Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and section 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance by one Ganeshi Lal of Rajgarh, Alwar District (hereinafter to be referred to as the petitioner) against the Director of Mines and Geology, United State of Rajasthan. The Tehsildar Rajgarh and the State of Rajasthan for issue of writs of certiorari or mandamus and prohibition against the opposite party.
(2.) THE petitioner's case is as follows. The petitioner was given a lease of the mines known as Chhodala mines in Rajgarh Tehsil for a period of 5 years commencing from 1st April 1947 for an annual rent of Rs. 3,500/- paya-able in equal quarterly instalments to His Highness's Government, Alwar. Similarly he was given a lease of another mine known as Bad Beleta for a period of 5 years commencing from the same date on an annual rent of Rs. 225/- payable in equal quarterly instalments. He was further given a lease of a group of quarries in Rajgarh comprising of (1) Pitari ki Doongri (2) Attabedki (3) Thika Gangabag and (4) Nathji ki Doongri also for 5 years on an annual rent of Rs. 2,250/- payable in equal quarterly instalments. The petitioner alleges that he was subsequently required to furnish sureties to the extent of Rs. 6,000/- and consequently he furnished one Gordhan Lal, a relation of his as a surety. Thereafter the petitioner deposited various sums on account of the rent as and when it became due. The opposite party No. 1, however, wrongly found a sum of Rs. 11,661/1/9 as outstanding against the petitioner without caring or explaining how it was due. On the 20th June, 1950, the opposite party (lessors) re-entered the mines and took back the possession thereof much before the expiry of the term of lease, which was in excess of their power and jurisdiction. The opposite party No. 3 had ordered for the recovery of the said sum of Rs. 11,661/1/9 as arrears of land revenue and the opposite party No. 2, was proceeding to take action against the petitioner for the recovery of this huge sum, which had so arbitrarily been fixed up and the property of the petitioner has been attached. On 1st September, 1950 petitioner was put in the lock up and was released only when he paid Rs. 100/- for which he obtained a receipt. The petitioner contends that the opposite party had no authority to take the law into their own hands and forcefully reinstate themselves to the mines which were legally leased out to the petitioner. They had also no authority to fix-up the liability and recover the same in the manner described. It has, therefore, been prayed that the papers be sent for examination and the order of the opposite party determining the lease, taking back the possession of the mines in question be quashed and the possession of the mines be restored on issue of a writ of certiorari or mandamus. It has also been prayed that the opposite party be directed to proceed in accordance with law instead of proceeding in a high-handed manner and they should also be prevented from recovering the alleged dues as arrears of land-revenue and the attachment made by the opposite party No. 3 be vacated. It has further been prayed that the lessors be prohibited from taking law in their own hands by fixing up the petitioner's liability and recovering them in their own manner. A rule nisi was issued to the opposite party to show cause why a writ of prohibition be not issued restraining them from realising the amount alleged to be due on account of the lease dated the 1st April 1947. 5. The opposite parties have made their return contending that the amount which has been shown to be due against the petitioner has been correctly found out and that in aggregate the petitioner has paid a total sum of Rs. 8098/1/- upto the 30th June, 1950 on account of the three leases, whereas a sum of Rs. 19,344/12/- had become due from them as rent on account of the three leases. Rs. 597/-/9 had become due as Nigrana, out of which only Rs. 414/6/9 were paid. Thereafter, in aggregate a sum of Rs. 11,661/1/9 was due from the petitioner and it could be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the law in force. It has also been contended that the lessors were entitled to recover the property in dispute under term 36 of the three leases on the default of the petitioner in praying his dues. Further it has been contended that under term 40 of the lease-deed, the dispute should have been referred to the Government for decision and the application for writs is misconceived. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. As the rule nisi was issued to the opposite party to show cause only in respect of the issue of a writ of prohibition, I have first to consider whether a proper case has been made out for the issue of such a writ. The writ of prohibition is a very old prerogative writ in England and is a creature of English common law. A provision was made in sec. 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 for the issue of such a writ in a proper case. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, too, it has been provided that such a writ among others may be issued in appropriate cases. As to what is the nature of this writ and in what cases it can be issued, we have however to refer to English Common law The writ of prohibition is a prerogative writ, issuing out of the High Court of Justice and directed to an inferior court which forbids such court to continue proceedings therein in excess of its jurisdiction or in contravention of the laws of the land (Halsbury's, Laws of England, 1909 edition, Vol. X,p. 141 Art. 286 ). Prohibition issues to restrain all inferior courts, whether such courts be temporal, ecclesiastical maritime or military or civil or criminal, whenever such courts take cognisance of matters outside their jurisdiction, and lies so long as such courts, act, or purport to act, in the exercise of judicial functions and in the course of judicial proceedings (Ibid P. 149, Article 299 ). Prohibition will not issue to any person, or body of persons who may be acting judicially but not as a judicial tribunal, nor against the ministerial or executive acts of the Government, but where by Act of Parliament a body of persons have the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals. (who are parties to the proceedings), the High Court will exercise as widely as possible the power of controlling such bodies, if those bodies attempt to exceed the jurisdiction prescribed by such Act, or usurp a jurisdiction of judicial character. (Ibid P. 159 Art. 303 ). This writ is issued by the High Court to prohibit an inferior court, using that term in its widest sense, to include any body exercising statutory quasi judicial powers from exceeding its jurisdiction. Before such a writ can be issued, it is, therefore necessary that the authority against which such a writ is issued Should be a judicial or quasi-judicial authority and the proceedings should be judicial or quasi-judicial. In this respect there is no difference between the writ of prohibition and the writ of certiorari. The former is issued at an earlier stage arid the latter at a later stage. With respect to the writ of certiorari their Lordships of the Supreme Court have decided in Province of Bombay vs. Kushaldas 8. Advani, (A. I. R. 1950 Supreme Court P. 222), that Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority a writ of certiorari may issue. When the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, decision will be quasi-judicial, described forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well recognised principles of approach are required to be followed". It has not been shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the law under which any of the three opposite parties was making the decision complained against itself required a judicial approch. They have not been able to show that the opposite party had the duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially, in the matter. The opposite party were, therefore, not acting as an inferior court and the decision complained against is neither judicial nor quasijudicial. The writ of prohibition cannot therefore, be issued against the opposite party. Similar is the difficulty with respect to the issue of a writ of certiorari. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a writ of mandamus may be issued in the circumstances of the case or any other writ or any other appropriate direction may be issued against the opposite party under Article 226 of the constitution of India or sec. 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. The rule nisi was issued only in respect of the writ of prohibition and the opposite party were asked to show why they should not be restrained from realising the amount alleged to be due on account of the leases dated the 1st April 1947. However, as arguments covered a wider ground and it was argued alternatively that a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India be issued and both the parties have fully argued on all these points, I may as well deal with the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate direction. The grant of a writ of mandamus is a matter for the discretion of the court. (Halsbury's Laws of England, 1909 Edition, Volume io, P. 78 Art. 161 ). The court will, as a general rule, and in the exercise of its discretion refuse a writ of mandamus, when there is an alternative specific remedy at law which is not less convenient beneficial and effective (Ibid. P. 102 Article 201 ). The petitioner had another remedy against the opposite party by way of a regular suit for an injunction restraining the opposite party from realising the amount of dues and also for the recovery of possession of the leased property, which has been reentered upon by the opposite party. This he has not done. Both in the matter of mandamus and other appropriate directions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it has been held by various courts in India that the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are extraordinary powers and should be sparingly used under law, only in those cases where the rights of a person have been seriously infringed, and he has no other adequate and specific remedy available. A full bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Indian Sugar Mills Association vs. The Secretary to the Government, Uttar Pradesh, Labour Department and others (reported in A. I. R. 1951 Allahabad P. 1) has held this view. In Union of Workmen of R. S. N. and I. G. N. and Railway Co. Ltd. vs. The, River Steam Navigation Company Ltd. , (A. I. R. 1951 Assam P. 96,) Ram Labhaya J. has held that Article. . . . . . . . . 226 confers very wide powers on the High Courts, but. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . these powers have to be exercised very sparingly. The article is not intended to provide an additional or an alternative remedy where another effective remedy is available. The remedy under this article may not be utilised as a substitute for the usual mode of redress by an action particularly when an enquiry into facts is involved. Extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under the Article may be invoked in cases where no other adequate remedy is available to the aggrieved party and application of article 226 affords a convenient and effective mode of redress. Patna High Court in Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Rly-Co. Ltd. , vs. State of Bihar and others, (A. I. R. 1951 Patna P. 231) has held that a party who has entered into an agreement with another party and is illegally dispossessed by the other in breach of the agreement cannot ask the High Court for a writ of mandamus as the aggrieved party can get an effectual and adequate remedy by an ordinary action in the Civil Court. The grant of a writ of mandamus is as a general rule, a matter for the discretion of the court and is not a writ of right. This very Division Bench of this court, on a review of a number of cases of different High Courts has held in writ case No. 28 of 1950, Seth Gokulchand vs. Rajasthan Government, (1) that where a remedy by way of a regular suit is available, it is unnecessary to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mere slight inconvenience or a little delay should not in these cases be considered sufficient to justify the issue of a writ or direction by this court in exercise of its extraordinary powers specially when the rights of the petitioners, in these cases are disputed, and are not very clear. Reliance has been placed inter alia on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rashid Ahmed vs. The Municipal Board, Kairana (A. I. R. 1950 Supreme Court 163) wherein His Lordship S. R. Das J. observed that there can be no question that the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. The relationship between the petitioner and the State of Rajasthan is that of a leasee and a lessor. A lease-deed has been executed between them. There are a number of terms in the lease-deed and under term No. 36 the lessors have been given a right to distrain as well as to reenter on the leased land. It is disputed between the parties whether there is any amount due from the petitioner and if so, whether the conditions giving rights of distraint and of re-entry have occurred. This can well be determined in a regular suit. No case has been made out for the issue of a writ of prohibition or for any of the other writs or directions under Article 226. 11. The application \s dismissed with costs to the contesting opposite party. The Government Advocate's fee is assessed at Rs. 50/ -. . ;