- (1.) THIS is an application by Durgaprasad Agarwal under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari in connection with an order passed by the District Judge of Bharatpur under section 6 of the Matsya Premises (Rent Control) Ordinance, 1948.
(2.) THE facts, which have led to this application, may be briefly narrated in order to understand the point which has been pressed on behalf of applicant. THE case relates to two shops, of which the applicant is the landlord and Hiralal is the tenant. Hiralal made an application to the Controller after the coming into force of the Matsya Ordinance for fixation of fair rent of the two shops, which he was holding from the applicant. THE Controller dismissed the application for reasons which need not be mentioned here. Hiralal then went in appeal under section 10 of the Matsya Ordinance to the District Judge, as that Officer had been designated as appellate authority for the purpose of that section. THE District Judge reversed the order of the Controller and fixed the rent at Rs. 18/12/- per month as against the contractual rent of Rs. 80/- per month. It is against this order of the District Judge that the present application has been made. A large number of grounds have been taken in support of the application, but the main point that has been pressed on behalf of the applicant and which only we propose to decide is that in view of section 6 of the Matsya Ordinance there was no foundation for the tenant to make any application at all and, therefore, neither the Controller nor the District Judge, Bharatpur as appellate authority, had any jurisdiction to pass any order under the Ordinance. We may briefly summarise the provisions of the Matsya Ordinance in order to understand the setting in which section 6 appears. Section x gives the short title, extent and commencement of the Ordinance. Section 2 contains repeals. Section 3 contains the interpretation clauses. Then we come to section 4 which provides what the fair rent is and fixes a maximum limit of such rent for premises which had been in exercise before the 1st day of January 1941. Section 5 fixes the maximum rent for premises constructed after the 1st day of January 1941. Then we come to section 6 which reads as follows: - "if the rent of any premises in occupation of a tenant is enhanced beyond the limit prescribed in sections 4 & 5 above, the tenant may make written application to the Controller who shall make an enquiry and fix the rent in accordance with sections 4 & 5. The argument on behalf of the applicant is that the tenant can only make an application under this section if the rent which he was paying on the date on which the Matsya Ordinance came into force is enhanced after the coming into force of the Ordinance. On the other hand the argument for the opposite party is that wherever the rent fixed is beyond the limits prescribed in section 4 or 5 the tenant has the right to make an application and the Controller has the authority to fix the fair rent as defined in section 4 or 5. We are of opinion that the contention on behalf of the applicant is correct because of the use of the word "enhanced" in section 6. Enhancement implies adding to something which was already existing. Obviously, therefore, rent can only be said to be enhanced if it is increased beyond what was being paid formerly. Further, as section 6 does not mention the date on which the enhancement should have taken place, it can only be applied prospectively, that is, from the date from which the Ordinance came into force, viz. the 9th of August 1948. Therefore, before the Controller can take action under section 6 there should have been an increase in the previous rent after the 9th August 1948. It is admitted between the parties that there has been no enhancement of the rent on or after the 9th August 1948. Under these circumstances, the tenant had no right to make an application under section 6 and as such the Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application. It naturally, therefore, follows that the appellate authority would have no jurisdiction in such a case to decide the appeal and |fix the fair rent. If the contention which has been put forward on behalf of the opposite party were accepted, we would be deleting the word "enhanced" from section 6 only. It is only when that word is deleted from section 6, that the remaining words would give power to the Controller to fix the fair rent in all cases in which the rent existing on the 9th August 1948 was more than the maximum fixed under section 4 or 5 of the Ordinance. It is not for us to speculate as to why the word "enhanced" was put into section 6. We have to interpret the section, as it stands, and give its due meaning to every word. If, therefore, due meaning is attached to the word "enhanced" in section 6 the jurisdiction of the Controller can only arise if there is any increase in the existing rent. In this case there was no such enhancement and therefore, the Controller and the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of Hiralal. We are, therefore, of opinion that a writ of certiorari should issue quashing the order passed by the appellate authority viz. the District Judge of Bharatpur. Let the writ issue as directed above. Taking all the circumstances into consideration we are of opinion that the parties should bear their own costs of the present proceedings. . ;