TARASINGH Vs. MOHANLAL
LAWS(RAJ)-1951-2-7
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on February 28,1951

TARASINGH Appellant
VERSUS
MOHANLAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Bapna, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision against an order of the Sessions Judge, dated the 29th of December, 1950.
(2.) THE opposite party, Mr. Mohan Lal, applied to the Second Class Magistrate of Bikaner, under the provisions of the Bikaner Prevention of Eviction Order, 1942, to evict Tara Singh petitioner from a house leased out to him, on the ground that he required the same for the occupation of his family THE tenant denied that the house was required by the landlord for his own use but the Tehsildar, after enquiry, directed eviction of the tenant on the 31st of October, 1950. A revision was filed to the Court of Session at Bikaner, which was disallowed on the 29th of December, 1950. In this petition it is argued that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, came into force on the 23rd of December, 1950, and on the same day the provisions of the entire Act were extended to Bikaner, and that under the law as it stands now, the tenant cannot be ejected. Various grounds were urged in support of the above contention, and they may be summarised as under: (1) Section 26 lays down that no decree for the eviction of a tenant shall be executed except on the grounds mentioned in section 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. Section 14 contains one of such circumstances that no suit shall be filed in any Court on the ground that the landlord required the premises for his own use unless the landlord had obtained a certificate from the Controller in that behalf. (2) Section 27 provides that in pending cases no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 13 and under the circumstances specified in the Act. The circumstances of section 14, if taken into consideration, required a certificate from the Controller. It may be pointed out that according to the law in Bikaner, no suit for eviction of a tenant was contemplated, but the landlord could take proceedings in the Court of a Magistrate. Section 26 refers in terms to the execution of a decree, and without expressing any opinion whether a final order in this case would amount to a decree, it is obvious that the objection under this section can only be taken at the time of the execution. For the present, the order directing eviction is being challanged in this revision and section 26 is, therefore, inapplicable. The second contention is based on sub-section (1) of section 27, which again refers to suits for eviction of tenants. As stated above, the present proceedings did not start with a suit. The provision applicable to pending proceedings other than the suits is to be found in sub-section (2) of section 27, and it provides for all cases not otherwise provided for they are to be dealt with by the authority before whom the matter is pending and according to the law in force prior, to the commencement of the Act. It was next contenied that sec. 13 (1) laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court should pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant, whether or not the period of tenancy had terminated, so long as he was ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by the Act, unless it was satisfied that certain circumstances existed. These circumstances are mentioned in clauses (a) to (k) of that sub-sec. , and clause (h) provides that the premises are required reasonably bonafide by the landlord for the use or occupation of himself or his family. According to the language of the section it is not necessary that all the circumstances should co-exist, but that the existence of each one of the circumstances justified the passing of the order of eviction. According to the facts found in this case, the landlord's son had been married and his daughter had also been married, and accommodation was required for them in addition to what was already with the landlord. The Tehsildar inspected the site to dispose of the contention of the tenant that the accommodation already with the landlord was sufficient, and it has been observed by the Tehsildar that the existing premises with the landlord were too small to accommodate the family as it now existed. Section 13, therefore, does not stand in the way of passing any order. In the circumstances this revision has no force and is dismissed. .;


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