jurisdiction to grant a declaration, as is being contended on behalf of the appellant, the court would also have jurisdiction to grant possession, and the appellant in that case should have sued for possession also & should have valued the suit properly, and paid ad valorem court-fee on it. In so far as he has failed to do so, the suit is barred under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. In the alternative, we are of opinion, that even if it were to be accepted that the civil court has jurisdiction in this case to grant a mere declaration, but cannot grant possession, the court should not grant a mere declaration which would have no meaning or value. Under sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act, a person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property, can get a declaration of such character or right. It has been held that no declaration should be made of abstract rights, which are of no practical utility, vide Wajid Ali Shah vs. Dianat-ullah Beg (L L. R. 8 All. 31). In the present case, therefore, a mere declaration would be of no practical utility, if the position is as put forward on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the State will not grant him the Jagir in spite of the declaration. We, therefore, hold that either the suit is barred under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and the court-fee paid is insufficient, or if a mere declaration can be granted, we are not prepared to grant an empty declaration of the type desired by the appellant. Issues decided accordingly. Issue No. 6 - We now turn to the issue of res judicata. This is based on an order passed by His Highness in 1902, by which the request of the appellant's father for grant of the Jagir was turned down. We are very doubtful as to what the position of the law in Mewar was in 1902. Under these circumstances we are not prepared to hold that the suit is barred by res judicata. It is very doubtful if His Highness' order can be said to be an order of a court. Issue No. 4 - We now turn to pedigree. We have already pointed out that the pedigree has not been admitted by the State, and is said to be wrong in many places. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that it was the duty of the State to state definitely which parts of the pedigree were incorrect, and that an application was made by the appellant in this behalf; but the State did not specify which part of the pedigree was incorrect, and, therefore, the pedigree should be taken to be correct. If the matter stood at that, there might have been some force in the argument; but the appellant's own case is that the pedigree published in the previous edition of the book called "List of Ruling Princes, Chiefs and Leading Personages of Rajputana and Ajmer" had one difference at one point, namely, whether Rup Singhji, who was adopted by Surat Singhji, was the grandson of Zalim Singhji, son of Nath Singhji or from outside the family. If the appellant had established that much, he might have taken advantage of the fact that the State did not plead specifically where the pedigree was wrong; but the evidence that has been produced by the appellant in this connection is of no value. There is the statement of the appellant himself and of two witnesses, namely, Shravan Nath and Shyam Lal. The appellant has no personal knowledge; nor has he filed any old pedigree or relied upon information supplied to him by his ancestors as the source of his knowledge. Shravan Nath and Shyam Lal also merely state that the appellant is the nearest heir to Bagor Jagir; but neither of them has recited the pedigree or disclosed his source of knowledge. As a matter of fact, Shravan Nath definitely stated that the appellant was not an Umrao. These witnesses have in our opinion, utterly failed to prove the main point in the pedigree, namely, the position of Rup Singhji who had been adopted by Surat Singhji. Learned counsel relied on the fact that correction had been made in the later editions of the book called "List of Ruling Princes, Chiefs and Leading Personages of Rajputana and Ajmer." But the preface to the book definitely states that "it must not be regarded as strictly accurate in all details of family history which have been supplied from interested sources." The correction, therefore, made in this book is no proof necessarily of the correctness of the correction. Reliance was also placed on two other circumstances. It is said that, in the first place, the Maharana of Mewar admitted the correctness of the correction. There is, however, no proof of this. Next, it is said that, because the present Maharana paid for the publication of the book the "Natawal family" it must be presumed that he admitted the correctness of whatever was contained in it, including the correction in the pedigree. This book was published in 1932, and printed at the State Printing Press, Udaipur. A dispute went on for about ten years as to who should pay for its publication. The Government of Mewar refused to pay and eventually His Highness the Maharana of Mewar paid the amount from his personal account as a matter of grace. It does not follow from this that there was an admission either by His Highness the Maharana or by the State of Mewar, that the correction had been correctly made in it. There is, in our opinion, therefore, no proof of the pedigree on that material point. Under these circumstances, it has not even been established as a fact that the appellant has any right as heir to the Jagir of Bagor. Issue No. 1 - The last point, which remains, is the question of limitation. The appellant and his ancestors have been admittedly out of possession since 1889. In any case, they must be deemed to be out of possession since 1902, when the appellant's father's request for the grant of Bagor Jagir was turned down. There was no law of limitation in Mewar upto 1st July, 1932. The law came into force on the 1st of July, 1932, and a period of 20 years was prescribed under Art. 5 for possession of immovable property, and 8 years under Art. 19 for such suits for which there was no specific provision. The starting point of limitation in one case was the date on which the right to possession arose, and in the other case, the date on which the right to sue accrued. If this were a suit for possession, the right to sue would be barred in 1922, while if it were a suit governed by Art. 19 of the Mewar Limitation Act, the right to sue became barred in 1910. Sec. 22 of the Mewar Limitation Act, however, provided that in case of suits for which there was no law of limitation, 8 years would be allowed from the 1st of July, 1932. This period was later extended by one year, & so the limitation for any kind of suit expired on the 30th June, 1941. The present suit was filed in March, 1949, and unless, therefore, the appellant can show how he still has the right to sue, the suit would be barred by limitation. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that sec. 14 of the Mewar Subordinate Civil Court Regulation, which came into force in October, 1940, barred the filing of such a suit in a civil court, and that this bar existed under the Mewar Civil Courts Act (No. XXVI of 1942), as amended by Act No. XII of 1945. This bar is said to have continued right up to the time when the State of former Rajasthan was formed in May, 1948. Thereafter the appellant brought the suit in March, 1949. We have already pointed out that the bar existed even after May, 1948, in view of the provision of the Mewar Revenue Act of 1947, inasmuch as a suit of this nature was only cognizable before the court of authority which was provided in the Mewar Revenue Act of 1947. But even if the cognizance of this suit by a civil court is barred from October, 1940, that would not in our opinion extend the period of limitation for a suit in the civil court beyond the 30th of June, 1941. The Indian Limitation Act was in force in the State of former Rajasthan with certain amendments by virtue of Ordinance No. XXXIII of 1948. Sec. 9 of that provides that once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. In the present case, the time began to run from the 1st of July, 1932, and, therefore, no subsequent disability or inability to sue can stop the running of time. There is provision in the Limitation Act for exclusion of certain period of time, which is contained in sec.12 to 16 of the Act. But the case of the appellant is not covered by any of these five sections, and, therefore, in his case, there can be no exclusion of any time after time began to run from the 1st of July, 1932. Therefore, if the suit were cognizable in the civil court, it became barred by time on the 30th of June, 1941. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the respondent.;