Nawal Kishore, J. - (1.) THIS is a plaintiff's revision against the order of the learned Munsif, Udaipur, directing him to amend the plaint by adding a relief for possession of the property in dispute and paying full court-fees thereon.
(2.) IT appears that Vardubai widow of Jeetmal alienated the property in dispute in favour of Bheronlal son of Maganlal and that accordingly, plaintiff Shobhalal as reversioner of the deceased Jeetmal instituted the suit out of which this revision arises for a declaration that the sale effected by Vardubai in favour of Bheroolal may be declared null and void qua his rights and as not binding upon him after the death of Vardubai. Vardubai died during the pendency of the suit. Accordingly, the relief for mere declaration lost its value and the plaintiff became entitled to ask for a decree for possession forthwith. On the defendants' suggestion that the court should take into consideration facts which have come into existence after the institution of the suit, that is, the death of the widow, the court directed the plaintiff to amend the plaint by adding a relief for possession of the property in dispute and paying full court-fee thereupon. The plaintiff has not complied with this order and has come to this court in revision. It is obvious that no exception can be taken to the order passed by the learned Munsif. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited certain authorities, namely, 1950 Cal. 386, (1) (Surendra Narain vs. Bhairabendra) and 1927 Lah. 128 (2) (Fateh Shah vs. Bahab Shah.) in support of the proposition that his right to maintain the suit for a declaratory decree was not affected by the fact that during the pendency of the suit, right to possession has also accrued to him. These authorities, however, are not in point inasmuch as the learned Munsif has not held that the suit for a declaratory decree was not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to cite a single authority questioning the correctness of the position that after the death of the widow, relief for possession of the property is thrown open to him and that accordingly it is fit and proper that he should amend the plaint in order that further litigation may be shortened. The general principle, no doubt, is that the rights of the parties must be determined as existing on the date of the action and not on the basis of rights which accrued to them after the institution of the suit. Where, however, it is shown that the original relief claimed has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate, the court may depart from this general principle. In fact, it has been held in 1933 Cal. 534 (3) (Priyambada Devee vs. Bholanath Basu 0 that it is the duty of the court to take notice of subsequent events, where if it is not so done, the court might deliver judgment which could not be carried into effect or grant a relief which is ineffectual. It appears that the learned Munsif stressed by this view of the law passed an order after the death of the widow directing the plaintiff to amend the plaint by asking for possession and paying full court-fees thereon. As stated above, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the order passed was wrong in law or otherwise. All he urges is that he cannot be forced to carry out this order and that if he does not amend, it would be open to the court to pass such order as it deems fit. That position is indeed clear. If the petitioner does not carry out the order passed by the court, the only question which will arise for decision will be whether after the death of the widow, a mere declaratory decree can be passed. That is a question which will be tackled in the court below and does not arise in this revision. The result is that this revision fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. .;